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“The Outward FDI Strategies of Chinese MNEs: an empirical study of the Role of 
Business Group Affiliation and State Ownership Types” 
 
 
Xinwei, Shi 
 
Abstract 
 
Chinese (C) Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have been emerging as important 
competitors on the global scene. This doctoral thesis aims to investigate the role of 
business group affiliation and state ownership types on CMNEs’ specific foreign direct 
investment (FDI) strategies. The thesis is broken down into five chapters. Chapter one 
provides a broad literature review on Emerging-market (E) MNEs and outlines 
mainstream International Business (IB) theoretical approaches to understand ing 
EMNEs with specific reference to CMNEs. The important features of CMNEs’ outward 
FDI strategies via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are highlighted. The 
second chapter conceptually and empirically explores whether business group 
affiliation influences CMNEs’ strategic asset seeking (SAS) FDI by type and property. 
It is argued that Chinese business group-affiliated firms have a greater likelihood of 
seeking patents, which have non-location-bounded (NLB) properties (i.e. can be 
exploited back in their domestic market, China), rather than trademarks, which have 
location bounded (LB) properties. Chapter three focuses on the impacts of state 
ownership types (i.e. incorporating central-government, provincial-government, 
municipal- or county-government and private ownership) on CMNEs’ technology and 
brand-seeking FDI. My findings reveal that Chinese privately owned enterprises (POEs) 
are more likely to seek both advanced technologies and foreign brands. In comparison, 
CMNEs owned by higher- levels of government have a lower likelihood of seeking both 
technologies and brands, but they tend to acquire target firms that involved in natural 
resources. In Chapter four it is demonstrated firstly, that Chinese POEs are less likely 
to undertake international product diversification. Those affiliated to a business group, 
however, have a greater probability of doing so; and secondly that CMNEs owned by 
higher government affiliation levels tend to seek more unrelated internationa l 
acquisitions. From Chapters two to four, this thesis progressively contributes to 
providing a specific picture of how home country effects in China determine MNEs’ 
specific FDI strategies using firm-level data. Chapter five summarises the key findings 
and contributions of the thesis. 
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Executive Summary 
The thesis has five chapters. Chapter one provides a broad literature review on 
Emerging-market Multinational enterprises (EMNEs) and outlines mainstream 
International Business (IB) theoretical approaches to understanding EMNEs with 
specific reference to Chinese (C) MNEs. The important features of CMNEs’ outward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) strategies are highlighted, including influence of home 
country effects on strategic asset seeking (SAS) orientation and international product 
diversification strategy. The home country effects refer to business group affiliation and 
state ownership types.  
 
The second chapter conceptually and empirically explores whether business group 
affiliation, one important identifying characteristic of CMNEs, influences CMNEs’ 
SAS FDI. I mainly use data from two different sources, including the Thomson One 
Banker (TOB) and the Orbis Database. Orbis provides data on the target firms’ patents 
and trademark volume, which I use as proxies for the strategic assets sought by CMNEs. 
Unlike previous research, which uses mostly location choice modelling using nationa l 
level proxies (i.e. number of patents granted nationally), I use firm-level data (i.e. what 
do CMNEs actually acquire). Further, I disaggregate strategic assets by type (i.e. patents 
and trademarks), which provides for further insights into EMNE theory.  
 
Using probit and negative binomial models, I find that Chinese business group affilia ted 
firms have a greater likelihood of seeking patents, which have non-location-bounded 
(NLB) properties (i.e. can be exploited back in their domestic market, China), rather 
than trademarks, which have location bounded (LB) properties (and are therefore less 
easy to exploit domestically). There are no empirical quantitative studies that clearly 
distinguish between the different types of strategic assets that are targeted by EMNEs. 
My findings are partially supported by the rationality of ‘New Internalization Theory’ 
(developed by Verbeke and Rugman (1992)), which stresses the properties of location-
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boundedness in strategic assets.  
 
Additionally, business group affiliation plays a significant role in CMNEs’ SAS FDI 
strategy. What emerges from these findings is the importance of the home country 
effects as a diver of outward FDI strategies, supporting ideas put forward in the 
‘springboard’ perspective and more importantly those stressing the asymmetries found 
between DMNEs and EMNEs with regards to access to emerging markets as in the 
bundling model of Hennart (2012) and the asymmetric liabilities of foreignness 
argument of Petersen and Seiferts (2015).   
 
In Chapter three I go on to focus on the impact of state ownership types (i.e. 
incorporating central-level, provincial- level, city-level and municipal-leve l 
government) on CMNEs’ specific technology-seeking and brand-seeking FDI via cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As). In addition, I add one more comparative 
study of whether CMNEs owned by higher-level governments tend to acquire target 
firms that have natural resources as opposed to strategic assets (i.e. technologies and 
brands). I utilize a similar data set and methodologies, testing whether different state 
ownership types influence CMNEs’ technology-, brand-, or natural resources-seeking 
FDI strategy. My findings reveal that Chinese privately owned enterprises (POEs) are 
more likely to seek both advanced technologies and foreign brands. In comparison, 
CMNEs owned by higher- level governments have lower likelihood of seeking both 
technologies and brands, but they tend to acquire target firms that are involved in 
natural resources. Hence, higher-level government owned firms are more likely to seek 
natural resource rather than strategic assets such as advanced technologies and brands.  
 
A lot of current studies show that state ownership positively facilitates CMNEs’ 
outward FDI. However, my findings suggest that state ownership may be not a 
significant factor influencing CMNEs’ SAS FDI strategy, one possible reason being 
that the Chinese central government started to promote the national strategy of 
indigenous innovation in 2006, and the Gross domestic spending on R&D (i.e. % of 
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GDP) increased from 1.369% in 2006 to 2.067% in 2015 (OECD, 2017). Therefore, 
my findings extend the institution-based view identifying that CMNEs owned by 
higher-level governments largely tend to seek for natural resource endowments other 
than technology-based and brand-based assets via CBM&As.  
 
In the fourth chapter, I explore a slightly different though related question to EMNE 
international business strategy. Anecdotally, CMNEs are seen to undertake unrelated 
international diversification. This is to say, they often acquire foreign businesses in 
unrelated industries as in Fosun Group’s recent acquisition of Club Med as Fosun has 
no background in the tourist/leisure/travel industry in China. In particular, the critical 
question is: does business group affiliation and/or state ownership types influence 
CMNEs’ international product diversification strategies via CBM&As?  
 
Given diversified business groups are quite common in the Chinese domestic market, 
it is possible the tendency towards domestic diversification may also influence their 
international M&A strategies. I measure the degree of international product 
diversification through matching both target firms and Chinese acquirers’ four-digit SIC 
codes. By using ordered probit models, I find that private firms are less likely to 
undertake unrelated international acquisitions. Those affiliated to a business group, 
however, have a greater probability of doing so; secondly CMNEs owned by higher-
level governments undertake more international product diversification (i.e. a higher 
level of unrelated acquisitions); and thirdly CMNEs’ degree of domestic diversifica t ion 
determines their degree of international product diversification in a positive and 
significant way. These findings contribute to the understanding of the effects of 
business group affiliation and state ownership types on CMNEs’ specific internationa l 
product diversification strategies, a topic hitherto not researched in the IB literature on 
EMNEs (though arguably one of their most important characteristics). This chapter, 
building on the previous two, is directly relevant to the home country effects on CMNEs’ 
outward FDI strategies.  
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From chapter two to chapter four, this thesis may progressively contribute to providing 
us with a specific picture of how the home country effects determine CMNEs’ specific 
FDI strategies. 
 
Chapter five summarises the key findings and contributions of my research, 
highlighting the importance of understanding the business group affiliation and state 
ownership types which determine CMNEs’ specific outward FDI strategies. 
Specifically, business group affiliation plays a significant role in CMNEs’ SAS FDI 
activities to catch up with DMNEs and enhance their competitive positions in both 
domestic and international markets; different levels of Chinese governments are leading 
CMNEs to rapidly expand abroad in order to reach governments’ strategic objectives.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Research on foreign direct investment (FDI) provides us with a barometer for observing 
multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) internationalization activities. For instance, Zekos 
(2005) argues that MNEs’ FDI reveals an increasing share of the global economic 
activity. Traditional FDI outflows represent multinational enterprises 1 ’ (MNEs’) 
investment from their home countries to overseas. In 2008, the OECD proposed a 
Benchmark definition of FDI that may account for the main attributes of MNEs: 
 
“Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in 
one economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting 
interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an 
economy other than that of the direct investor …The “lasting interest” is evidenced 
when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the direct 
investment enterprise.” (OECD, 2008) 
 
Over the past two decades, the world economy has witnessed a new and unprecedented 
wave of outward (O) FDI from emerging economies. According to UNCTAD (2017), 
FDI outflows from developing economies increased to $383.43 billion in 2016 from 
$13.11 billion in 1990. This represents a 30-fold increase, and their share rose from 
5.38% to 26.40%. Emerging-country (E) MNEs are playing an increasing role in the 
world economy. In particular, the FDI outflows from China in 2016 occupied 47.75% 
of developing economy FDI outflows and 17.54% of developed economy FDI outflows 
(compared with 5.60% and 0.55% respectively in 1990), reaching $183.10 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2017). 105 Chinese (C) MNEs were ranked on the Fortune Global 500 list 
in 2017, which are all originally established on the Chinese mainland (Fortune, 2017). 
CMNEs can be regarded as one largest representative group of EMNEs.  
                                                                 
1 MNE in this research follows Rugman and Verbeke’s (2001:238) definition as ‘a firm with value-
added activities in at least two countries.’ 
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Ramamurti (2012:41) has challenged us to ask the question: “What is really different 
about emerging market multinationals?” EMNEs are defined as “firms from emerging 
markets that have value-added activities outside their country of origin” Cuervo-
Cazurra, Newbury, and Park (2016:2). Relevant EMNE-specific FDI theories (e.g. 
Mathews’ (2006) LLL framework and Luo and Tung’s (2007) Springboard Perspective) 
suggest EMNEs’ need to seek strategic resources so as to maintain or even establish 
their international competitive positions. Previous scholars have identified four firm-
level determinants of MNEs’ FDI, including market seeking FDI, resource seeking FDI, 
efficiency seeking FDI, and strategic asset seeking (SAS) FDI (Dunning, 1993, 2000). 
According to many, EMNEs actively follow SAS FDI strategies (Deng, 2009; Luo and 
Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui and Yip, 2008), differing from developed-market (D) 
MNEs that tend to exploit their advantages including ownership advantage, 
internalization advantage and location advantages based on the popular ‘eclectic 
framework’ by Dunning (1977). Despite these differences, Gaffney, Kedia, and Clampit 
(2013) assert that the individual EMNE has its own different incentives to invest abroad, 
leading to heterogeneity in FDI or internationalization strategies. Specifically, Deng 
(2004:10) states that CMNEs’ FDI are largely driven by five main motivations, namely, 
“resources, technology, markets, diversification, and strategic assets.” In short, 
CMNEs may internationalize to pursue all or any one of them at any one time.  
 
Given the liabilities of foreignness, the possession of ownership advantages for firms 
is a required initial condition (Zaheer, 1995). However, the firm-specific advantages 
(FSAs) of EMNEs are unlikely to be the same as those of DMNEs, the former “possess 
some unique and sustainable resources, capabilities or favoured access to markets 
which, if they chose to engage in asset augmenting foreign direct investment, they might 
expect to protect or augment” (Dunning, 2006:139). Ramamurti (2012) argues that due 
to the distinctive home market conditions in emerging markets, EMNEs may have 
differing ownership advantages. There are FSAs and country-specific advantages 
(CSAs) that EMNEs can exploit when undertaking OFDI (Ramamurti, 2009; Rugman, 
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2010). Also, Hennart (2012) suggests that CSAs can facilitate EMNEs’ foreign 
acquisition deals for their asset augmentation purposes. In terms of a firm’s 
heterogeneity, however, limited research has addressed the extent to which home 
country effects determine each emerging-country firm’s resources or capacities to 
achieve the special FSAs and CSAs that allow them to pursue specific FDI strategies. 
Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, and Forsans (2016:987) note that “the extant literature 
does not provide sufficient understanding of how the EMNE internationalises to 
augment its assets if it does not have sufficient pre-existing competitive advantages.”  
 
China’s OFDI is widely discussed, due to its great increase (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; 
Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008; Sutherland and Anderson, 2015; Yang and Deng, 2017). 
As Buckley et al. (2007:50) state, “China is a particularly good test case for the general 
theory of FDI as it presents many special conditions that are rarely encountered in a 
single country.” Therefore, this study mainly focuses on CMNEs as the unit of analys is. 
The main purpose of this first chapter is to provide a specific literature review on 
CMNEs and outline mainstream IB theoretical approaches to understanding EMNEs 
with specific reference to CMNEs.  
 
In the spirit of better understanding the rise of CMNEs, identifying which specific home 
country effects that contribute to CMNEs’ development is of vital importance. Thus, to 
what extent do traditional firm theories help to meet this requisite?  
 
In the context of emerging economies, business groups are believed to possess relative 
competencies and resources to address institutional voids compared with stand-alone 
firms in the context of emerging economies (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Guillen, 2000; 
Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Yiu (2011) argues that Chinese business groups even 
possess multinational advantages to maintain competitive positions in overseas markets.  
 
Existing research by Buckley et al. (2007), Huang and Chi (2014), Wang, Hong, and 
Kafouros, and Wright (2012) observe that Chinese privately owned enterprises (POEs) 
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and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) largely receive differing treatment such as access 
to financial support in the domestic institutional environment. Furthermore, Wang et al. 
(2012) distinguish two types of government involvement including government 
affiliation level and state ownership. The former construct reflects the fact that 
governments want to engage in EMNEs’ internationalization by establishing 
relationships with companies (Wank, 1995). In the Chinese context, governme nt 
affiliation levels refer to central-government level, provincial-government level, and 
municipal- or county-government level. The second construct means the government is 
one of the shareholders of the firm (Wang et al. 2012). Notably, the two concepts are 
sometimes not correlated. A private firm may be affiliated with a higher government 
level, while the state-owned firm may be affiliated with a lower government level. To 
deal with this issue, this study will employ the term ‘state ownership types’ by dividing 
Chinese firms into four levels according to the ultimate owner or the largest shareholder, 
which are central-government owned, provincial-government owned, municipal- and 
county-government owned, and private ownership. 
 
As a consequence, I focus on these two main factors of home country effects, includ ing 
business group affiliation and state ownership types. Building on extant literature, I 
found that no empirical research has addressed whether these two factors affect CMNEs’ 
specific SAS FDI strategies by types and properties and international product 
diversification strategy. Accordingly, first of all, I want to highlight the importance of 
the business group affiliation and study its influence on CMNEs’ specific SAS FDI by 
types. Given the context of government involvement in China, the second study is 
mainly designed to explore state ownership types on CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies, 
including technology, brand and natural resource seeking strategies. In the third study, 
I intend to study CMNEs’ international product diversification strategy, exploring the 
influences of both business group affiliation and state ownership types. In the end, this 
thesis can contribute to providing a general picture of how home country effects in 
China determine MNEs’ specific FDI strategies.  
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To concentrate on home country effects, therefore, I follow prior studies (e.g. Gaur, 
Kumar, and Singh, 2014; Wang et al. 2012) by integrating the resource-based view 
(RBV) and institution-based view (IBV), and explore the extent to which business 
group affiliation and state ownership types affect CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section one, I consider the unique 
features of the Chinese economy and in turn the features of the CMNEs that motivate 
me to undertake this research. Section two sets out the research questions and relevant 
objectives made prior to a general literature review. Section three, drawing from extant 
International Business (IB) theories, provides a specific literature view on CMNEs’ FDI 
strategies, and identifies theoretical underpinnings to address the research questions 
above. Section four discusses past methodologies on my research topics. In the last 
section, I lay out the research agenda to further highlight relevant research topics in this 
thesis.  
 
1.1 Research motivation  
In October 2000, the Chinese central government formally announced the ‘Go Global’ 
national strategy and integrated it as a critical part of China’s long-term and innovation-
leaded national development plan (Deng, 2007). The central government initiated a 
series of relevant regulations for improving Chinese firms’ international competit ive 
positions. Table 1.2.1 clearly displays the increasing number of Chinese mainland -
based MNEs which are ranked on the Fortune Global 500 list (from 2 in 1996 to 105 in 
2017).  
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Table 1.2.1 The number of Chinese firms on the Fortune Global 500 list 1 
Year Total Chinese 
firms 
Total, 
Mainland of 
China 
State-owned 
firms, Mainland 
of China 
Privately-owned, 
Mainland of China 
1996 2 2 2 0 
1997 3 3 3 0 
1998 6 3 3 0 
1999 8 5 5 0 
2000 11 9 9 0 
2001 12 11 11 0 
2002 13 11 11 0 
2003 12 11 11 0 
2004 16 14 14 0 
2005 18 15 15 0 
2006 23 19 19 0 
2007 30 22 22 0 
2008 35 26 26 0 
2009 43 35 34 1 
2010 46 43 40 3 
2011 69 59 56 3 
2012 79 71 67 4 
2013 95 87 81 6 
2014 100 93 87 6 
2015 106 95 90 5 
2016 110 100 88 12 
2017 115 105 86 19 
Source: Fortune (2017) 
 
China also overtook Japan again and became the second largest economy in terms of 
FDI outflows in 2015 (seen in Figure 1.2.2).  
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Figure 1.2.2 the comparison in FDI outflows between developed countries and China (millions of 
dollars) (UNCTAD, 2017) 1 
 
As for ‘BRICS’ countries (referred to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) , 
China is playing a leading role in emerging economies’ FDI outflows, reaching 47.75% 
(Figure 1.2.3).  
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Figure 1.2.3 The comparison in FDI outflows between BRICs (millions of dollars) (UNCTAD, 2017) 
2 
 
Zhu (2015) claims that China was pursuing export-oriented growth and is transitioning 
to a new development model based on consumption and outward investment. In 
September 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed to build the “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
when he visited Kazakhstan; and in October 2013 he proposed the initiative of the “21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road” in Indonesia (Tian, 2015). The One Belt One Road 
Initiative (OBOR) is a national developmental strategy comprising the Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. Moreover, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping announced the establishment of a new China-led multilateral development 
bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in October, 2013 (Weiss, 2017). 
The AIIB will operate to serve the OBOR strategy (Zhu, 2015). Zheng2 (2017) asserts 
that China’s OBOR plan represents the next phase of globalization. As discussed above, 
one country’s OFDI activities can be largely illustrated by its’ MNEs’ 
internationalization activities. Accordingly, if we correctly understand which specific 
                                                                 
2 Zheng Bijian is the former permanent Vice-President of the Central Party School (Zheng, 2017).  
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factors determine CMNEs’ FDI strategies, in the future we can better assess the 
performance of China’s national initiatives (e.g. OBOR plan) and understand the 
growing global role in terms of both economics and politics.  
 
It is these issues, as well as gaps in existing research on CMNEs’ OFDI, which have 
largely driven me to develop this research.  
 
First of all, I observe that the role of Chinese business groups in China’s economic  
development process. Business groups, are defined as a ‘collection of firms bound 
together in some formal and informal ways’ (Granovetter, 1995:95). This organizationa l 
form, however, is pervasive in many emerging economies (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; 
Hikino and Amsden, 1994; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a). China’s largest business groups 
are referred to as the ‘national team’ (Nolan, 2001; Sutherland, 2009). This includes a 
group of around 100 or so super large enterprise groups. At lower levels, such as at the 
provincial level, teams of groups also exist, as lower level policy-makers emulate the 
lead of the centre. Therefore, state policy has encouraged the formation of business 
groups in China.  
 
These groups initially emerged in the era of China’s market-oriented reform; in the mid-
1980s, the Chinese government believed that business groups could solve a number of 
difficulties the Chinese economy was facing. For example, they might facilitate the 
introduction of new technology and then enhance international competitiveness (He, 
Mao, Rui and Zha, 2013). Chinese business groups also contribute a lot to China’s 
OFDI (Sutherland, 2009; Yiu, 2011). Thus, Chinese business groups have increasingly 
captured researchers’ attention in IB and management literature (Keister, 2000; Lu and 
Ma, 2008; Sutherland, 2009; Yiu, Bruton and Lu, 2005; Yiu, 2011). Notwithstand ing, 
we know little about whether business group affiliation contributes to CMNEs’ specific 
FDI strategies.  
 
Secondly, from another perspective, the Fortune Global 500 (Figure 1.2.1) also shows 
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that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) occupy a dominant share in the total 
Chinese mainland-based MNEs and they are playing a significant and important role in 
economic development. Rugman and Li (2007) contended that CMNEs’ current 
international achievement is mainly attributed to country-specific resources that they 
have privileged access including natural resources, government support, and lower cost 
investment. In other words, the increasing emergence of Chinese SOEs on the Fortune 
Global 500 largely benefits from their privileged access to domestic critical resources.  
 
According to UNCTAD (2017), a new database on state-owned MNEs shows their 
increasing influential role in the global economy. Specifically, 41 of the top 100 EMNEs 
are state-owned, and China is the largest home economy of state-owned MNEs. In terms 
of firms on the Fortune Global 500 list, there are 86 Chinese SOEs and 105 CMNEs in 
total (Fortune, 2017). Given more government interventions, the predictability of 
relevant policies for investors would be further declined. The recent IB literature has 
highlighted the critical role that governments are playing on CMNEs’ foreign expansion 
via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) (Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010; Rui 
and Yip, 2008). However, there are few studies that investigate the effects of different 
state ownership types on specific corporate strategies (i.e. strategic asset seeking, 
international diversification etc.) by CMNEs. 
 
The Chinese central government had strictly inhibited OFDI so as to conserve foreign 
exchange untill the mid-1990s (Peng, 2012), and it began to largely support OFDI in 
the late 1990s (Luo, Xue and Han, 2010). In the early 2000s, a great range of 
government policy tools were used to facilitate OFDI, including ‘low-interest financing, 
favorable exchange rates, reduced taxation, and subsidized insurance…’ (Peng, 
2012:98). In terms of institutional transitions3, Lin (2016: 689) comments “no country 
in the human history has ever grown so fast for so long as China did in the past three 
decades”. Despite a relatively inefficient home market mechanism, overall Chinese 
                                                                 
3 Institutional transitions is defined as ‘fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the 
formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players’ (Peng, 2003:275). 
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SOEs have capacities to enhance their competitiveness in the international market, and 
their foreign expansion strategy is less influenced by domestic institutiona l 
development (Wu and Chen, 2014). As a result, SOEs should be regarded as another 
main research sample for studying CMNEs’ FDI strategies.  
 
To sum up, the study of EMNEs has generated significant academic interest and 
generated the ‘Goldilocks debate’ regarding the need to analyze their distinctiveness in 
relation to theory (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). The debate has three perspectives: (i) 
EMNEs behave differently and there is a need to have new theories and models to 
analyse their behaviour; (ii) EMNEs are not a new species and existing theories can 
adequately explain their behavior; and (iii) the analysis of EMNEs does not require new 
theories but some modification or extension of existing theories and models (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012). I believe the study of CMNEs can contribute to addressing the 
‘Goldilocks debate’, which is another main motivational factor for the development of 
this research.  
 
1.2 Research questions  
Dunning (2000:164-165) has identified four general determinants of firms’ OFDI, 
including ‘market seeking, or demand oriented FDI’; ‘resource seeking, or supply 
oriented FDI’, ‘rationalized or efficiency seeking FDI’; and ‘strategic asset seeking 
FDI’ (Dunning, 2000:164-165).  
 
A substantial body of literature has suggested that EMNEs as ‘late-comers’ are actively 
involved in SAS FDI in developed markets to augment deficiencies in their own FSAs 
(Boisot and Meyer, 2008; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Cui, Meyer, and Hu, 2014; Li, 
Li and Shapiro, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007). This asset-augmentation strategy argues 
that EMNEs are pushed to achieve the competitive advantages they lack to compete 
with foreign entrants in their home country (Chari, 2013) and local firms in host 
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countries (Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, and Forsans, 2016). Specifically, CMNEs 
undertake aggressive CBM&As for acquiring technologies, brands and other assets in 
the developed countries (Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui and 
Yip, 2008). Nevertheless, few investigations discuss whether a firm’s heterogeneity in 
access to resources, determines CMNE SAS in what types (technologies or brands) via 
rapid foreign M&As.  
 
Moreover, another dominant reason for firms’ CBM&As is to promote their 
diversification strategy (Markiders and Ittner, 1994; Seth, 1990). Deng (2004) adds the 
diversification-oriented FDI strategy for CMNEs. The asset-seeking FDI is viewed as 
a ‘spring-board’ internationalization strategy (Luo and Tung, 2007). Thus, firms’ 
expansion abroad for diversification purposes may be seen as a growth strategy or still 
SAS strategy in related or unrelated industries.  
 
Ansoff (1957:113) highlights that “the term ‘diversification’ is usually associated with 
a change in the characteristics of the company’s product line and/or market, in contrast 
to market penetration, market development, and product development, which represent 
other types of change in product-market structure.” Herein, in terms of product 
development, two main types of diversification may be included: related diversifica t ion 
and unrelated diversification. Moreover, Ansoff (1965) lists four major types of firm 
growth strategies:  
Firstly, market penetration - stresses that firms seek more sales by using established 
products in their current (international) markets. Secondly, market development- 
firms seek more sales by taking established products into new (internationa l) 
markets. Thirdly, product development-firms develop new products in their current 
(international) markets for increasing sales. Fourthly, diversification growth - 
Firms develop new products and take these into new (international) markets.  
 
Arguably the fastest way to pursue international diversification growth directly, is to 
merge or acquire a relatively less-related existing foreign firm. In this research, I term 
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this growth strategy as ‘International product diversification’.  
 
Chinese firms’ managers are believed to desire rapid diversification strategy (Li and 
Wong, 2003). As such, do CMNEs tend to seek an international product diversifica t ion 
strategy by acquiring related or unrelated foreign businesses? Likewise, no research 
discusses which home country effects in particular influence CMNEs’ internationa l 
product diversification via rapid foreign M&As and in what degree of relatedness.  
 
As discussed previously, business groups contribute a lot to Chinese economic 
development. Business groups have been defined as groups of legally independent 
firms spanning across multiple industries (i.e. are diversified) and are connected with 
each other through persistent formal (such as equity) and informal such as (family) ties 
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). In particular, business groups occupy a dominant position 
in China and significantly contribute to China’s OFDI (Sutherland, 2009), as well as 
many other developing countries, because their unique organizational mechanisms and 
capacities are appropriately adapted to the institutional voids found in emerging 
countries (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Hikino and Amsden, 1994; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000).  
 
In South Korea, business groups are called Korean chaebol and a substantial number 
of them belong to pyramids consisting of two or three firms (Almeida, Park, 
Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon, 2011). Moreover, a large number of Korean chaebol 
firms that are owned by the family, have no ownership relationship with any other 
chaebol firms (Almeida et al. 2011). By comparison, the initial formation of business 
groups in China is to restructure China’s large state-owned enterprises into business 
groups which cover different industries and geographic regions, and encourage them to 
become national champions so as to strengthen global market positions (Nolan, 2001). 
Furthermore, the group company generally represents the main characteristics of 
Chinese business groups, and all affiliated firms can share with the group company in 
elements of financial equity, human resources and business partners (Carney, Shapiro, 
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and Tang, 2009). In addition, among member firms in Chinese business groups, there 
are strong social connections including family and school ties (Luo and Chung, 2005). 
Member firms may also have ownership links with any other Chinese business groups. 
As such, Chinese business groups may have access to more domestic resources than 
Korean chaebol firms.  
 
According to in-depth interview research, Huang and Chi (2014) testify that the home 
country effects, mainly referred to the institutional environment and firms’ availability 
of different types of resources, significantly determine Chinese POEs’ market- and SAS 
FDI strategies. As for Chinese SOEs, one recent study has supported that home country 
effects (mainly in the forms of state ownership) determine their OFDI (e.g. Huang, Xie, 
Li, and Reddy, 2017; Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, by observing 27 CBM&As by Chinese firms, Boateng, Qian and Tianle 
(2008) find that Chinese firms’ internationalization activities are mainly driven by rapid 
new market expansion, strategic asset acquisitions and international diversification.  
 
Nevertheless, no empirical research has been developed to study whether specific home 
country effects determine CMNEs’ SAS FDI and international product diversifica t ion 
strategy. Above all, do business group affiliation and state ownership types facilita te 
CMNEs’ SAS and international diversification strategy (i.e. degree of relatedness) via 
international M&As? These are among the more important topics explored in this 
research.  
 
 
1.3 Literature review 
Do existing IB theories sufficiently explain EMNEs’ (CMNEs in particular) specific 
FDI strategies? How do the business group affiliation and state ownership types affect 
firms’ OFDI strategies? This section first discusses traditional theories in explaining 
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EMNE internationalization. Secondly, novel alternative models and perspectives are 
further discussed in explaining EMNE internationalization. Thirdly, by integrating the 
resource-based view (RBV) and the institution-based view (IBV), I develop a specific 
literature review, identifying unique home country effects on CMNEs’ FDI strategies. 
The section will conclude with a table summarising extant empirical studies on CMNEs’ 
FDI strategies.  
 
1.3.1 Traditional theories  
IB scholars have developed a number of theories to explain MNE internationalizat ion. 
However, the majority of these theoretical contributions were based upon initia l 
research exploring DMNE internationalization (Buckley et al. 2007; Ramamurti, 2012).  
 
First of all, the internationalization process model also known as the “Uppsala model” 
suggests that firms follow an incremental learning process if they want to occupy 
foreign markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). This learning process stresses that 
firms’ internationalization depends on the amount of knowledge they have acquired 
(Andersen, 1993). As discussed above, EMNEs tend to undertake rapid CBM&As for 
reaching SAS purpose (e.g. Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008). Given rapid OFDI 
activities, some argue that this incremental Uppsala model may be inappropriate for 
exploring CMNEs’ home country effects and explaining their FDI strategies. However, 
it is of interest to note that very few scholars have applied the Uppsala model to the 
case of EMNEs.  
 
A firm should possess a firm-specific advantage to mitigate this liability of foreignness 
(Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). Due to the importance of networks in firms’ 
internationalization, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) further revised the 1977 Uppsala 
model. In particular, the new version has been updated to include the role of network 
from liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership, referring to firms’ problems in 
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international business as being less on country-specific but on network-specific.  
 
Secondly, eclectic paradigm, also known as the OLI paradigm, explain firms’ FDI 
(Dunning, 1977, 1980). Drawing from Dunning (1980), MNEs’ international activit ies 
are determined by three main factors including ownership (O) advantages, location (L) 
advantages and internalization (I) advantages. Then MNEs exploit these advantages by 
setting up foreign subsidiaries (Cantwell and Narula, 2001; Dunning, 1988, 2000, 2001).  
 
Ayden (2015) argues that the OLI model integrates a series of IB theories such as 
transaction cost economics, internalization theory, and resource-based view/theory to 
explaining firms’ FDI. According to the transaction cost economics view (Hennart, 
1987; Williamson, 1979), the internalization theory accounts for firms’ FDI being 
viewed as an approach to reducing transaction costs by coordinating activit ies 
internationally (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1980). Internalization theory 
explains that MNEs aim to control their FSAs (Rugman, 2010). However, many 
scholars argue that EMNEs may not have the same firm-specific ownership advantages 
that the OLI suggests (Kedia, Gaffney, and Clampit, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007; 
Mathews, 2006).  
 
Dunning’s (1977) OLI model is a simple theoretical framework for helping us organise 
thoughts about the benefits of FDI. For instance, the ownership condition stresses that 
the firm must own some advantageous assets such as advanced technologies, known 
brands. The greater the competitive advantages of the investing firms, the more they 
are likely to increase their foreign production (Dunning, 2000) for exploiting their 
advantages. Also, the OLI model has been seen as the predominant one for analyzing 
firms’ CBM&As (Dunning, 1993; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanathc and Pisanod, 2004). 
Notwithstanding, the OLI model is relatively inappropriate for explaining EMNEs’ 
foreign strategies, as they are comparatively lacking of competitive ownership 
advantages (Buckley et al. 2007; Mathews, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007).  
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1.3.2 Alternative perspectives and models 
Luo and Tung (2007:485-487) develop a springboard perspective to explain the 
determinants of EMNEs’ FDI are to ‘compensate for their competitive disadvantages’, 
‘overcome their latecomer disadvantage’, ‘counter-attack global rivals’, ‘bypass 
stringent trade barriers’, ‘alleviate domestic institutional constraints’, ‘secure 
preferential treatment offered by emerging market governments’, and ‘exploit their 
competitive advantages in other emerging or developing markets’. To some extent, 
given these seven determinants of FDI, the spring-board perspective theoretica lly 
supports my research on analyzing EMNEs’ FDI and specific strategies.  
 
Another somewhat similar perspective, primarily developed on multinationals from the 
Asia-Pacific region, is the linkage, leverage, and learning (LLL) model proposed by 
Mathews (2006). The LLL model suggests that latecomer and newcomer MNEs need 
to follow three processes before they derive competitive advantages. Firstly, they need 
step into a foreign market through joint ventures or other forms of collaborat ive 
partnership achieving linkage advantages. Secondly, based on established links with 
local partners or incumbents, latecomer MNEs can leverage resources accordingly.  
Thirdly, owing to repetitive application of linkage and leverage processes, latecomer 
MNEs can perform better via constant learning activities (Mathews, 2006). One 
criticism may be that not all DMNEs are willing to provide EMNEs with equal 
opportunity for achieving linkages.  
 
In addition, Rugman (2010) argues that EMNEs’ internationalization benefit from their 
exploitation of home-country competitive advantages including natural resources and 
low-cost labor force. These explanations are not satisfactory because home country 
location advantages cannot be equal to long-term competitive advantage and they are 
relatively available to all firms (Ramamurti, 2012). Buckley et al. (2007) suggest that 
EMNEs have developed their own specific ownership advantages including flexibility, 
better familiarity of operating in emerging market contexts, and other capacities for 
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accessing the resources they require. In particular, Chinese SOEs can enjoy privileged 
access to cheap capital, which may subsidize their OFDI.  
 
Furthermore, Hennart (2012) contends that most CSAs or location-determined 
advantages of countries are not liberally accessible to foreign firms. Alternative ly, 
“Many, such as land, natural resources, labor, and distribution assets, are sold in 
imperfect markets, giving their local owners significant market power.” (Hennart, 
2012:169) Some EMNEs that possess privileged access to CSAs have more competit ive 
advantages that facilitate their OFDI. Thus, Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick and Forsans 
(2016) suggest that the bundling of assets argument is critically important for 
explaining why some EMNEs have FSAs through transforming CSAs. In the context 
of emerging economies, business group-affiliated firms may derive more CSAs as 
opposed to independent firms. Likewise, SOEs may enjoy privileged access to CSAs 
relative to POEs. Such arguments are comparatively consistent with Ramamurti’s (2012) 
viewpoints that EMNEs may have differing ownership advantages. As a result, the 
bundling model, developed by Hennart (2009), could be another theoretica l 
underpinning to account for CMNEs’ FDI strategies. Therefore, whether business group 
affiliation and state ownership types also determine CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies is 
worthy of further investigation.  
 
Recently, through reviewing 166 articles from 11 leading IB and management journals, 
Luo and Zhang (2016:336) summarised the top five most used theories on studying 
EMNEs, including the ‘resource-based view (RBV), institutional theory or the 
institution-based view (IBV), OLI model or eclectic paradigm, springboard perspective, 
and organizational learning theory’. As discussed above, does the integration of RBV 
and the IBV underpin the theoretical explanations of these two idiosyncratic attributes  
including business group affiliation and state ownership types?  
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1.3.3. Resource-based view 
The RBV suggests “what a firm wants is to create a situation where its own resource 
position directly or indirectly makes it more difficult for others to catch up” (Wernerfelt, 
1984:173). The core assumption of this perspective is that a firm’s resources includ ing 
tangible and intangible assets can create high returns (Wernerfelt, 1984). Barney (1991) 
further argues that resource heterogeneity and immobility are critical assumptions that 
enable us to understand sources of sustained competitive advantage. A firm’s resource 
base must have four attributes so that it can maintain the potential of sustained 
competitive advantages: “(a) it must be valuable... (b) it must be rare…(c) it must be 
imperfectly imitable, and (d) there cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for this 
resource that are valuable but neither rare or imperfectly imitable.” (Barney, 1991:105-
106) The essence of RBV lies in that we may need to treat enterprises as independent 
analysis units when discussing the resources available to them. As such, it further 
reflects the importance of applying RBV in analyzing firms’ international strategy (Hitt, 
Tihanyi, Miller and Connelly, 2006). 
 
The emergence of business group is to respond to imperfect markets (Leff, 1978). 
Business groups are seen as a pool of resources which can facilitate member firms’ 
internationalization (Carney, 2008a; Yiu, Bruton and Lu, 2005). For instance, member 
firms can enjoy a ‘reputation premium’ that business groups have, especially when there 
is higher cost involved in finding information (Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  
 
Peng (2001) highlights that the RBV has largely encouraged scholars to explore the 
resources that drive firms to pursue various diversification activities. Many scholars 
have asserted that resources are significant antecedents of firms that choose to diversify 
internationally (Chang, 1995; Kotabe, Srinivasan, and Aulakh, 2002). This reputation 
premium of a business group may further assist member firms to expand a new market 
and easily achieve the economies of scale (Carney, 2008a).  
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As for location choices, EMNEs have found that they possess competitive advantages 
when operating in other emerging economies compared to their counterparts in 
developed countries, as EMNEs have accumulated experiences in similar 
underdeveloped institutional environment (Cuervo- Cazurra and Genc, 2008).  
 
Du and Boateng (2015:431) state that “the resource-based view literature suggests that 
one important reason for CBM&A [cross-border mergers and acquisitions] is to gain 
access to strategic assets, such as natural resources, product differentiation, patent-
protected technologies, and superior managerial and marketing skills.” The RBV may 
assist us extending the view of explaining variations in assets affect EMNEs’ OFDI 
(Wang et al. 2012). To address the liability of foreignness, EMNEs may choose to 
possess different types of resources such as cheap labor, natural resources or a focus on 
domestic markets, since they are largely lacking in traditional resources (i.e. 
technologies, brands etc.) (Gaur, Kumar, and Singh, 2014). Moreover, firms in 
emerging economies owned by different government levels are likely constrained in 
making decisions to internationalize (Wang et al. 2012). Chinese POEs also face a 
different institutional environment for their OFDI (Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010).  
 
In terms of industry, most Chinese POEs have to operate in competitive industr ies 
including textiles, and electronics, while most SOEs are involved in oil and gas, and 
telecommunications services (Huang and Chi, 2014). Such differences of treatment not 
only influence Chinese POEs’ motives of internationalization, but also accumula te 
resources and abilities. In contrast, the Chinese government may offer SOEs with tax 
reductions and financial support supporting their CBM&As (Luo et al. 2010; Peng, et 
al. 2008). Additionally, there is a predetermined target of state-directed Chinese OFDI 
for achieving advanced technology, and other intangible strategic assets such as brands, 
marketing networks and foreign management capacities (Taylor, 2002; Deng, 2003; 
Warner, Hong, and Xu, 2004). Thus, Deng (2013) suggests that the RBV can be seen 
as the primary theory in analyzing CMNEs’ catch-up strategies. 
 
 38 
 
Oliver (1997:697) argues that “the resource-based view has not looked beyond the 
properties of resources and resource markets to explain enduring firm heterogeneity.” 
The RBV somewhat enables us to identify CMNEs’ unique advantages due to 
idiosyncratic resources that mainly come from their specific organization forms such 
as business groups and SOEs. 
 
Wang, et al. (2012:657) further argue that “While the RBV suggests that the 
internationalization decision is economically justified, and depends on idiosyncratic 
resources, institutional theory argues that such decisions are the outcome of isomorphic 
pressures and political influences.” Recent extension of the RBV has focused on 
nonmarket-based factors such as political resources and capacities as opposed to the 
traditional view of focusing on market-based resources and capabilities (Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008). Then, the IBV could be also employed to explain the importance of 
business group affiliation and state ownership types in explaining CMNEs’ FDI 
strategies.  
 
1.3.4 Institution-based view 
The IBV led by North (1990) and followed by others suggests that national institut ions 
can be regarded as the rules of the game that influence firms’ strategies. Moreover, 
North formally defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction” (1990:3), which contains formal institutions (i.e. laws, regulations) 
and informal institutions (i.e. social customs, norms, cultures). The organizational form 
of business groups is to address the voids that emerging economies lack the effective 
formal and informal institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000). In comparison, 
SOEs’ behaviors or strategies may be more influenced by formal institutions, while 
POEs’ may have to address both formal and informal institutions.  
 
Furthermore, Sahaym and Nam (2013:426) describe that “A country’s institutional 
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environment consists of a set of political, social, and legal ground rules that fix the 
basis for production, exchange, and distribution within a system.” Thus, firms may 
derive different advantages in different home country institutions. MNEs’ competit ive 
advantages depend on institutions in their home country (Dunning, 2000).  
 
In terms of institutional regulation, institutions in emerging economies are largely 
ineffective compared to those in developed economies, and thus business groups are 
prevalent in emerging economies and have been seen as a response to institutional voids 
(Carney et al. 2011; Change and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007). China is no exception. Before the mid-1980s, there were no business 
groups in China; in the mid-1980s, the Chinese government started to promote 
industrial reform, encouraging firms to form business groups (qiye jituan) (Keister, 
2009).  
 
Yiu (2011) has proposed that this organizational form has ‘multinational advantages’ 
that may facilitate CMNEs’ FDI activities. Specifically, business group affiliated firms 
can fill the voids of imperfect markets and institutions in emerging economies. This 
includes imperfect capital, labour and product markets, not to mention facilitation of 
technology acquisition via internalization processes (Carney et al. 2011; Goto, 1982; 
Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Leff, 1978). Specifically, business groups form interna l 
capital markets, for example, which gives their affiliated firms access to lower cost 
capital (Khanna and Rivkin, 2011). Similarly, internal labour markets allow member 
firms to draw from an internal pool of labour resources, mitigating the ineffic ient 
markets found in emerging economies. These internal labour markets may facilita te 
internationalization. Meanwhile, internal product markets allow for member firms’ 
sharing of reputation and brand, again lowering information costs for consumers 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Owing to internal markets, business groups create lower 
transaction costs (i.e. by addressing information problems and addressing such things 
as a weak legal institutional environment) (Wright et al. 2005). Furthermore, business 
groups may internalize the capability of technological learning, which is consistent with 
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the lines of Mathews’ (2006) LLL model. 
 
Accordingly, institutions may affect CMNEs pursuing different FDI strategies. Peng, 
Wang and Jiang (2008) regard an IBV4 of IB strategy as one leg of the ‘strategy tripod’ 
(the other two legs consisting of the industry- and resource-based views). Peng et al. 
(2008:920) state that this IBV assists to respond to the most fundamental questions in 
IB, such as “What drives a firm’s strategy in international business (IB)?”  
 
As Ramamurti (2009) observes, in the first decade of the 20th century, the development 
of capabilities and institutional support have facilitated the transition of less-developed 
countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to become the most 
influential emerging economies. According to Peng, et al. (2008), institutions mainta in 
this market mechanism’s effective functioning, which help firms and individuals avoid 
incurring undue costs or potential risks while they are involved with the market 
transactions.  
 
Scott (1995) argues that there are three pillars of institutions including the regulat ive 
pillar, the normative pillar, and the cognitive pillar. In spite of its market economy’s 
increasing development, China somewhat maintains a political economy whereby 
government involvement plays a significant role in business by owning and regulat ing 
(Deng, 2007). Government affiliation likely affects Chinese firms’ resource use to go 
abroad by imposing coercive pressures and normative expectations (Wang et al. 2012), 
which are consistent with Scott’s (1995) explanations of the regulative pillar and the 
normative pillar. Moreover, Huang and Chi (2014) assert that Chinese SOEs have a 
favorable institutional environment as opposed to POEs because Chinese governments 
consider SOEs to be the pillars of the national economy. In this respect, Scott’s (1995) 
cognitive pillar has also been explained by Chinese SOE and POEs. Further, Wang et 
al. (2012) argue that Chinese SOEs may suffer differing institutional pressures due to 
                                                                 
4 The term ‘an institution-based view of business strategy’ was first proposed by Peng (2002).  
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different government affiliation levels. The different government levels have divergent 
strategic goals and access to different resources (Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010).  
 
In terms of firm-level capabilities, CMNEs’ accumulated firm-specific advantages are 
largely dependent on domestic market size, the cheap labor force, and relevant 
supportive policy from the state (Collinson and Rugman, 2007). Given governments’ 
support, Chinese SOEs would accumulate more FSAs in creating value. Du and 
Boateng (2015) have provided strong evidence that the government and institut ions 
largely determine Chinese firms’ value creation process in their course of 
internationalization via CBM&As. Moreover, state ownership also plays a significant 
role in CMNEs’ FDI location choice (Duanmu, 2012). Prior empirical studies reveal 
that state ownership significantly determines the pattern of Chinese OFDI (Amighini, 
Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo, 2013; Huang, Xie, Li, and Reddy, 2017).  
 
As for financial resources, its ownership may critically determine firms’ growth 
(Doukas and Lang, 2003). In China, the main Chinese banks are largely owned and 
controlled by Chinese governments (Morck et al. 2008) and primarily operated to 
support SOEs’ activities (Huang and Chi, 2014). In contrast, many Chinese POEs may 
have to rely on private capital or raise capital via tax havens when they go internationa l 
(Sutherland and Ning, 2011). Given the financial resources, firms can sustain 
competitive advantages through investing more on research and development (R&D) 
activities, marketing campaigns, and employment of talents. More engagement in R&D 
activities may allow firms to achieve technological resources (Martin and Salomon, 
2003) and further sustain competitive advantages. In other words, institutiona l 
influences not only determine the resources available to Chinese firms but also their 
different FDI strategies.  
 
On balance, integrating the RBV and the IBV into analyzing CMNEs’ OFDI enables us 
to identify the two idiosyncratic firm-level attributes: business group affiliation and 
state ownership types.  
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Also, Table 1.1 summarizes 22 empirical studies on CMNEs’ OFDI strategies. However, 
no research has been developed to investigate the extent to which business group 
affiliation and state ownership types affect CMNEs’ specific SAS FDI in types and 
properties and international product diversification strategy.  
 
 
 43 
 
Table 1.1 Empirical studies on Chinese MNEs’ OFDI strategies 1 
Authors Investment 
mode 
Theoretical 
framework 
Identification of home 
country effects 
Sample period; variables for proxies 
of FDI strategies 
Analytical 
approach 
Key findings on FDI strategies 
Anderson 
and 
Sutherland, 
2015 
Greenfield 
investments 
and M&As 
Bundling 
model; 
Spring-board 
perspective 
Institutional support: 
state ownership vis-a-
vis private ownership 
2003-2011, 380 greenfield deals and 
160 acquisition deals;  
Chinese FDI in US: DV-frequency  
county of Chinese FDI projects in the 
host state; 
IDV-strategic assets: three-way linear 
additive composite of (1) state share 
of US Fortune 500 companies , (2) 
state share of Masters of Business 
Degrees Awarded, (3) state share of 
national utility patents registered; 
Market-Gross State Product; Natural 
resources-raw material exports (earths 
and stones, ores and fuels) 
Negative 
binomial 
models 
EMNEs tend to use acquisitions to seek 
strategic assets than greenfield 
investments; 
Chinese SOEs were not likely to seek 
strategic assets, but POEs did seek 
strategic assets via M&As; 
Insignificant results on market seeking 
variable and resource seeking variable 
Boateng, 
Qian and 
Tianle, 2008 
M&As Resource-
based view 
and 
organizationa
l learning 
Not included 2000-2004, 27 cross-border M&As; 
The data relating to the motives of 
M&As are from the China Daily 
newspapers and China Securities 
Statistical 
analysis 
Chinese firms are mainly driven by 
market development so as to further 
expand into new markets, promote 
diversification, and achieve advanced 
technology.  
Buckley, 
Clegg, 
Cross, Liu , 
Voss, and 
FDI OLI paradigm 
and 
institutional 
theory 
Not included, but 
theoretical 
propositions (State 
ownership; inefficient  
1984 and 2001; 
DV: Annual outflow of Chinese FDI; 
IDV: Market-Host country GDP per 
capital; Natural resources-the ratio of 
Random 
effects (RE) 
generalized 
least square 
Chinese outward FDI is positively 
associated with host market size (1984-
1991) (‘market seeking’) and host natural 
resources endowments (1992-2001) 
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Zheng, 2007 banking systems; 
conglomerate firms  
with inefficient  
internal capital market;  
and family owned 
firms) 
ore and metal exports; Strategic 
assets-Total annual patent 
registrations in host country 
method (‘resource seeking’); insignificant finding  
on asset seeking 
Cui, Meyer, 
and Hu, 
2014 
Institutional 
theory 
Strategic 
choices is 
driven by 
decision 
makers’ 
awareness, 
motivation, 
and capability  
(AMC) 
State ownership vis-a-
vis private ownership 
2007 and 2010, 1047 Chinese 
manufacturing firms that are listed in 
China; 
DV: the SAS intent of FDI is a latent 
construct measured by a survey 
instrument 
Hierarchical 
regression 
method 
Private ownership is significantly and 
positively related to Chinese firms’ SAS 
intent.  
There is no significant relationship 
between private ownership and Chinese 
firms’ market seeking intent.  
Deng and 
Yang, 2015 
M&As Resource 
dependence 
theory 
Government 
ownership  
2000-2012; 
DV: the number of cross-border 
M&As in host market; 
IDV: market-seeking: the ratio of 
stock market capitalization to GDP;  
natural resource-the ratio of ore and 
metal exports; strategic assets-the 
number of patent registrations  
Random-
effect 
negative 
binomial 
regression 
There are significant and positive 
relationships between Chinese cross -
border M&As and the size of host market  
and the richness of natural resources and 
strategic assets of developed countries; 
Host government effectiveness in 
developing countries also significantly  
and positively moderates the relationships 
between Chinese cross-border M&As and 
the market size and richness of strategic 
assets of developing countries; Cross -
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border M&As by government-owned 
EMNEs are most associated with seeking 
natural resources (including Chinese 
government-owned firms) 
De Beule 
and 
Duanmu, 
2012 
M&As Traditional 
economic 
factors and 
host country 
institutional 
perspective 
Not included 2000-2008, 121 and 531 acquisitions 
by Chinese and Indian firms  
respectively; 
DV: whether or not the M&A entry 
would take place in a host country 
IDV: natural resource-the share of 
ores and metals exports; strategic 
assets-both patent and trademark 
applications 
Conditional 
logistic 
regression 
Chinese firms are not likely to seek out 
resource-rich countries or strategic asset 
endowments either; But in high tech 
manufacturing, Chinese acquisitions are 
more likely to target countries with higher 
level of technological assets, other than 
brand assets 
Hong, 
Wang, and 
Kafouros, 
2015 
FDI Institutional 
theory and 
resource-
based view 
State ownership; 
business group 
affiliation (control 
variable) 
2006-2007; 615 Chinese 
manufacturing firms and 11 mining  
farms;  
DV: each firm’s actual amount of 
annual overseas investment; 
IDV: state ownership (share); group 
affiliation (dummy variable) 
Ordinary 
least square 
regression 
(OLS) 
State ownership and business group 
affiliation significantly facilitate Chinese 
firms’ international expansion; 
Government specific industry policy 
significantly and positively moderates the 
relationship between state ownership and 
Chinese firms’ foreign expansion. 
Huang and 
Chi, 2014 
FDI Institutional 
perspective 
and resource-
based view  
Private ownership vis-
a-vis state ownership 
Chinese POEs’ outward FDI from 
Zhejiang Province; interviewing ten 
senior managers from five Chinese 
POEs located in the City of Wenzhou; 
Five firms have long history in 
international operations (5-10 years).  
In-depth 
interviews 
with senior 
managers 
and 
extensive 
Domestic market position largely  
determines Chinese POEs’ foreign market  
selections;  
After the global financial crisis, Chinese 
POEs use cross-border M&As to seek 
strategic assets. Chinese POEs use three 
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secondary 
data analysis 
approaches: firstly, acquiring 
international competitors, secondly, 
vertical integration, and thirdly, buying a 
single strategic asset such as brand name, 
technology, or R&D 
Huang, Xie, 
Li and 
Reddy, 2017 
FDI Resource-
dependence 
theory 
State ownership  2007-2013; 507 Chinese publicly-
listed manufacturing SOEs; 
DV: newly established foreign 
subsidiaries in each year; 
IDV: Central SOEs-if a SOE’ largest 
shareholder or ultimate controller is 
the SASAC of the State Council;  
Local SOEs-the largest shareholder or 
ultimate owner is the SASAC of local 
governments including provincial, 
municipal or county governments  
Zero-inflated 
Poisson 
regression 
A high percentage of state-owned shares 
has negative effect on SOEs’ outward 
FDI; the negative effect will be reduced 
by institutional development and 
competition intensity; Compared with  
local manufacturing SOEs, central SOEs  
are less likely to engage in outward FDI 
Kang and 
Jiang, 2012 
FDI Traditional 
economic 
factors and 
institutional 
perspective 
Not included 1996-2008; 
DV: FDI stock from Chinese firms in 
each of the eight host Asian 
economies  
IDV: market-seeking-GDP per 
capital; Resource-the ratio of ore and 
metal exports; Strategic assets-patent 
applications 
Panel data 
with 
random-
effects 
model 
Insignificant result on market seeking 
hypothesis; resource seeking is found 
significantly related to Chinese firms ’   
FDI in developing countries; No test on 
strategic-asset seeking hypothesis  
Lin, 2015 Approved 
FDI projects 
Traditional 
economic 
State ownership 2003 and 2012; 633 China’s outward 
FDI projects in Latin America and the 
Random 
effect 
Chinese SOEs are more likely driven by 
the motivation of resource-seeking in 
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factors and 
institutional 
perspectives 
Caribbean; 
State ownership: the ultimate 
controlling shareholder 
negative 
binomial 
regression 
model 
Latin America and the Caribbean, while 
Chinese POEs are more market-seeking.  
Lu, Liu, and 
Wang, 2011 
FDI  Integration of 
resource-
based, 
industry-
based and 
institutional-
based views 
Private ownership A questionnaire survey on private 
firms conducted in 2008; 
DV: the importance of strategic-asset 
seeking and market-seeking FDI 
(1=not important, 5=very important);  
strategic assets include technologies, 
brands, high-end human resource 
Survey data 
analysis 
Supportive government policies are 
important motivations for Chinese POEs ’ 
both strategic asset seeking and market-
seeking FDI.  
Lu, Liu , 
Filatotchev, 
and Wright, 
2014 
International 
diversificatio
n 
Knowledge-
based view 
State ownership 2002-2009, 1027 publicly listed firms  
with 12,557 subsidiaries in total in 
2009 (553 overseas subsidiaries); 
DV: the extent of firms’ investment 
across countries; 
IDV: the percentage of shares owned 
by the government and SOEs (the 
ultimate shareholder) 
Panel Tobit 
model 
State shareholding is negatively and 
significantly related to Chinese listed 
firms’ international diversification 
Lu, Liu , 
Wright and 
Filatotchev, 
2014 
FDI Knowledge-
based view 
and 
institutional-
based view 
Government 
ownership 
2002-2009, 74 Chinese publicly listed 
firms among 53 countries; 
DV: Entry dummy, equals 1 if sample 
firm has conducted a new subsequent 
entry in the target country; 
IDV: Government equity share: equity 
shares owned by government agencies 
Panel Logit  
model with  
fixed effects 
Government ownership share has a 
positive and significant role on Chinese 
firms’ outward FDI decisions.  
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Ramasamy, 
Yeung, and 
Laforet, 
2012 
FDI Dunning’s 
eclectic 
paradigm 
State ownership vis-a-
vis private ownership 
2006-2008, 63 public listed Chinese 
firms with 1350 foreign projects 
across 59 countries; 
IDV: Market: GDP per capital, 
resource-the ratio of ores and 
minerals, strategic assets-number of 
registered patents , host country’s 
exports of high technology products  
Poisson 
count data 
regression 
Chinese central government-controlled 
firms are more likely to go to politically  
stable countries for strategic asset seeking 
motives, showing a clear difference 
between SOEs;  
Chinese POEs follow that SOEs by 
investing in natural resource rich 
countries and provide related products 
and services; Chinese firms are attracted 
by commercially viable technology rather 
than core research content 
Sun, Peng, 
and Tan, 
2017 
International 
diversificatio
n 
Institution-
based view 
and 
traditional 
economic 
factors 
CEOs with political 
ties; 
State ownership 
The number of Chinese listed firms  
ranges between 846 in 2001 and 1576 
in 2011Chinese listed firms  
(excluding financial service-related 
firms); 
DV: International diversification-the 
extent of exposure to foreign markets;  
State ownership- 1 equals to the 
ultimate controlling shareholder of the 
firm is the state 
Multilevel 
regression 
models 
CEOs with political ties are negatively 
related to firms’ international 
diversification, while CEOs with  
international experience are positively 
related to firms’ international 
diversification; 
There is no significant relationship 
between state ownership and Chinese 
listed firms’ international diversification 
Wang, 
Hong, 
Kafouros, 
and Wright, 
2012 
FDI Resource-
based view 
and 
institution-
based view 
State ownership, 
government affiliation  
level 
2006-2007, 626 Chinese 
manufacturing firms; 
DV: the actual amount of annual 
outward FDI by each firm; 
IDV: the degree of state ownership; 
Hierarchical 
OLS 
regression 
State ownership drives Chinese 
manufacturing firms’ resource-seeking 
FDI, whereas affiliation to higher 
government affiliation levels influence 
market seeking FDI;  
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government affiliation level including 
state, provincial, city, county and 
other levels; business group affiliation 
(dummy variable) 
No significant influence found on 
business group affiliation  
Wu and 
Chen, 2014 
FDI Institutional 
theory 
Government 
ownership 
1996-2000, a survey covered 300 
Chinese firms’ foreign expansion to 
US market  
DV: dummy variable that 1 equals to 
firms expand to US market; 
IDV: Government ownership-the 
percentage of stakes owned by 
governments 
Stepwise 
hierarchical 
regression 
approach 
There is a significant and positive 
relationship between government 
ownership and the propensity of foreign  
expansion;  
And government ownership negatively 
moderates the relationship between 
institutional development and the 
likelihood of foreign expansion 
Wu, 
Pangarkar 
and Wu, 
2016 
Regional and 
Global 
diversificatio
n 
A perspective 
on regional 
and global 
strategies of 
MNEs 
Not included 1998-2000, a survey on 625 Chinese 
manufacturing MNEs; 
Global diversification reflects a level 
of firm’s global diversification 
Tobit 
regression 
model 
Regional diversification can significantly  
predict firms’ global diversification; firm-
specific technology and marketing know-
how both increase the propensity of a 
firm’s moving from regional to global 
diversification 
Xia, Ma, Lu  
and Yiu , 
2014 
FDI Resource 
dependent 
theory 
State ownership; 
Business group 
experience 
2001-2007, 780 Chinese listed firms  
across 28 industries; 
DV: a count of outward FDI projects 
(i.e. foreign subsidiaries); 
IDV: state ownership-all the 
shareholders’ proportion of SOE 
shares; business group experience-the 
logarithm of the year since the 
Zero-inflated 
negative 
binomial 
regression 
model 
State ownership has a significantly  
negative effect on Chinese firms’ outward 
FDI, while business group experience has 
positive effects.  
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formation of business group 
Yang and 
Deng, 2017 
M&As OLI paradigm 
and 
institutional 
theory 
State ownership 1996-2012, Chinese cross-border 
M&As in developed markets; 
DV: the number of completed cross-
border M&As by Chinese firms; 
IDV: market- host country GDP;  
natural resources- the share of fuels, 
ores, and metals exports; strategic 
assets-the number of patents 
registered in the host country 
Negative 
binomial 
regression 
model 
Host countries’ market size, natural 
resources and strategic assets positively 
determine the number of Chinese cross-
border M&As;  
Chinese government involvement  
strengthens the main effects of market  
seeking, natural resource seeking, and 
institutional environment;  
The effect of strategic asset seeking is 
significant in both government- and non-
government-involved Chinese cross-
border M&As 
Zheng, Wei, 
Zhang, and 
Yang, 2016 
M&As Resource-
based view, 
Linkage, 
Leverage, and 
Learning 
(LLL) and 
springboard 
perspective 
Not included Three case studies; Chinese 
manufacturing MNEs’ cross-border 
M&As in the UK in recent years  
Multiple 
case study 
Results show that Chinese MNEs are 
interested in global brands, advanced 
technologies, and technological and 
marketing capabilities.  
Notes: DV refers to dependent variable and IDV refers to independent variable; SOEs, state-owned enterprises; POEs, privately-owned enterprises 
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1.3.5 An overview of research methodologies 
A lot of studies use aggregate FDI data to explore CMNEs’ internationalizat ion. 
However, as Sutherland and Anderson (2015) point out, many of these studies do not 
use data properly. This is because around 80% of Chinese FDI is found in Hong Kong, 
the Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands (Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, 2008). Most 
of this, however, is capital in transit. The most cited IB study on the determinants of 
China’s OFDI, Buckley et al.’s (2007) empirical work, utilized questionable FDI data 
(before 2001, when Chinese POEs were not officially allowed to invest in foreign 
countries) (Huang and Chi, 2014). Kolstad and Wiig (2012) contend that their results 
are likely biased because there are also unofficial FDI flows from Chinese POEs that 
they may have different motives of FDI. Other scholars such as Beugelsdijk et al. (2010) 
have pointed out the drawbacks of research based on aggregate FDI flows and stocks, 
which overestimate or underestimate subsidiary activity varying with host-country 
characteristics. 
 
Moreover, Amighini et al. (2014) argue that the reliability of using aggregate data in 
empirical research on China’s OFDI, has not been sufficiently investigated because FDI 
data largely ignores relevant features including the details of industry composition, 
ownership structure and modes of foreign entry. Similarly, De Beule and Duanmu (2012) 
highlight that research using aggregate data neglects the characteristic of industry 
specific and firm-based heterogeneity. In a review of 112 empirical papers about 
Chinese OFDI published between 2002 and 2014, Quer, Claver, and Rienda (2015) 
argue that more empirical research using firm-level data is highly required.  
 
Extant studies were mainly based on either aggregate official data or case studies, which 
to some extant limit the research generalization (Quer, et al. 2015). Although the OFDI 
data can represent EMNEs’ increasing multinationalisation, it by and large shows us a 
macro picture (Cuervo-Cazurra, Newbury, and Park (2016). Since government 
involvement in China’s economy has been widely recognized, it is required that analys is 
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at the firm level be taken more into consideration (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008; Wang, 
Hong, Kafouros, and Wright, 2012).  
 
There are several primary modes of internationalisation by Chinese firms includ ing 
exports, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), joint ventures, M&A, and 
greenfield investment (Child and Yan, 2001). At the beginning of the 1980s, export was 
particularly the most popular entry mode for Chinese companies when the central 
government promoted the ‘Open Door’ policy (Peng, 2000). This entry mode largely 
benefits from this special development path, the Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM). It can integrate Chinese companies’ cost advantage with foreign firms’ brand 
advantage, reaching economies of scale (Peng, 2000). This development path has 
facilitated Chinese companies’ further foreign expansion. For example, Galanz, located 
in Guandong Province, has been the largest microwave oven manufacturer in the world 
for years (Sodhi and Tang, 2013).  
 
These days, CBM&As have been regarded as having the fastest approach for achieving 
expected targets when firms go international (Agyenim et al. 2008). Peng (2012) 
suggests CBM&As are the preferred mode of entry for CMNEs. The World Investment 
Report 2017 by UNCTAD suggests that a surge of CBM&As by Chinese firms drive 
this country’s OFDI, which propel it to firstly become the second largest investor in the 
world. According to recent news by CGTN5, “M&A is the major approach for overseas 
investment for Chinese enterprises; about 88 percent of over 2,858 agreements by 
Chinese companies overseas were completed via M&A between 2000 and 2016 [Center 
for China and Globalization]” (Nian, 2017). For example, the acquisition of IBM’s 
personal computing division allows Lenovo to continually use the IBM brand and 
worldwide distribution networks, making Lenovo the third largest computing company 
in the world (Deng, 2007). On the other hand, the greenfield investment mode is 
relatively time consuming for firms seeking SAS FDI. Thus, it is suggested ‘EMNEs 
                                                                 
5 CGTN refers to China Global Television Network, which is owned by China Central Television 
or Government of the People’s Republic of China.  
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will try to overcome their latecomer disadvantage through aggressive, proactive and 
risk-taking acquisitions’ (Kedia, Gaffney and Clampit, 2012:159).  
 
Therefore, in this research I examine CBM&As by CMNEs. The most important 
approach, however, is the employment of firm-level data that can account for ultima te 
ownership. This circumvents some of the problems found with the use of official FDI 
data above.  
 
1.4 Research agenda 
Increasing internationalization of EMNEs through acquisitions has significant 
implications for theory building (Peng, 2012). It presents an excellent opportunity to 
revisit theories, provide new empirical evidence, and find new theoretical explanations 
(Ramamurti, 2012). The M&A has been seen as a faster mode of market entry for 
EMNEs, including CMNEs (Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007) to expand their 
international product and consumer markets (Chen and Findlay, 2003; Deng, 2007, 
2009; Li, 2007; Wang and Boateng, 2007), and in particular to acquire strategic assets 
in international markets (Agyenim et al. 2008; Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui 
and Yip, 2008). Luo and Wang (2012) focus on home country environment parameters 
(e.g. economic growth, institutional environment, competitive pressure, and other 
macro level factors) and study their influences on 153 CMNEs’ overseas investment 
sales (measured by assets and employment scales respectively). CBM&As provide us  
a chance to directly observe firm-level activities. Then, instead of measuring home 
country parameters, I specifically focus on acquirers’ business group affiliation and 
state ownership types, investigating whether these two factors make a significant 
difference on CMNEs’ FDI strategies. The following three research projects are 
presented: 
 
Study 1- to explore the role of business group affiliation on CMNEs’ SAS 
 54 
 
orientation by disaggregating strategic assets in detailed types and natures 
Chari (2013) has identified that business group affiliation significantly drives Indian 
MNEs’ FDI. It may imply that emerging-economy firms affiliated to business groups 
have more competitive advantages. Nevertheless, no empirical research has been 
developed to explore whether business group affiliation determines EMNEs’ SAS FDI. 
More importantly, many academic studies rely upon patents as the key empirical proxy 
of SAS orientation, even though they highlight that strategic assets refer to both cutting 
edge technologies and brands, among other things (Buckley et al. 2007; Drogendijk and 
Blomkvist; Li, Li, and Shapiro, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012). To the 
best of my knowledge, however, there are no empirical studies that clearly distinguish 
between the different types of strategic assets that are targeted by CMNEs.  
 
Study 2-to what extent state ownership types influence CMNEs seeking what 
specific types of strategic assets (i.e. technology-, brand-based assets or both) and 
natural resources 
Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2014) argue that existing theory does not present a consistent 
prediction of the state ownership influence on MNEs’ OFDI. Luo, Xue and Han (2010) 
suggest that two views, including institutional escapism and governmental promotion, 
seem to be paradoxical. The actual influence is likely attributed to firms’ heterogene ity 
in industries and ownership. For example, SOEs may be significantly affected by the 
government promotional force, while the force of institutional escapism largely 
influence POEs (Luo, Xue and Han, 2010). Investigating all Chinese firms’ OFDI 
between 2006 and 2007, Wang, et al. (2012) find out that a higher government 
affiliation level significantly determines FDI in developed markets. For Chinese 
publicly- listed manufacturing SOEs between 2007 and 2013, Huang, Xie, Li, and 
Reddy (2017) reveal that central SOEs are less likely to undertake OFDI than local 
SOEs. To a certain extent, these inconsistent findings are inappropriate for assessing 
the influence of state ownership on CMNEs’ FDI strategies. Following prior studies 
(e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; Hennart, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012), I add to the under-
researched area concerning the special ownership advantages for EMNEs, with a 
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particular reference to CMNEs.  
 
Study 3-To investigate the extent to which business group affiliation and state 
ownership types affect CMNEs’ international product diversification. 
There are an increasing number of research studies on the relationship between the 
international diversification of firms in emerging countries and their financ ia l 
performance (Gaur and Delios, 2015; Guar and Kumar, 2009; Kim, Kim, and Hoskisson, 
2010; Li and Wong, 2003; Lu and Yao, 2006). Nevertheless, if we cannot clearly 
identify which specific factors determine firms’ international diversification strategy, 
the evaluation of their financial performance is relatively ineffective and insufficient. 
 
To this end, the greatest contribution from studying EMNEs lies in providing us space 
to further improve on extant theories of the internationalization process, other than 
simple finding about whether and how EMNEs react differently from DMNEs 
(Ramamurti, 2012).  
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Chapter 2: Business Group Affiliation and 
Strategic Asset Seeking Orientation 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
“Since large numbers of firms in many developing countries are affiliated to 
business groups, if business groups facilitate the FDI of their affiliates, this would 
contribute to our understanding of the drivers of developing country firm FDI.”  
(Chari, 2013: 349)  
 
Owing to a lack of firm specific advantages (FSAs), especially in R&D and marketing, 
the increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) by Emerging-country (E) Multinationa l 
enterprises (MNEs) poses a theoretical puzzle to extant theory to explain their 
internationalization activities in overcoming liabilities of foreignness (LOF) and 
foreign expansion (Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Ramamurti, 2009). EMNEs 
are often considered different to developed-country (D) MNEs, because of their 
strategic-asset-seeking (SAS) intent, undertaking outward (O) FDI such as cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) to augment, rather than exploit, existing FSAs. 
This is the so-called ‘late-comer’ (Child and Rodrigues, 2005), ‘springboard’ (Luo and 
Tung, 2007), or ‘strategic intent’ perspective (Rui and Yip, 2008). EMNE OFDI 
strategies, these perspectives argue, are insufficiently explained by existing theory 
(such as the OLI paradigm), launching the call for further extended theoretica l 
contributions to explain the behavior of EMNEs (Buckley et al. 2007; Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, A. 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; 
Narula, 2012; Yiu, 2011). One explanation given to explain the unusual OFDI strategy 
of EMNEs is the predominance of market imperfections in emerging markets and the 
presence of business groups, formed to address these institutional voids. This study, 
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therefore, focuses on the impact of the domestic market environment in which EMNEs 
have evolved. These so-called home country effects (HCEs) are thought to be important 
in shaping their unusual strategies and behaviours (Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2012: Hertenstein, 
Sutherland and Anderson, 2015). Yet, there is still comparatively limited research on 
exactly which HCEs influence EMNEs’ SAS activities. This is important, because, as 
noted, explaining SAS is central to understanding the current conceptual debate 
regarding the need for new paradigms to understand EMNEs (i.e. is the OLI model 
redundant ?). As discussed in chapter one, integrating the resource-based view (RBV) 
and institution-based view (IBV) allow us to further discover the role of business group 
affiliation on Chinese MNEs’ specific FDI strategies.  
 
Business groups occupy dominant positions in China (Sutherland, 2009), as well as 
many other developing countries, as their unique organizational mechanisms and 
capacities are appropriately adapted to the institutional voids found in emerging 
countries (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Hikino and Amsden, 1994; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000). Drawing on Mathews’s (2006) LLL framework (linkage, leverage and learning), 
scholars (i.e. Yiu, 2011; Chari; 2013; Hennart, 2012; Ramamurti, 2012) propose that 
the organizational form of business groups may facilitate internationalization activit ies, 
including SAS. Their unique attributes, such as internal markets, inward linkages, and 
institutional support, as Yiu (2011) argues, potentially provide additional support to 
SAS FDI activities. As for Chinese MNEs (hereafter CMNEs), China’s large business 
groups do undertake a considerable proportion of Chinese OFDI (Sutherland, 2009). 
Despite the importance of Chinese business groups in OFDI, no empirical research has 
yet specifically explored the extent to which business group affiliation6 in China affects 
the volume and likelihood for SAS FDI. Does business group affiliation actually spur 
SAS related FDI? Does group affiliation therefore provide one possible explanation for 
why EMNEs exhibit different OFDI characteristics?   
 
                                                                 
6 In this study, business group affiliation refers to those Chinese businesses affiliated to a large 
business group.  
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In addition, many academic studies rely upon patents as the key empirical proxy of SAS 
orientation, even though they highlight that strategic assets refer to both cutting edge 
technologies and brands, among other things (Buckley et al. 2007; Drogendijk and 
Blomkvist; Li, Li, and Shapiro, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012). As far as 
I know, however, there are no empirical studies that clearly distinguish between the 
different types of strategic assets that are targeted by CMNEs. Do foreign technology 
and brand-related assets both attract CMNEs to pursue OFDI to the same extent? 
Arguably, both possess slightly different properties, with the former having stronger 
non-location-bounded (NLB) properties vis a vis the latter, which are more location 
bounded (LB). Furthermore, does CMNEs’ business group affiliation determine their 
specific SAS FDI strategies? This research therefore concentrates on the study of 
CMNEs’ OFDI activities on the firm-level, with regards to business group affilia t ion 
and the particular type of SAS orientation (i.e. NLB and LB). It mainly employs data 
about their CBM&As from the period between 2006 to 2015.  
 
First, I discuss the distinction between specific types of strategic assets that CMNEs 
seek via CBM&As. Following that, I formulate some hypotheses about the relationship 
between business group affiliation and specific types of SAS FDI activities. Secondly, 
I explain the methodology, involving a pooled data set of 843 completed CBM&As. 
Finally, I discuss the implications of the findings and implications for future research. 
 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
There are many definitions of business groups. One definition, for example, is that they 
are groups of legally independent firms that cross multiple industries (i.e. are diversified) 
and are connected with each other through persistent formal (such as equity) and 
informal such as (family) ties (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). However, one way of 
thinking about business groups is not with respect to any single definition (for there is 
considerable heterogeneity among groups) but rather by their internal characterist ics 
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and the functions that they fulfil. In particular, their ability to address institutional voids 
via internal capital, labour and product markets is often remarked (Carney, Essen, Estrin, 
and Shapiro, 2017; Granovetter, 1995; Kedia, Mukherjee, and Lahiri, 2006; Khanna 
and Palepu, 1997; Lee, Peng, and Lee, 2008). This allows business group affilia ted 
firms to have more channels and potentially stronger capacities than independent firms. 
It raises the further question of whether group affiliated firms seek strategic assets in 
the course of OFDI, and whether there are any differences to those of independent firms.  
 
2.2.1 The location boundedness of SAS activities 
EMNEs may achieve these strategic assets by undertaking rapid and aggressive 
CBM&As of DMNEs to alleviate latecomer disadvantages including technologica l 
backwardness, lack of known brands, and other home-country institutional voids 
(Buckley et al. 2007; Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008). Strategic 
assets that EMNEs acquire can assist in reducing their latecomers’ liability of 
foreignness (LOF) and competing with rivals in developed economies (Luo and Tung, 
2007). The key point, however, is that the existing EMNE literature does not clearly 
identify the different types of strategic assets.  
 
Drawing from Rugman and Verbeke’s (1992) work, I distinguish two types of strategic 
assets: non-location bounded (NLB) and location bounded (LB) strategic assets.  
 
The NLB-FSAs are defined as:  
  
“FSAs that can be exploited globally, and lead to benefits of scale, scope or 
exploitation of national differences. In the context of FDI, the NLB-FSAs can be 
transferred abroad at low marginal costs and used effectively in foreign operations 
without substantial adaptation. All of a multinational's FSAs of a transaction cost 
nature typically fit into this category.”  
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In comparison, LB-FSAs are defined as:  
  
“FSAs that benefit a company only in a particular location (or set of locations), 
and lead to benefits of national responsiveness. In the context of FDI, these LB-
FSAs cannot easily be transferred and require significant adaptation in order to be 
used in other locations.” (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992:763).  
 
Previous studies have ‘failed to identify empirically or explain precisely the difference’ 
between NLB and LB strategic assets (Collinson and Rugman, 2008:7). As the 
definition of NLB FSAs previously discussed, the FSA concept is accordingly broad in 
coverage and hard to capture and measure empirically. 
 
Regardless of its effectiveness, patents are the most commonly used proxy for SAS FDI 
in the extant EMNE literature (Buckley et al. 2007; De Beule and Duanmu, 2012; 
Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013; Li et al. 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012). 
More significantly, NLB FSAs are thought to contain high levels of codified knowledge. 
Thus, patents largely fit this description because the patenting also involves explic it 
description of the intellectual property being registered. Compared to tacit knowledge, 
codified knowledge is more easily transferred between countries.  
 
As opposed to codified knowledge, for example, firms’ ‘reputational resources’ are not 
transferable in most cases because they may lose value when transferred across. Hence, 
it qualifies as a LB FSAs (Verbeke and Kano, 2015:421-422). Moreover, brands, to a 
greater extent, are a firm’s reputational resources because they act as identifiab le 
signaling mechanisms, which make commodities distinguishable in the markets that 
firms mainly operate in. As a result, most brands of any value are typically registered 
as trademarks for the purpose of intellectual property rights protection, and the number 
of trademarks owned by a target firm could be potentially utilized as a proxy for LB 
FSAs. In addition, although LB FSAs may also refer to human capital, networks and so 
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on, in this research I mainly focus on the use of trademarks which is countable for 
further measurement.  
 
The new internalization theory was developed to better explain subsidiary specific 
advantages and their reverse diffusion to parent companies (Verbeke and Rugman, 
1992). Li and Oh (2016) suggest that ‘new internalization theory’ focuses on the 
explanation of FSAs’ nature and attributes and their diffusion within member firms. 
This new internalization theory can provide useful insights into the question of what 
specific types of strategic assets are sought by EMNEs in foreign markets. Verbeke and 
Kano (2015:421) has made the ‘critical extension’ to ‘new’ internalization theory (vis-
à-vis ‘conventional’ internalization theory), which is its distinction between the 
different types of FSAs that MNEs may possess, specifically stressing their properties 
of location-boundedness. Thus, FSA location boundedness became a core focus of ‘new’ 
internalization theory (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001; Verbeke and Rugman, 1992). 
Narula and Verbeke (2015:615) have commented that this distinction implied ‘a 
quantum leap in the development of modern IB research’. In spite of this, ‘new 
internalization theory’ has not been extensively applied into studying EMNEs. 
 
A number of IB studies have revealed that EMNEs tend to acquire advanced 
technologies or known brands via CBM&As (e.g. Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; 
Rui and Yip, 2008). After deals, intra-MNE diffusion processes may diffuse the FSA. 
New internalization theory critically refers to the multidimensionality of FSA diffus ion. 
As a result, it would appear appropriate for it to be applied to research on EMNEs. 
Moreover, in comparison with independent firms, I contend that business group-
affiliated EMNEs may seek different properties of strategic assets. 
 
2.2.2 Hypotheses development 
Economists regard business groups as functional substitutes for market failures of 
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resource allocation in production (Leff, 1978). Moreover, entrepreneurs use business 
groups to internalize the market failure addressing the difficulties of achieving capital, 
talents, technology in emerging economies (Guillen, 2000). Compared with foreign 
investors and domestic independent firms, business groups in emerging economies may 
access more country-specific advantages (CSAs) including local resources, labor and 
capital assets. Hennart (2012:169) has argued that “most CSAs are not freely available 
to foreign investors. Many, such as land, natural resources, labor, and distribution 
assets, are sold in imperfect markets, giving their local owners significant market power. 
This explains why some EMMs can compete with MNEs and generate the profits needed 
to acquire the FSAs they lack.” According to Hennart’s (2012) arguments, the 
preferential access to complementary local resources7  (CLRs) that business group 
affiliated firms have may facilitate their intangible asset seeking FDI. From this 
theoretical lens, group affiliation may be transformed into Chinese firms’ one special 
kind of ownership advantage.   
 
With respect to Luo and Tung’s (2007) springboard explanation, Chari (2013) suggests 
both business groups and independent firms have the strategic intent of undertaking 
FDI in order to maintain their domestic market positions from foreign rivals. It may be 
argued, however, that business groups can obtain privileged treatment from home 
country governments in encouraging FDI compared to independent firms due to their 
dominant positions in the domestic markets (Sachwald, 2001; Gaur, Kumar, and Singh, 
2014). “Compared with a standalone firm, a corporate Business Group-affiliated firm 
is likely to have an edge in undertaking OFDI. Its effective strength is partly derived 
from the accessibility to the Group resources, and the economies of scale and scope 
spanning the Group” (Singh, 2011:145). Chari (2013), for example, has also shown a 
positive and significant relationship between Indian firms’ business group affilia t ion 
and their FDI. The above arguments imply business group affiliation in emerging 
economies may facilitate SAS related OFDI, a view generally in accord with the EMNE 
                                                                 
7 Hennart (2012:169) defines the preferential access to the subset of country-specific advantages as 
complementary local resources.  
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literature (though not tested) (Chari, 2013; Sutherland, 2009; Yiu, Bruton and Lu, 2007). 
However, a further area for consideration relates to the particular types (i.e the 
qualitative nature) of strategic assets that business groups may seek. 
 
2.2.2.1 Business Group Affiliation and NLB (i.e codified technology) 
SAS in business groups vis a vis stand-alone firms 
Compared with independent firms, business groups have more advantages in 
supporting their OFDI through a process of linking, leveraging, and learning (LLL) 
(Mathews, 2006). Business groups provide group-level resources which are important 
for developing innovations (Chang, Chung, and Mahood, 2006; Choi, Lee, and 
Williams, 2011; Hobday and Colpan, 2010; Khanna and Rivkin, 2006; Mahmood and 
Mitchell, 2004). Existing studies indicate business group affiliation can facilita te 
member firms’ innovativeness by providing them with access to group-level shared 
resources, including capital, technology, labor and other service (e.g. Carney, Essen, 
Estrin, and Shapiro, 2017; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). Business groups have greater 
capacities in leveraging accessed resources or acquired assets (Chair, 2013; Yiu, 2011).  
 
In studying the determinants of Chinese OFDI, therefore, it is not surprising that 
Buckley et al. (2007) claimed three special explanations, one of which was capital 
market imperfections (and special ownership advantages, and institutional factors) 
which might influence Chinese OFDI strategies. In particular, they argued that capital 
market imperfections might allow Chinese firms within special organisational forms 
(i.e. business groups) to raise finance at below-market rates which could encourage 
their FDI. As noted above, business groups often develop their own interna l capital 
markets to address imperfect capital markets found in emerging economies (Carney, 
Essen, Estrin, and Shapiro, 2017; Chang, Chung, and Mahmood, 2006; He, Mao, Rui, 
and Zha, 2013; Gonenc, Kan, and Karadagli, 2007). Buckley and his colleagues (2007) 
thus speculated that business group affiliation may effectively subsidise Chinese OFDI. 
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They argued that Chinese business groups had developed their own internal capital 
market that supported their FDI strategies. Later research has echoed this argument 
regarding the impact of group affiliation on capital market constraints, further 
suggesting such internal markets may support SAS types of OFDI (Yiu, 2011; Chari, 
2013). Furthermore, internal financial resources within a business group could be more 
effectively allocated to member firms to develop innovative opportunities than outside 
financial investors (Chang, Chung, and Mahmood, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, drawing on Castellacci (2015)’s empirical research, group affiliated firms 
would efficiently allocate human resources internally within the group if the country 
had limited human capital. Due to the imperfections in human capital markets, Leff 
(1978) argued that business group could be seen as one advantageous source. For 
example, groups might incorporate labor market management institutes such as 
business schools and head-hunting firms (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Accordingly, 
groups can employ and allocate more technical talents into R&D investments. In a study 
of Korean manufacturing firms from 1994 to 2006, Choi, Yoshikawa, Zahra, and Han 
(2014) found out that group affiliated firms are in a better position to conduct R&D 
investment by taking advantages of the benefits of improved institutions than 
independent firms. The internal human market within the business group may then 
contribute to R&D activities.  
 
Drawing from the resource-based view of the firm, Amsden and Hikino (1994) have 
argued that business groups would increasingly internalize the R&D function within 
the group. They suggested that business groups are more capable of internalizing and 
exploiting foreign technologies across the entire group. Hence, I may postulate that 
business groups that have their own R&D center may have a higher inclination to 
acquire NLB assets from DMNEs and exploit them in the home market. To illustra te 
using an example, the Geely Group has its own research institute in Hangzhou, China. 
After it acquired Volvo, it may better exploit and share technologies within the entire 
group. 
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Additionally, business groups can provide their member firms a known reputation when 
information in emerging markets is hard to collect and analyse (Khanna and Palepu, 
1997). This group reputation also contributes to the foreign acquisition of technologies 
as it may alleviate foreign firms’ fear of losing their intellectual property (Carney, 
2008b). Given that patents are highly codified they are considered to have NLB 
properties, business group affiliated firms, therefore, are likely to acquire them. 
Therefore, business groups may have more inclination for seeking technology-based 
FDI than independent firms, leading to the following three hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1-a: business group affiliated firms have a stronger NLB (i.e. codified 
technological) strategic asset seeking orientation than non-affiliated firms.  
    
Hypothesis 1-b: business group affiliated firms with internal capital markets are 
more disposed to seek NLB assets than non-affiliated firms. 
 
Hypothesis 1-c: business group affiliated firms with R&D centers are more likely 
to seek NLB assets than non-affiliated firms.  
 
2.2.2.2 Business groups and LB SAS (i.e. brand-seeking)  
Frey, Ansar, and Wunsch-Vincent (2015:217) have argued that: “In recent years, firms 
in emerging economies have been more active users of these markets by licensing or 
acquiring established global brands. Emerging market multinationals—such as Lenovo 
buying IBM and Tata Motors buying Range Rover—have purchased Western brands to 
establish international brand recognition.” IB scholars have suggested that Chinese 
firms pursue brand seeking FDI (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Luo and Rip, 
2008; Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). So does business group affilia t ion 
facilitate CMNEs’ brand seeking FDI via CBM&As?  
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To recap, business groups form and develop owing to imperfect markets and 
institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Carney, 2008a). One such imperfect 
market identified in the literature are imperfect product markets. According to this view, 
developing brand names is typically a costly and difficult process in emerging markets. 
Therefore, once firms in emerging markets have established a brand or trademark, they 
can sell products more easily than those without any brands or trademarks. In emerging 
markets, like China, consumer rights are limited and information (concerning, for 
example, product quality) has historically also been rather limited. Consequently, 
brands wield tremendous power in emerging markets to a considerable extent. Then 
through enforcing reputation via high quality standards and product guarantees, 
business groups can easily develop their own brand value across different sectors.  
 
Rugman and Verbeke (2001) note that ‘local reputation’ as an FSA is not transferab le. 
For example, most Western trademarks are written using the Roman alphabet. Pinyin is 
the equivalent in Chinese, but it is not generally recognized, rather Chinese hanzi 
(characters) are used and understood by most. This vividly illustrates that if Chinese 
firms acquire foreign brands/trademarks, they will likely have to adapt them to the 
Chinese market, so all Chinese customers can recognize them. Thus, it is possible that 
Chinese business group affiliated firms may be less likely to acquire foreign brands.  
 
Compared with independent firms, business groups typically have additional resources 
available to them for the purpose of SAS and, as postulated in the first hypothesis, are 
potentially better able to exploit acquired strategic assets. In the case of brands, however, 
it is not as clear what the impact of business group affiliation will be. On the one hand, 
business group affiliation may facilitate successful exploitation of that brand via the use 
of business group resources that can be used to exploit the brand. On the other hand, 
however, business groups already possess a strong brand name (at least in their 
domestic market). However, acquired brand assets may not be well-recognized in the 
domestic market, and if they are, may simply corrode or undermine the value of the 
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business group’s domestic brand identity. Thus it is not quite as clear cut how valuable 
foreign brands may be for powerful domestic business groups.  
 
Given the tendencies of acquiring brands, one dominant reason is that this may allow 
EMNEs to ‘catch-up’ with DMNEs. However, the logic behind this thinking requires 
further critical appraisal. Some EMNE theories suggest that EMNEs strongly tend to 
repatriate strategic assets they acquired to the home market for exploitation there 
(Hennart, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007; Petersen and Seifert, 2014; Rudy, Miller and 
Wang, 2016). Then it must be addressed whether location boundedness also becomes a 
consideration in EMNEs’ SAS FDI strategies.  
 
As discussed above, brands may be more strongly bounded by location and considered 
to be LB-FSAs. Unlike the NLB case, there is relatively less theoretical support to 
propose a stronger orientation towards LB assets in group-affiliated firms compared 
with independent firms. Rugman and Verbeke (1992) suggest that LB assets cannot be 
easily transferred at lower cost for further exploitation in any other new location. In 
short, the value of acquired LB assets cannot easily be ‘leveraged’ (using Mathews’s 
(2006) terminology) by EMNEs, especially in the domestic market. Arguably, when the 
acquirer has reached a certain level of FSAs, including the capacity to absorb and 
exploit the LB assets in their local market, then the value of LB assets may be largely 
and likely realized. And the expecting level of FSAs in EMNEs is more likely found 
among business group-affiliated firms.  
 
But, this is certainly not to say that LB assets could not attract EMNEs. From another 
perspective, LB assets could still be very attractive for EMNEs including CMNEs if 
they are actively pursuing expansion of foreign markets and for which FSA 
transferability is not an issue. For instance, CMNEs could develop more factual values 
in the target markets by acquiring local reputation and the associated local distribution 
networks in the developed countries. Given the lack of known brands and recognit ion 
in developed markets, successful Chinese manufacturers may find an effective way to 
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directly expand in these markets by acquiring a foreign brand. In comparison with 
exporting unbranded products, direct acquisition of a foreign brand can assist EMNEs 
to better extract the great value via vertical integration within the value chain. As noted 
above, it is likely the reason that many IB scholars support the notion that EMNEs are 
also largely pursuing brand-seeking FDI. Nonetheless, there are somewhat two 
competing forces in play. If SAS FDI is motivated by the acquisition of foreign 
intangibles primarily for domestic market exploitation (i.e. following Hennart’s (2012) 
bundling model), I might expect brand seeking FDI to be less common among business 
groups. On the other hand, if brand-seeking FDI is motivated by consideration of 
international expansion, CMNEs are truly expecting to use foreign acquisitions to 
expand internationally.  
 
Business groups can provide their member firms a known reputation when information 
in emerging markets is hard to collect and analyse (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). 
Therefore, established brands in emerging markets have remarkable power and then 
business groups with a reputation are more easily to expand new markets (Carney, 
2008b; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). As discussed previously, I may still postulate that 
Chinese business groups are less likely to acquire a foreign brand to expand domestic 
markets. As opposed to repatriation of such assets, I would expect there may not be a 
stronger propensity in business groups vis a vis independent firms in the Chinese 
context.  
 
In addition, almost all relevant EMNE literature on SAS denote strategic assets in the 
same general category. For example, strategic assets simply refer to critical capabilit ies 
such as R&D capacity, advanced technology, known brands and reputation and 
marketing resources that strengthen firms’ competitive position (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993; Teece, 1997). Accordingly, testing LB assets seeking FDI hypotheses may 
provide more potential insights into current theorizing regarding CMNEs’ FDI 
strategies.  
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Consequently, another hypothesis can be established:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese business group affiliated firms have a weaker strategic-
asset-seeking orientation towards LB assets (i.e. foreign brands) than non-
affiliated firms. 
 
 
2.3 Methodologies 
There are generally two ways that have been used to develop empirical research of 
CMNEs’ OFDI: one way is to investigate China’s OFDI activities by using aggregate-
level FDI data; the other way is to look at firm-level OFDI activities. Amighini et al. 
(2014) and others (Sutherland and Anderson, 2015) have shown that empirical research 
on China’s OFDI is compromised by the unreliability of using aggregate data. 
Aggregate FDI data largely ignores relevant features including details of industry 
composition, ownership structure and the modes of foreign entry. Indeed, FDI data in 
general has been seen as a biased measure of MNE subsidiary activity (Beugelsd ijk, 
Hennart, Slangen, and Smeets, 2010). Ning and Sutherland (2011) have found that 
aggregate FDI data largely ignores the issue of ‘round-tripping’ and ‘onward-
journeying’ investment, which is highly important for understanding the true 
determinants of CMNEs’ OFDI.  
 
Previous studies on Chinese firms’ outbound FDI projects mainly selected listed firms 
(Sutherland and Ning, 2011; Yang, Yang, Chen and Allen, 2014). However, my study 
focused on both listed, delisted and unlisted firms that had completed cross-border 
M&A deals. Yang, Yang, Chen and Allen (2014) exclude FDI projects in tax havens 
and offshore financial centres (THOFCs) as they believe those entities are simply 
investment holding companies. In fact, using the Orbis database, I found that some 
target firms located in THOFCs also own some patents and trademarks. Subsequently, 
achieving firm-level evidence is critically important to understand the true determinants 
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of CMNEs’ SAS FDI behaviours.  
 
According to recent news by CGTN 8 , “M&A is the major approach of overseas 
investment for Chinese enterprises; about 88 percent of over 2,858 agreements by 
Chinese companies overseas were completed via M&A between 2000 and 2016 [Center 
for China and Globalization]” (Nian, 2017). 
 
A lot of existing studies have shown that CMNEs seek strategic assets to alleviate their 
own competitive disadvantages (e.g. Agyenim et al. 2008; Deng, 2004, 2009; Luo and 
Tung, 2007; Peng, 2012; Zheng et al. 2016). This research may contribute to extant 
literature on CMNEs’ SAS FDI. Secondly, the mode of greenfield is relatively time 
consuming for a firm to achieve foreign advanced technologies or brands. Thirdly, in 
terms of data collection, Thomson One Banker (TOB) may allow us to access to 
Chinese firms’ firm-level CBM&As, while it is somewhat difficult to achieve Chinese 
firms’ detailed greenfield investment activities. 
 
For this study I used the firm-level approach to exploring CMNEs’ SAS orientation (i.e. 
patent seeking and trademark seeking). 
 
CBM&As has been seen as a faster mode of market entry for EMNEs, includ ing 
CMNEs (Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007) to expand their international product and 
consumer markets (Chen and Findlay, 2003; Deng, 2007, 2009; Wang and Boateng, 
2007), and in particular to acquire strategic assets in international markets (Agyenim, 
Wang and Yang, 2008). Further, Deng and Yang (2015) show that most OFDI from 
emerging countries has been embodied in CBM&As.  
 
Therefore, I mainly used CMNEs’ CBM&As as the research sample, exploring the 
influence of business group affiliation on specific SAS activities.  
                                                                 
8 CGTN refers to China Global Television Network, which is owned by China Central Television 
or Government of the People’s Republic of China.  
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The data for this study was mainly taken from two different sources, including the TOB 
and the Orbis Database. TOB provides data on the cross-border M&A deals that have 
been completed by CMNEs in the period between 2006 and 2015. Orbis database 
provided by Bureau van Dijk, covers 200 million companies around the world (Bureau 
van Dijk, 2016).Then I obtained the supplementary firm-level details about both 
acquirers and target firms from the Orbis database. I arrived at the final sample in the 
following four main stages.  
 
2.3.1 Data collection 
In the first stage, I collected the data on CMNEs’ CBM&As via TOB database. I needed 
to ensure that all target firms are located outside of Mainland China. All Chinese 
acquirers had to be firms originating in Mainland China. In this case, I ensured that the 
acquirer’s ultimate parent nation was in China. According to the standard OECD/IMF 
definition of FDI, I placed one condition for each acceptable M&A deal that the 
percentage, namely the value of the shareholdings after transaction stood between 10 
to 100% of total. In other words, Chinese acquirers owned more than 10% ownership 
of target firms. In this stage, I found 1,736 such deals between 2006 and 2015 in the 
TOB database.  
 
In the second stage, I obtained the Chinese acquirers’ firm- level information. Numerous 
challenges were encountered when collecting data about brand or trademark  
acquisitions, as these acquisitions are not made alone and become one part of an M&A 
deal (Frey, Ansar, and Wunsch-Vincent, 2015). However, the firm-level data from 
databases like Orbis have the advantage of providing considerable details about the 
target (and acquiring) firm’s intellectual property information, including both patents 
and trademarks. Using the Orbis database allows us to collect firm-level information, 
including target firms’ number of both patents and trademarks, acquirers’ date of 
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registration, firms’ sizes (i.e. number of employees), age, profitability (i.e. return on 
assets, profit margin), total assets as well as details on the size of the groups to which 
they belong. Firstly, having isolated target and acquiring firms from TOB, I used the 
‘batch-search’ function in Orbis to match each pair of firms. After this, I manua lly 
checked each firm’s details. For example, I discarded some target firms that were 
actually representing single locations and some of them that were originally Chinese  
firms, which amounted to 255 ineffective target companies in total. I further abandoned 
some target firms that are originally other Chinese foreign-based subsidiaries, which 
are not relevant for our research purpose. Furthermore, there were 25 repetitive M&A 
deals that were excluded. Another 89 target firms were simply part assets such as wind 
farms, oil, gold projects for which I cannot find any actual company registrat ion 
information. I also found five ineffective target observations for which there no details 
were found in the Orbis database.  
 
In the third stage, I started to check acquirers. Firstly, I excluded 136 Chinese acquirers 
which had been dissolved, according to the information given by Orbis. Secondly, 
checking acquirers’ global ultimate ownership (GUO), I found 26 acquirers are not 
indigenous Chinese firms. Thirdly, I excluded another 92 Chinese acquirers because 
they consisted of individual investors. Finally, I double-checked the remaining data 
sample, leaving finally 843 effective Chinese CBM&As involving 486 Chinese 
acquirers. 
 
2.3.2 Variables 
The notion of a strategic asset is somewhat broad and has been measured using different 
proxies in different studies. Both technology and brand seeking have been considered 
as vital elements of firms’ SAS FDI in the conceptual literature (Child and Rodrigues, 
2005; Luo and Rip, 2008; Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). For instance, Child 
and Rodrigues (2005) suggest that one important motivational factor for China’s OFDI 
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is to acquire technological and brand assets. Also, Luo and Tung (2007:485) state that: 
“Springboard links a firm's international expansion with its home base. For 
instance, EM MNEs (such as China's TCL, Lenovo, Chunlan, ZTE, and Haier) have 
reorganized their home supply or production bases to meet their increased global 
sales for high-end products, or have re-branded their homemade products after 
using foreign acquirees' technologies and trademarks.” 
 
As noted above, the novelty of this study is that it uses specific measures of target firms’ 
strategic assets (i.e. patents and brands). Most empirical studies to date have used 
country level proxies (i.e. Buckley et al. 2007; De Beule and Duanmu, 2012; Li, Li, and 
Shapiro, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012). Another innovative approach 
here, as noted, is the division of the SAS proxy into two types: NLB assets (i.e. patents) 
and LB assets (i.e. trademarks). Below, I specifically discuss all relevant variables in 
the models.  
 
2.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Strategic assets have been defined as ‘know-how, technologies, brands, equipment, 
buildings, and sites acquired or leased abroad with the aim of creating or extending 
advantages in the future, or in businesses and territories other than where the assets 
are currently employed and exploited’ (Petersen and Seifert, 2014:381).Such assets, as 
this definition implies, are largely akin to the broad conceptualization of FSAs, which 
are critically important for firms’ sustainable competitiveness. A great number of IB 
scholars have specifically treated patents as one SAS proxy for studying CMNEs’ OFDI 
(Anderson and Sutherland, 2015; Anderson, Sutherland, and Severe, 2015; Buckely et 
al. 2007; Chari and Acikgoz, 2016; De Deule and Duanmu, 2012; Deng and Yang, 2015; 
Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012; Zhao, 2009). 
However, little or no empirical research has tried to provide the empirical evidence of 
patent seeking activities in the target firm itself. Table 2.3.2.1 below specifica l ly 
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displays the most current empirical research on Chinese OFDI.  
 
There are two main issues. Firstly, aggregate FDI data has been tested to be a biased 
measure of MNE subsidiary activity (e.g. Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen, and Smeets, 
2010; Sutherland and Anderson, 2014). All firm-level empirical research of Chinese 
OFDI (displayed in Table 2.3.2.1) have demonstrated the positive result of SAS (e.g. 
Anderson and Sutherland, 2015; Cui, Meyer and Hu, 2014; De Beule and Duanmu, 
2012; Li, Li, and Shapiro, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012; Yang, Yang, 
Chen, and Allen, 2014). On the other hand, using aggregate FDI data bring us negative 
result of CMNEs’ SAS (Buckley et al. 2007; Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013). 
Therefore, the use of firm-level data can better assist us in finding out the real 
determinants of Chinese OFDI. The second issue lies in the measurement of strategic 
assets. Alon (2010:11) argues that ‘there is no theoretically established variable best 
suited to capture strategic-asset-seeking FDI’. Thus, existing empirical research cannot 
reach a consensus on CMNEs’ SAS FDI. For example, the IB scholars listed in Table 
2.3.2.1 selected various SAS proxy, but neglected trademarks (or brands) in defining a 
SAS proxy except for De Beule and Duanmu (2012). However, their study still added 
the data on trademarks at a country level rather than a firm level. In short, no empirica l 
research so far has tried to use either firm-level patent or trademark as a SAS proxy. 
One plausible explanation maybe attributed to the difficulties of collecting firm-leve l 
patent or trademark information.  
 
In this study I employ the target firm’s total patent count and number of trademarks 
(taken from Oribis) to proxy the NLB and LB assets respectively.  
 
I cannot neglect that using the trademark counts has several possible limitations. First 
of all, some brands acquired may already be recognized in the acquiring firms’ domestic 
market (i.e. their reputation has spread across their home market, giving them NLB 
properties as well. However, this study focused on CMNEs’ brand seeking FDI. Despite 
target firms’ brand reputation, foreign trademarks cannot be widely recognized by the 
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Chinese market because China is not an English-speaking country. As Pang (2017) 
suggests, “English is almost universally accepted as the language of international 
business, but domestic Chinese consumers will typically look for Chinese characters 
and colors before looking at the English version of a brand name. Therefore, a brand’s 
name in Chinese and its trade dress is critically important to not only the perception of 
the brand in China but also what effect its branding and marketing will have in helping 
it to succeed in China.”  
 
The second limitation of using trademark count is that it cannot represent trademark 
value. Extensive information on target firms’ brand value is not widely available. For 
example, according to a recent article in the Guardian, Monaghan (2017) reported that 
when Shanghai-based Bright Food bought Weetabix 9 , the world famous brands, 
especially in UK market, it had expected the cereal would become widely recognized 
in China and accepted by Chinese customers as part of a general trend towards more 
western eating habits. But the market share has disappointed so that China’s Bright 
Food sold Weetabix to the US Company Post Holdings (Monaghan, 2017). More or 
less, Weetabix will likely be recognized by more Chinese customers in future, but 
indeed it indeed needs time and unexpected marketing investment. 
 
However, an important focus of my study is exploring comparative location 
boundedness (i.e. comparative study on the distinction between NLB and LB assets 
seeking FDI). I believe that it is the comparative distinction between NLB and LB 
proxies, that is of great significance. There are also good reasons for supposing 
trademarks are more location bounded than patents.  
 
Based on the above discussion, I measured strategic assets by using the number of 
patents (TNPAT) and trademarks (TNTRADM) that target firms have registered and 
owned as dependent variables at the time of their acquisition (i.e. negative binomia l 
                                                                 
9 The Weetabix portfolio includes Alpen, the no.1 muesli brand in the UK, Ready Brek, Barbara’s 
and Weetos (Monaghan, 2017).  
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modelling). Furthermore, to further investigate the likelihoods of CMNEs’ specific type 
of SAS activities, I additionally built two dummy variables for patent seeking and 
trademark seeking activities respectively as dependent variables (i.e. logit modelling). 
If the target firm had at least one patent or one trademark, then I measured this variable 
as 1, and 0 otherwise. Overall, this firm-level study can allow us to find out the 
determinants of CMNEs’ specific SAS FDI. 
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Table 2.3.2.1 Summary of empirical studies on Chinese OFDI exploring the strategic asset seeking activities  1 
Authors Theoretical perspective Time period SAS proxy Dependent variables Evidence of strategic asset seeking?
and year of Study and Number of observations in the host countries
Alon, 2010 Institutional perspectives Firm level, 800 Chinese firms investing R&D spending Aggregate Chinese OFDI; Sector Yes; but only occurs in state sector
in 103 countries between 2003 and 2007  level OFDI
Anderson and Sutherland, Entry modes and Firm-level; 380 greenfield deals Three-way linear additive composite of Frequency count of Chinese Yes; Acquisitions are the primary mode 
2015 strategic asset seeking and 160 acquisition deals (1) state share of US Fortune 500 companies; FDI projects in the host state of strategic asset seeking  for
from 2003 to 2011  (2)Masters of Business Degrees Awarded; Chinese firms' OFDI in US
(3)national utility patents registered
Buckley et al. 2007 Capital market imperfections, Aggregate level; Annual patent registration in host country Annual outfolow of Chinese FDI NO; no significant result for 
special ownership advantages approved OFDI data strategic asset seeking
and institutional factors between 1984 and 2001
Cui, Meyer, and Hu, 2014 Awareness-motivation-capability Firm-level; 154 Chinese firms foreign technology, 12 items of measuring firms' SAS, Yes; foreign competition, governance 
 (AMC)  framework of brand asses, managerial know-how, market seeking, and structure and relevant financial
competitive dynamics global business information efficiency seeking intents of FDI and managerial capabilities are
 relevant about chinese firms' SAS intent
De Beule and Duanmu, Market seeking, natural resource Firm level; 121 acquisitions by chinese  number of patents and Dummy variable (1=the host Yes; chinese acquisitions are more likely to 
2012 , strategic asset seeking firms and 531 acquisitions by trademarks registrations in the host countries country receives take place in countries with 
Indian firms a MA entry from china, 0 otherwise; higher-level technological assets;
1=the host country receives a MA no positive and significant results  
entry from India, 0 otherwise about trademark seeking in
high-level manufacturing sector and mining industry
Drogendijk and Blomkvist, Cultural distance Aggregate level; Chinese firms' OFDI in The number of patents registered Chinese firms' OFDI in 174 countries No significant result
2013 174 countries between 2003 and 2009 in the host countries
Li, Li, and Shapiro, 2012 Knowledge seeking Firm-level; 410 Chinese firms The number of industry-specific Hazard of investment Yes; Chinese firms had a greater propensity
firm ownership between 1990 and 2009 patent information in host country firm's propensity to invest in a country  to invest in countries with technology advantages
in a given year
Ramasamy, Yeung, and Location choice and Firm level; 63 Chinese listed companies number of registered patents in host countries the number of Chinese investment Yes; all firms have strategic intent;  
Laforet, 2012 firm ownership 2006 and 2008 and the proportion of technology exports to projects in host countries the attractiion is commercially viable technology
total exports of the host countries rather than core research content (i.e. patents)
Yang, Yang, Chen, Allen, Traditional FDI vs SAS FDI Firm level; 191 FDI projects in 2008 the motivations are to seek or acquire dummy variable (SAS FDI Yes; industry openness and increased 
2014 with 100 A-share Chinese technology, marketing and was coded as 1) absorptive capacity
listed companies management extertise make chinese firms more likely 
to engage in SAS FDI
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2.3.2.2 Main independent variable 
Following prior research, I measured business group affiliation (BGA) using an 
indicator variable with value ‘1’ to indicate if the firm is affiliated to a business group, 
and 0 otherwise (Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, and Forsans, 2016; Chari, 2013; Chittoor, 
Kale, and Puranam, 2015; Kim and Lui, 2015; Ma, Yao, Xi, 2006; Ramaswamy, Li and 
Petitt, 2005; Wang, Yi, Kafouros, and Yan, 2015). I mainly followed four stages to 
check and confirm Chinese acquirers’ business group affiliation.  
 
Firstly, in 1998, the State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China launched the ‘Interim Provisions on the Administration of Enterprise 
Group Registration’ (Enterprise Registration Bureau, 2017). According to this business 
law, one first condition that an enterprise group should meet refers to the parent 
company of an enterprise group has a registered capital of £5 Million10 and at least five 
subsidiaries. Then I identified each firm’s business group affiliation according to the 
information provided by the Orbis database about the number of companies in a 
corporate group. However, some acquirers’ information in Orbis is so severely curtailed, 
that I had to find other viable approaches to identify their business group affiliat ion. 
Prior studies also identified a firm’s group affiliation through checking whether its 
ultimate controlling entity had more than one firm in that year (He, Mao, Rui and Zha, 
2013). Following the He et al.’ (2013) approach, I checked each acquirer’s global 
ultimate owners in Orbis database and searched their group-affiliated information.  
 
Thirdly, following previous studies (Lu and Ma, 2008; Xia, Ma, Lu, and Yiu, 2014), I 
identified enterprise group information from various editions of ‘Large Corporations 
of China’; a list from the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administra t ion 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC). The definition of those business groups 
listed in ‘Large Corporations of China’ is also according to “Enterprise Group 
                                                                 
10 The exchange rate was calculated as 1 pound to 10 RMB 
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Registration Management Interim Provisions”.  
 
Fourthly, I double-checked this measure of business group affiliation by using further 
related secondary sources (such as corporate websites, media reports, company annual 
reports reported in Chinese). 
 
2.3.2.3 Other control variables 
As for the firm-level factors, Deng (2012:413) mentions that:  
“Firm-level antecedents of the ICF [international of Chinese firms] are the focus 
of scholarly work using one basic strategic assumption. Scholars assume that 
Chinese firms choose to engage in international activity to enhance the value or 
competitiveness of the firm, and that these choices depend largely upon firm-
specific factors such as company size, ownership, export intensity and 
international experience.”  
 
To explore the true determinants of CMNEs’ specific SAS orientation, this study 
included three levels of controlling factors: firm level, industry level and country level. 
Table 2.3.2.2 displays all variables’ descriptions including measurement methods, data 
sources and expected relationship with dependent variables. Following Yang et al.’s 
(2014) empirical research, I considered the influence of government ownership in 
determining CMNEs’ SAS FDI behaviours. I used an indicator variable (STATE) with 
value 1 if the acquirer is mainly owned by the Chinese government, and 0 if otherwise. 
Yang et al. focused on Chinese firms that were listed either on the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Markets, while my study expanded its research sample to all listed, delisted, and 
unlisted firms. The data sample in this study, therefore, is about all Chinese firms that 
had done M&A deals between 2006 and 2015. Also, it was difficult to measure 
ownership control in this study by using the percentage of state ownership as Yang et 
al. did. Chinese stated-owned enterprises (SOEs) have more privileged support from 
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the Chinese government (Buckley et al., 2007; Child and Rodrigues, 2005), includ ing 
financial and policy support. Such government support may facilitate Chinese firms’ 
more risky SAS FDI (Ramasamy et al. 2012). In spite of that, similar prior studies about 
exploring determinants of EMNEs’ OFDI somewhat neglect the influence of state 
ownership on specific types of SAS FDI (e.g. Chair, 2013; Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, 
and Forsans, 2016).  
 
Yang et al. (2014) used intangible asset quantity and R&D capability to measure firms’ 
absorptive capacity. Following their research, I also added the two factors, but using 
different proxies. Accordingly, the logarithm-transformed number of patents (LANPAT) 
and trademarks (LANTRADM) were used to measure acquirers’ absorptive capacities  
and domestic market positions respectively. For instance, if one Chinese MNE has 
many known domestic brands and it still tends to acquire foreign brands, one better 
explanation is that this company wants to both strengthen domestic market positions 
and expand its reach into foreign markets. 
 
Moreover, firms may accumulate technological resources by establishing the own R&D 
centres (Martin and Salomon, 2003). Technological resources also represent firms’ 
absorptive capacity (Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, and Forsans, 2016). As discussed 
above, business groups have more resources to build the own R&D centres. I 
constructed a dummy variable to measure group-affiliated firms’ R&D centre (BG_RD), 
which was coded ‘1’ if the business group to which acquirers were affiliated had its 
own R&D centres, and ‘0’ if otherwise. Moreover, existing research also uses interna l 
financial resources to study its importance on SAS FDI (Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, 
and Forsans, 2016; Cui, Meyer and Hu, 2014). Likewise, the internal capital market 
variable (BG_FIN) was also simply applied. I coded ‘1’ if the business group affilia tes 
were involved in a financial industry, and ‘0’ if otherwise. 
 
In general, firm heterogeneity is controlled by the age and size of the firm. The firm’s 
age (LAGE) is based on total years since its incorporation and is also log-transformed 
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(Buckley et al. 2016; Cui et al. 2014). A firm’s age may determine its FDI decision as 
it largely brings to the accumulation of knowledge and experience (Wong, Hong, 
Kafouros, and Boateng, 2012). Longer established firms have a greater propensity to 
engage in SAS FDI than traditional FDI (Cui, Meyer and Hu, 2014; Xia, Ma, Lu, and 
Yiu, 2014; Yang et al. 2014). I expected that established Chinese firms are more likely 
to undertake sophisticated patents or trademarks seeking activities. Following Cui et al. 
(2014)’s approach, firms’ total assets in US dollars (LTASSET) was also log-
transformed to measure acquirers’ firm size in our study. In terms of financ ia l 
performance, Yang et al. (2014) suggest that better performing firms have a higher 
likelihood of engaging in relatively long-term investment, potentially including the 
SAS FDI. Hence, acquirers’ profit margin (PROFIT) was further employed as one 
control variable.  
 
Prior research also use an indicator variable to measure whether a firm is listed in a 
stock exchange and under market scrutiny or not (Chittoor, Kale, and Puranam, 2015). 
I expected to know whether Chinese firms choose to go public or not before their M&A 
deals. Public status (PUBLIC), as a control variable, was measured as a dummy variable 
whereby ‘1’ means the acquirer is listed, and ‘0’ if otherwise. If firms had been listed 
in a stock market, they would be more capable of raising funds to support SAS FDI 
activities. This study also used the ownership level of acquirers after M&A deals 
(OWNTRANS) as one of control variables, exploring whether there are some difference 
about acquirers’ ownership level in between patent seeking and trademark seeking 
activities.  
 
Furthermore, foreign experience has also been employed as one control variable to 
study its importance on firms’ SAS FDI behaviors (Buckley et al. 2016; Cui, Meyer and 
Hu, 2014; Yang et al. 2014). This study measured firms’ foreign experience (FEXPE) 
as a dummy variable with the value ‘1’ meaning Chinese acquirers have established one 
foreign subsidiary at least before acquiring a foreign company, and ‘0’ if otherwise. The 
Orbis database enables us to achieve Chinese acquirers’ foreign subsidiary information 
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with respect to their location and date of registration. If acquirers had already built 
subsidiaries in the foreign markets, they would have accumulated knowledge or 
resources and would be less likely to seek foreign patents or trademarks.  
 
In terms of industry types, I followed Jones and Temouri (2016)’s approach in 
classifying two-digit NACE industry codes into high technology (HITECH), medium 
technology (MEDTEC) and low technology (LOWTEC) manufacturing industr ies, 
knowledge intensive (KNINTEN) and less knowledge intensive (LEKNIN) service 
industries (as shown in table 2.3.2.2). Yang et al. (2014) argue that industry factors 
might lead to EMNEs’ distinct SAS FDI behaviors.  
 
Lastly, I controlled for time heterogeneity by including year dummies for each year in 
which CMNEs’ foreign M&A deals completed. Buckley et al. (2016:991) highlight the 
necessity of adding time control: “(1) the acquisitions are on a rising trend; and (2) 
various changes that occurred over time may have impacted the firm’s acquisition 
capabilities.”  
 
Table 2.3.2.2 Variable descriptions 2 
Variable name  Measurement Data source Expected 
sign 
Dependent variables 
TNPAT Number of target firm's patents ORBIS Database + 
TNTRADM Number of target firm's 
trademarks 
ORBIS Database + 
T_PAT 1 means the target has 1 patent at 
least, 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database + 
T_TRADE 1 means the target has 1 
trademark at least; 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database - 
LANPAT log(1+Acquirers' number of 
patents) 
ORBIS Database + 
LANTRADM log(1+acquirer's number of 
trademarks) 
ORBIS Database - 
Independent variables 
BGA 1 means the firm is affiliated to a 
business group, 0 otherwise 
large Corporations 
of China 2008; 
China National 
+ 
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Knowledge 
Infrastructure 
(CNKI); ORBIS 
Database; 
Corporate 
websites 
STATE 1 means the firm is a state-
owned, 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database; 
Corporate 
websites 
- 
BG_FIN 1 means the group affiliated firm 
has its own financial centre or it 
is involved in a financ ia l 
business, 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database; 
Corporate 
websites 
+ 
BG_RD 1 means the group affiliated firm 
has its own R&D centre, 0 
otherwise 
ORBIS Database; 
Corporate 
websites 
+ 
LAGE log(Firm's age) ORBIS Database - 
PROFIT Profit margin% ORBIS Database + 
LTASSET log(Total assets) ORBIS Database + 
PUBLIC 1 means the firm is a listed, 0 
otherwise 
ORBIS Database + 
OWNTRANS its ownership level % after 
M&As transaction 
Thomson One 
Database 
+ 
DEVOPED 1 means the target firm is located 
in a developed country, and 0 
otherwise 
ORBIS Database; 
UNCTAD 
statistics 
+ 
FEXPE 1 means the firm has one foreign 
subsidiary at least representing 
its foreign experience, 0 
otherwise 
ORBIS Database + 
INDRELATE 1 means the acquirer is involved 
in an industry which is mostly 
related to the target firm (the 
same two digit NACE coes), 0 
otherwise 
ORBIS Database + 
NACE codes Industry classifications ORBIS Database . 
HITECH Dummy variable where 
manufacturing firms included in 
NACE 2-digit codes: 21 and 26 
=1 and 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database + 
MEDTEC Dummy variable where 
manufacturing firms included in 
NACE 2-digit codes:19; 20; 22; 
23; 24; 25; 27; 28; 29; 30 and 33 
ORBIS Database + 
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=1 and 0 otherwise 
LOWTEC Dummy variable where 
manufacturing firms included in 
NACE 2-digit codes: 10; 11; 12; 
13; 14; 15; 16; 17; 18; 31 and 32 
=1 and 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database + 
KNINTEN Dummy variable where 
manufacturing firms included in 
NACE 2-digit codes: 50; 51; 58; 
59; 60; 61; 62; 63; 64; 65; 66; 69; 
70; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 78; 80; 84; 
85; 86; 87; 88; 89; 90; 91; 92 and 
93 =1 and 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database - 
LEKNIN Dummy variable where 
manufacturing firms included in 
NACE 2-digit codes: 45; 46; 47; 
49; 52; 53; 55; 56; 68; 77; 79; 81; 
82; 94; 95; 96; 97; 98 and 99 =1 
and 0 otherwise 
ORBIS Database - 
 
2.3.3 Research models 
As noted above, I obtained 843 effective CBM&As dating from between 2006 and 2015 
by 486 Chinese acquirers. In this study a pooled data set was mainly used for three main 
reasons.  
 
First and foremost, acquisition is not a regular activity for the most of firms, although I 
found a few Chinese firms had acquired foreign companies several times in the same 
year. The average number of foreign acquisition deals by Chinese firms is about 1.73 
(843 deals by 486 Chinese firms) over a ten-year period. Thus, there is dispersion in the 
data. As Buckley et al. (2016) suggest, such data is not best captured by employing 
panel data estimation models, but the pooled ordinary least square (POLS). Panel data 
estimation procedures generally assume there are cross-sectional and timer series 
relationships embedded in the data. My data does not fit this description well. Moreover, 
I was simply interested in whether the acquired firms had any patents or trademarks. It 
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is relatively unnecessary to observe from a longitudinal perspective. Secondly, given 
the relative stability in the variance across time in the business group affiliation, I 
selected cross-sectional data set instead of a longitudinal panel study. Thirdly, I focused 
on both SOEs and POEs, regardless of their public status. Admittedly, it was also 
difficult to achieve extensive information about both of them from 2006 to 2015, 
especially for unlisted ones.  
  
As for dependent variables, target firms’ patents and trademark counts likely include a 
number of zeros, meaning firms do not have any patents or trademarks. Then, it may 
discount the prediction of whether business group affiliation determine CMNEs’ patent 
seeking and trademark seeking FDI strategy. To test the business group affiliation on 
the likelihood of patent and trademark seeking FDI activities, I ran the probit regression 
model. Thus, models for testing the likelihood of patent seeking and trademark seeking 
are illustrated as follows:  
The probability of engaging in patent seeking or trademark seeking == 
1
{1+𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝛾}
                  
Where  
𝛾(𝑇_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡/𝑇_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡)  = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2 × 𝐵𝐺_𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽3 ×
𝐵𝐺_𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 × 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽5 × 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽7 ×
𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽8 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽9 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽10 × 𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽11 × 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽12 × 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽13 × 𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽14 ×
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝛽15 × 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝛽16 × 𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  +𝛽17 × 𝐿𝐸𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  + 
𝜀  
 
𝑇_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝑇_𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡  represent the target firm i in year t has at least one patent and 
trademark. 𝐵𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 in both models is the main independent variable referring to that 
1 means the target firm i is affiliated to a business group, and 0 otherwise. Particula r ly, 
all explanatory variables are mostly relevant to Chinese acquirers’ attributes and 
strategic choices, while dependent variables are simply about target firms’ patent and 
trademark information.  
 
The number of patents or trademarks was both a count and discrete variable, which 
ranges from zero to a certain positive number. Since it is non-negative, standard 
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multiple regression models or POLS mentioned above are not appropriate. A count data 
can be modelled as a Poisson or Negative binomial regression model. The Poisson 
model assumes that the number of acquisition deals happen at certain rate in a period 
of time that cannot effectively deal with the overdispersion. Therefore, I regarded the 
negative binomial regression model as a better choice. Following Greene’s (2003) 
suggestion, I also applied the Vuong test (Vuong, 1989) and then made the final choice. 
Since the Vuong Z-scores were insignificant, I finally adopted the negative binomia l 
models. Also, I followed prior studies (Buckley et al., 2016; Deng and Yang, 2015) to 
run the negative binomial regression models with respect to the tests for the amounts 
of patents and trademarks. The model equations are explained below: 
 
𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡/𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2 × 𝐵𝐺_𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽3 ×
𝐵𝐺_𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 × 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽5 × 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽7 ×
𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽8 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽9 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽10 × 𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽11 × 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽12 × 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽13 × 𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽14 ×
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽15 × 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽16 × 𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽17 × 𝐿𝐸𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝜀  
 
𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡  represent the number of patents and trademarks 
respectively that the target firm i has in year t. 
 
2.3.4 Estimations 
As for estimations, I firstly consider the existence of heteroscedasticity because the 
statistical tests of significance may be biased resulting in invalid variance estimation 
(Goldberger, 1964). The Breusch-Pagan test was applied to identify the problem of 
heteroscedasticity in a linear regression (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). The BP test result 
was significant meaning the heteroscedasticity occurred. Then I added the robust 
standard error analysis in estimations. Furthermore, multicollinearity was also tested in 
the whole process of estimations. Stata contains a “post-regression” command called 
“vif” (variance inflation factor) that can be utilized to detect multicollinearity. To 
calculate the VIF factor for𝛽?̂?, the following formula can be used:  
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𝑉𝐼𝐹 =
1
1 − 𝑅𝑖
2 
 
To generalize, a rule of thumb is that if VIF (𝛽?̂?) > 10, then multicollinearity is high 
(Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter, 2004).  
 
Last but not least, the endogeneity problem was addressed, since it has been widely 
recognized as an important issue in strategic management research (e.g. Brouthers, 
Brouthers, and Werner, 2003; Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013). He, Zhang and Wang 
(2015) argue that firm’s strategic choice is non-random or even self-selected which may 
be dependent on its organizational attributes that are hard to measure. If the endogeneity 
issue is neglected, it would result in biased parameter estimations (Hult, Ketchen, et al. 
2008). Firms’ foreign market seeking can be seen as an endogenous decision due to 
certain firm characteristics (He, Zhang, and Wang, 2015; Hult, Ketchen, et al. 2008). In 
this study, EMNEs tend to choose developed markets for SAS FDI (e.g. Deng, 2009; 
Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008). Based on UNCTAD’s country classificat ion, 
I classified whether the target country is located in a developed country or developing 
country. Thus, I added one more control variable ‘DEVEOPED’ (seen in Table 2.3.2.2), 
indicating that value ‘1’ means CMNEs tend to developed markets for SAS FDI and ‘0’ 
if otherwise. And it was treated as the key endogenous variable. Following that, I 
specifically introduced two instrument variables: the target country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and International Property Rights Index (IPRI) respectively. Next, I 
tested whether these two instrumental variables are not significantly correlated with 
dependent variables. As for dependent variables (T_PAT and T_TRADM), I ran an 
Instrument-variable (IV)probit model to estimate the data.  
 
Moreover, as I explored the main influence of business group affiliation on CMNEs’ 
SAS FDI, the potential selection bias has to be dealt with. Otherwise, it may also result 
in the endogeneity problem. For example, the group-affiliation sample may be selected 
based on some unobservable factors that potentially affect firms’ strategies (He, Mao, 
Rui, and Zha, 2013). Thus, I used the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage method to deal with 
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the self-selection bias. In the first stage, I estimated a probit model of business group 
affiliation on a group of variables that determine a firm’s group affiliation choice. Then 
I added the Lambda based on the probit estimate in the previous regression 
specifications, controlling potential self-section bias.  
 
Lastly, to better avoid possible endogeneity with the dependent variable in the model, I 
followed previous studies (i.e. Deng and Yang, 2015) and lagged all independent 
variables by one year. For example, I measured Chinese acquirers’ absorptive capacity 
by using the number of patents that they already had prior to any M&A deals. 
 
2.3.5 Robustness checks 
Following He et al. (2013), I considered the heterogeneity element within business 
groups for one lens of robustness tests. As discussed previously, business groups in 
emerging economies likely have an internal capital market or an R&D center. Therefore, 
after further considering these business group characteristics, I firstly examined the 
robustness of modelling results. Secondly, I split the full sample to two subsamples 
based on firms’ ownership type (such as SOEs and POEs), comparing the coefficients 
between these subsamples after estimations. Thirdly, as for testing the amounts of 
patents and trademarks, I further added the IV Two-State Least Squares (2SLS) 
regression model for robustness tests. For the purpose of solving the overdispersion 
problem, the IV_GMM regression model was specifically selected. Given the presence 
of heteroscedasticity, GMM estimation would be more efficient than standard IV 
regression (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003).  
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2.4 Research findings 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.4.1.1 presents the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation matrix for all 
variables in this study. Correlation analysis is mainly utilized to evaluate the degree of 
multicollinearity in the explanatory variables (Miller, 1988). I used the pairwise 
correlation analysis in Stata because the issue of missing values is to be addressed 
appropriately. I selected the significant level at 5 percent. We ran the VIF test, although 
variables in the correlation matrix were not highly correlated. Since the test results were 
less than 10, there were no serious collinearity issue (Kutner et al. 2004).  
 
The average number of patents that target firms had (470.95) is far larger than the 
average number of target firms’ trademarks (7.00) (Table 2.4.1.1). With respect to SAS 
orientation, CMNEs had close inclinations of patent seeking and trademark seeking 
FDI reaching 21% and 23% respectively. Interestingly, there was a greater proportion 
of Chinese acquirers affiliated to a business group, occupying 76% of the total number 
of acquirers. In terms of acquiring firms’ international experience, 73% of Chinese 
firms had invested abroad prior to their CBM&As. As for deals, the average of 
ownership level after M&As exceeded 73%, suggesting CMNEs generally seek high 
levels of control when undertaking CBM&As.  
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Table 2.4.1.1 Descriptive analysis results 1 
 
 
 91 
 
Table 2.4.1.2 mainly report the distribution of CMNEs’ SAS FDI projects. First of all, 
I can find that 69.07% of Chinese acquirers are affiliated to a business group, occupying 
75.56% CMNEs’ CBM&As from 2006 to 2015. There were more trademark seeking 
FDI projects (196) than patent-seeking FDI projects (177). Secondly, Chinese firms 
were more likely to acquire both patents and trademarks in these developed countries, 
including the United States of America (51 and 57 respectively), Germany (41 and 27 
respectively) and Japan (11 and 13 respectively). In addition, I found that CMNEs may 
also go to emerging economies (e.g. Republic of Korea) for patent and trademark 
seeking FDI. Target firms located in tax havens and offshore financial centers (e.g. 
Hong Kong, Virgin Islands (British), and Cayman Islands also have patents and 
trademarks.  
 
Table 2.4.1.2 Research sample characteristics 2 
Chinese MNEs' cross-
border M&A deals 
Counts Percent 
(Acquirers) 
Number of 
M&A deals 
Percent 
(M&A 
Deals) 
Chinese acquirers 514 1.0000 843 1 
Business group affilia ted 
acquirers 
355 0.6907 637 0.7556 
Business group with financ ia l 
centre 
212 0.4125 440 0.5219 
Business group with R&D 
centre 
256 0.4952 491 0.5824 
State-owned acquirers 224 0.4358 433 0.5136 
Privately-owned acquirers 290 0.5642 410 0.4864 
  
 
Percent 
(deals) 
 
M&As-Target firms 843 1.0000 
 
Target firms with patents 177 0.2100 
 
Target firms with trademarks 196 0.2325 
 
Total number of target 
countries 
59 
 
Top 15 locations 
 
Percent 
(deals) 
Target 
firm: >=1 
patent 
Target 
firm: >=1 
trademark 
United States of America 127 0.1507 51 57 
Australia 125 0.1483 10 7 
Hong Kong 84 0.0985 1 3 
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Germany 61 0.0724 41 27 
Canada 53 0.0629 5 7 
United Kingdom 52 0.0617 5 13 
Virgin Islands (British) 33 0.0391 0 1 
Singapore 27 0.0320 2 3 
Japan 26 0.0308 11 13 
Bermuda 24 0.0285 4 3 
Cayman Islands 19 0.0225 1 1 
France 17 0.0202 4 6 
Italy 16 0.0190 9 9 
Netherlands 13 0.0154 2 5 
Korea, Republic of  12 0.0142 4 7 
 
 
2.4.2 NLB assets seeking orientation 
Table 2.4.2.1 reports the results of probit regression model for testing the likelihood of 
NLB assets seeking FDI from model 1 to model 5. Models 1-5 were designed to test 
hypotheses 1-a, 1-b and 1-c. Model 1 was the base model without adding industry 
control variables (including HITECH, MEDTECH, MEDTEC, LOWTEC, KNINTEN, 
and LEKNIN). Model 2 added the industry control variables. Due to business group 
characteristics, Model 3 further added BG_FIN and BG_RD variables. As discussed 
above, in the beginning Chinese governments encouraged the formation of business 
groups, and therefore a larger ratio of Chinese SOEs are business group affiliated in our 
sample. Then I split two subsamples. Model 4 was mainly designed to study the Chinese 
SOE sample and model 5 for studying the Chinese POE sample.  
 
I achieved significant modelling results from model 1 to model 5. In terms of Pseudo 
R2, a better model fit from model 1 to model 3 was achieved. The mean VIF value in 
each model was less than 5, which means there was no multicollinearity problem 
affecting estimations.  
 
For hypotheses tests, first of all, the coefficients for BGA in both models 1 and 2 were 
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positive and significant (0.4398 at p < 0.01 and 0.5511 at p < 0.01 respective ly), 
indicating that Chinese business group affiliated firms are more likely to seek NLB 
assets (i.e. patents) than independent firms. In this regard, I can support the Hypothesis 
1-a. In model 3, I found that BG_RD was also positive and significant (0.6345 at 99.99% 
confidence level). But BG_FIN was insignificant and negative. Hence, we can reject 
Hypothesis 1-b, but accept Hypothesis 1-c. It means that Chinese acquirers affiliated to 
a business group with their own R&D center have higher likelihoods of seeking NLB 
assets from target firms. In contrast, the internal capital market within a business group 
may not significantly influence Chinese affiliated firms’ NLB assets seeking activit ies 
via CBM&As. Moreover, according to models 4-5, business group affiliation may 
significantly determine Chinese POEs’ likelihood of pursuing patents seeking FDI. 
There was no significant relationship between business group affiliation and Chinese 
SOEs’ likelihood of patents seeking FDI. 
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Table 2.4.2.1: Probit regression model-NLB assets seeking FDI 3 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  
Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 1.0325*** 1.1064*** 1.1223*** 1.2104*** 1.1632***  
0.1551 0.1619 0.1625 0.2574 0.2452 
BGA 0.4604** 0.5861** 0.1011 0.7560 0.5359**  
0.1603 0.1689 0.2298 0.5408 0.1930 
BG_FIN 
  
-0.0265 
  
   
0.1536 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.6524*** 
  
   
0.1831 
  
STATE -0.3871** -0.3356* -0.4097** 
  
 
0.1315 0.1339 0.1429 
  
LAGE -0.0650 -0.1139 -0.1574 -0.1223 -0.0825  
0.1145 0.1196 0.1245 0.1694 0.1872 
PROFIT 0.0033 0.0038 0.0030 -0.0043 0.0096**  
0.0024 0.0025 0.0026 0.0039 0.0034 
LTASSET -0.0488 -0.0153 -0.0049 0.0068 -0.0446  
0.0304 0.0332 0.0362 0.0503 0.0498 
LANPAT 0.0653** 0.0571* 0.0546* 0.0091 0.1338**  
0.0217 0.0258 0.0259 0.0350 0.0417 
LANTRADM 0.0619 0.0665 0.0443 0.1226 -0.0127  
0.0627 0.0713 0.0731 0.1151 0.0948 
FEXPE -0.1855 -0.2527+ -0.2527+ -0.4114* -0.1642  
0.1362 0.1372 0.1389 0.2049 0.1871 
PUBLIC 0.0368 0.0132 0.0512 0.0693 0.1421  
0.1149 0.1181 0.1210 0.1678 0.1809 
OWNTRANS -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0020 0.0009 -0.0066*  
0.0017 0.0018 0.0018 0.0025 0.0026 
HITECH 
 
1.0868*** 1.1157*** 0.9581* 1.1191*   
0.2466 0.2532 0.4089 0.4812 
MEDTEC 
 
0.6540** 0.7320*** 0.5468* 0.7333   
0.1934 0.2005 0.2337 0.4568 
LOWTEC 
 
0.8026** 0.9361** 0.2544 1.1256*   
0.2867 0.2954 0.4768 0.5085 
KNINTEN 
 
0.2647 0.3834 0.2798 0.3932   
0.2329 0.2375 0.2984 0.4827 
LEKNIN 
 
0.2379 0.3495 0.1614 0.2126   
0.2623 0.2715 0.3388 0.5192 
Constant -0.2444 -1.3785+ -1.5629+ -2.3022 -0.8846  
0.7001 0.8292 0.8721 1.4789 1.2534 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 102.92 139.32 153.54 69.64 83.29 
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Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1382 0.1763 0.1929 0.179 0.2305 
Log 
pseudolikelihoo
d 
-351.3427 -335.8141 -329.03864 -158.792 -161.3662 
Mean vif 2.34 2.38 2.42 2.38 2.38 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
 
Table 2.4.2.2 displays results on studying CMNEs’ NLB assets by applying negative 
binomial regression models. Models 6-10 used the number of target firms’ patents as 
dependent variables. Equally, model 6 did not add industry variables. Model 8 further 
added BG_FIN and BG_RD, and models 9-10 were made to address SOE and POE 
sample. These six models are all significant at p value less than 0.001. The LR test of 
alpha allows us to decide whether we choose the Poisson or Negative binomia l 
regression model. I found that LR test results were all significant and then reject the 
null hypothesis of choosing the Poisson regression model.  
 
As discussed above, since there was overdispersion in our data, the ‘Voung’ test allows 
us to consider whether I need to use the zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
model instead of the standard negative binomial regression model. Except for model 6, 
I achieved insignificant Voung test results for models 7-10. Then I kept using a standard 
negative binomial regression model for testing hypotheses. The BGA variable was 
significant if I selected 90% confidence interval from model 7. I achieved a more 
significant result on BG_RD in model 8 which its coefficient was 3.9384 at 99.99% 
confidence interval. Then I can conclude that group affiliated firms are more likely to 
acquire the target firm that has a larger quantity number of patents, especially for those 
business groups having their own R&D center. As for ownership difference, I found 
that business group affiliation can significantly facilitate Chinese SOEs’ amounts of 
patent seeking FDI, but not for those of Chinese POEs.  
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Table 2.4.2.2: Negative binomial regression-NLB assets seeking FDI 4 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10  
Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 2.4235*** 2.6052*** 2.7149*** 4.4224*** 3.5848***  
0.6361 0.6110 0.6339 0.9279 0.5550 
BGA 1.0993+ 1.8118** -0.1447 6.2930*** 1.2515*  
0.6074 0.6022 0.8084 1.7813 0.5329 
BG_FIN 
  
-1.5929* 
  
   
0.6353 
  
BG_RD 
  
4.3827*** 
  
   
0.7051 
  
STATE -0.2710 -0.6779 -1.2888* 
  
 
0.5663 0.4849 0.5245 
  
LAGE -0.2284 -0.3275 -0.9095+ -2.2988* 0.8927*  
0.4990 0.4079 0.5022 1.0426 0.4086 
PROFIT -0.0080 -0.0057 -0.0077 -0.0790** 0.0179*  
0.0102 0.0073 0.0075 0.0258 0.0072 
LTASSET -0.0353 0.0042 0.0253 0.2185 0.0811  
0.1015 0.0876 0.0875 0.1355 0.1366 
LANPAT 0.5038*** 0.4033*** 0.4131*** 0.0790 0.6004***  
0.0817 0.0842 0.0843 0.1295 0.0847 
LANTRADM 0.3257 0.5270* 0.2916 0.5172 -0.6180**  
0.2675 0.2352 0.2586 0.5424 0.1987 
FEXPE -0.7490+ -0.7911* -0.8735+ -4.4369*** -0.2733  
0.4299 0.4031 0.4716 0.9862 0.5149 
PUBLIC -0.5397 -0.4140 -0.3179 -2.5191*** 0.2417  
0.4583 0.4374 0.4665 0.6757 0.4972 
OWNTRANS 0.0048 0.0014 0.0033 -0.0140 -0.0219**  
0.0060 0.0057 0.0060 0.0095 0.0070 
HITECH 
 
1.5216+ 1.8410* 1.3910 2.6534+   
0.8008 0.8754 1.5496 1.3904 
MEDTEC 
 
1.8068** 1.8174** 2.2629+ 2.7329*   
0.6783 0.6901 1.2438 1.2533 
LOWTEC 
 
0.0870 1.5531 1.6962 3.1600+   
0.9819 1.2302 1.8004 1.6497 
KNINTEN 
 
-1.4338+ -0.7985 1.4068 0.5417   
0.7369 0.7931 1.5370 1.3360 
LEKNIN 
 
-0.7412 0.2446 -3.3901* 2.0526   
0.7997 0.9362 1.3985 1.3575 
Constant 0.6804 -1.5595 -0.4341 -2.3229 -6.256662  
2.6314 2.0191 2.1405 3.8300 2.0441 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 289.31 458.71 479.86 308.52 501.19 
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Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0499 0.057 0.0626 0.0701 0.1135 
Log 
pseudolikelihoo
d 
-1251.5346 -1242.2101 -1234.8364 -564.6423 -625.8147 
LR test of alpha=0 
Prob>=chibar2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean vif 2.34 2.38 2.42 2.38 2.38 
Voung test of zinb vs standard negative binomial (inflate _cons) 
z 0.49 0.55 -0.01 1.47 -0.03 
Pr>z 0.311 0.2917 0.5049 0.0713 0.513 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
 
Furthermore, I added robustness checks to better deal with potential endogeneity 
problems in the estimations. Table 2.4.2.3 reported the Ivprobit regression model on 
NLB assets seeking FDI. Wald tests of exogeneity in models 11-15 were all significant, 
meaning DEVOPED is an endogenous variable. Additionally, the acceptable threshold 
of VIF value should be less than 10 (Hair et al. 1995; Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 
1989). In this study, the mean value of all VIFs from model 11 to model 15 is well 
below 4, indicating that these models do not suffer from serious problems of 
multicollinearity. The variable ‘DEVOPED’ was significant and positive from Model 
11 to Model 15 at the 99.99% confidence interval. In short, Chinese firms were more 
likely to choose developed countries for patents seeking investment.  
 
By comparison, ‘BGA’ in Models 1-2 and Models 11-12 respectively are both 
significant and positive, which therefore provides stronger evidence showing that 
Chinese group-affiliated firms tend to seek NLB assets. ‘LANPAT’ in model 5 and 
model 15 are both positive and significant at the 99% confidence interval, which means 
Chinese POEs’ innovation performance significantly determines their likelihood of 
seeking foreign technologies via M&As. As for industry control variables, both model 
2 and model 12 shows that ‘HITECH’, ‘MEDTEC’ and ‘LOWTEC’ are all positive and 
significant.  
 
 98 
 
Table 2.4.2.3: Ivprobit regression model -NLB assets seeking FDI 5 
Models Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
DEVOPED 1.6805*** 1.8309*** 1.8343*** 1.9806*** 1.9014*** 
  0.2228 0.2267 0.2300 0.3511 0.3074 
BGA (H 1-a) 0.4129** 0.5189** 0.0817 0.7864 0.4254* 
  0.1573 0.1656 0.2181 0.4894 0.1928 
BG_FIN (H 1-b) 
  
0.0575 
  
  
  
0.1491 
  
BG_RD (H 1-c) 
  
0.5434** 
  
  
  
0.1786 
  
STATE -0.3642** -0.3029* -0.3792** 
  
  0.1271 0.1297 0.1395 
  
LAGE 0.0104 -0.0291 -0.0673 -0.0324 -0.0262 
  0.1071 0.1122 0.1157 0.1618 0.1723 
PROFIT 0.0043+ 0.0048* 0.0040 -0.0002 0.0089** 
  0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 0.0043 0.0032 
LTASSET -0.0467 -0.0098 -0.0062 0.0224 -0.0324 
  0.0302 0.0326 0.0352 0.0476 0.0510 
LANPAT 0.0468* 0.0400 0.0407 -0.0022 0.1133** 
  0.0216 0.0248 0.0250 0.0336 0.0392 
LANTRADM 0.0503 0.0463 0.0258 0.0588 -0.0250 
  0.0605 0.0675 0.0691 0.1110 0.0897 
FEXPE -0.2644* -0.3290* -0.3330* -0.4862* -0.2047 
  0.1332 0.1340 0.1358 0.1970 0.1839 
PUBLIC 0.1300 0.1185 0.1483 0.1844 0.2101 
  0.1105 0.1139 0.1164 0.1635 0.1716 
OWNTRANS -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0026 0.0005 -0.0078** 
  0.0016 0.0017 0.0017 0.0024 0.0025 
HITECH 
 
1.1094*** 1.1461*** 1.2376** 1.0510* 
  
 
0.2412 0.2476 0.3807 0.4664 
MEDTEC 
 
0.6349** 0.7124*** 0.5837* 0.7451+ 
  
 
0.1878 0.1946 0.2281 0.4434 
LOWTEC 
 
0.8058** 0.9291** 0.3326 1.1218* 
  
 
0.2786 0.2864 0.4554 0.4964 
KNINTEN 
 
0.2738 0.3783+ 0.2959 0.3980 
  
 
0.2233 0.2290 0.2851 0.4692 
LEKNIN 
 
0.3927 0.4828+ 0.3296 0.4073 
  
 
0.2522 0.2604 0.3177 0.5108 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.7619 -2.0336* -2.0975* -3.3298* -1.4887 
  0.6930 0.8063 0.8436 1.3720 1.1903 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 134.51 191.3 204.4 96.57 120.81 
 99 
 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-602.3701 -575.2191 -567.5770 -293.8573 -248.8329 
Wald test of exogeneity 
chi2 13.4 15.43 14.6 6.88 9.81 
Prob>chi2 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0087 0.0017 
Mean vif 2.4 2.42 2.46 2.43 2.43 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
 
 
Table 2.4.2.4 presented the IVgmm regression model. The DWH test displayed in Table 
2.4.2.4 (Models 16-20) proved that DEVOPED is an endogenous variable. To test the 
overidentifying restrictions in the context of GMM, we employed J statistic of Hansen 
(1982). Hansen J results in models 16-20 were all insignificant, meaning the two 
instrumental variables were appropriately utilized in the IVgmm regression models. I 
consistently found DEVELOPED was significant and positive in Models 16-20. 
Moreover, I found that BGA in Model 16 and Model 17 are both significant and positive, 
meaning business group affiliation also significantly facilitates CMNEs’ amounts of 
NLB asset seeking FDI. BG_RD in Model 18 is significant and positive (0.3887 at p 
value <0.01). BG_FIN is still not significant. However, I did not find a significant 
difference about the influence of business group affiliation between SOE samples and 
POE samples.  
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Table 2.4.2.4: IV(GMM) regression-NLB asset seeking FDI 6 
Models Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
DEVOPED 1.3378*** 1.3262*** 1.2751*** 1.5196*** 1.3209*** 
  0.1955 0.2029 0.2052 0.3824 0.2449 
BGA (H 1-a) 0.3250* 0.3448* 0.0035 0.5395 0.1751 
  0.1498 0.1546 0.1838 0.4493 0.1915 
BG_FIN (H 1-b) 
  
0.1687 
  
  
  
0.1883 
  
BG_RD (H 1-c) 
  
0.3887** 
  
  
  
0.1185 
  
STATE -0.3704* -0.3354+ -0.4156* 
  
  0.1753 0.1772 0.1907 
  
LAGE 0.1554 0.1034 0.0641 -0.0365 0.1466 
  0.1149 0.1146 0.1142 0.1644 0.1572 
PROFIT 0.0022 0.0023 0.0017 -0.0009 0.0031 
  0.0017 0.0018 0.0017 0.0033 0.0024 
LTASSET -0.0311 0.0016 0.0016 0.0423 -0.0044 
  0.0268 0.0294 0.0293 0.0492 0.0472 
LANPAT 0.0970*** 0.0813** 0.0821** -0.0270 0.2226*** 
  0.0278 0.0311 0.0316 0.0319 0.0601 
LANTRADM 0.0542 0.0645 0.0365 0.2062 -0.1438 
  0.0779 0.0815 0.0821 0.1300 0.1068 
FEXPE -0.2172 -0.2394 -0.2447 -0.4016+ -0.1241 
  0.1581 0.1573 0.1559 0.2431 0.2022 
PUBLIC -0.0592 -0.0734 -0.0569 0.0564 -0.0636 
  0.1248 0.1234 0.1226 0.1615 0.1809 
OWNTRANS -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0043 
  0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0028 0.0028 
HITECH 
 
0.6908* 0.7221** 0.8120 0.5854+ 
  
 
0.2693 0.2675 0.5068 0.3414 
MEDTEC 
 
0.4502* 0.5111** 0.2336 0.6295* 
  
 
0.1911 0.1927 0.2349 0.3033 
LOWTEC 
 
0.5334* 0.6029** 0.2049 0.9613** 
  
 
0.2208 0.2222 0.2948 0.3396 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0254 0.1005 -0.1430 0.2373 
  
 
0.2017 0.2042 0.2827 0.3040 
LEKNIN 
 
0.2477 0.3139 -0.1619 0.6554+ 
  
 
0.2191 0.2213 0.2701 0.3446 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Constants -0.0137 -0.8407 -0.8000 -1.7449 -0.5869 
  0.6519 0.7477 0.7324 1.4404 0.9437 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 76.62 92.69 96.91 38.69 79.33 
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Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0294 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0641 0.0802 0.0921 0.0366 0.1972 
DWH test 
Robust score chi2 25.1732 
(p=0.0000) 
24.7525 
(p=0.0000) 
23.3523 
(p=0.0000) 
11.343 
(p=0.0008) 
15.672 
(p=0.0001) 
Robust 
regression F 
25.9768 
(p=0.0000) 
25.4433 
(p=0.0000) 
23.9057 
(0.0000) 
11.5601 
(p=0.0007) 
14.5641 
(p=0.0002) 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansens J chi2 1.44996 
(p=0.2285) 
1.11971 
(p=0.2900) 
1.22091 
(p=0.2692) 
1.52054 
(p=0.2175) 
0.225254 
(0.06351) 
Mean vif 2.4 2.42 2.46 2.43 2.43 
Notes: GMM weight matrix: robust; +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Robust standard 
error (italic); coefficient (underline) 
 
As noted above, I also used the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage method to deal with self-
selection bias. I added the lambda into models 1-20 (seen from Table A2.4.2.1 to 
TableA2.4.2.4 in the appendix). However, I still achieved quite consistent and similar 
results, especially on the main variables of BGA, BG_FIN, and BG_RD.  
 
For further comparative explanations, I conducted a marginal effect analysis as Table 
2.4.2.5 shows. Firstly, I can easily find that results on the influence of BGA and BG_RD 
are consistent in the probit model and the ivprobit model. In model 2-mar, if a Chinese 
firm is affiliated to a business group, then there is 12.64% possibility of a patents-
oriented acquisition. After addressing the endogeneity problem, such possibility of 
seeking patents-oriented acquisition increases to 51.89% (seen model 12-mar). 
Likewise, based on model 13-mar, I can reach that business groups having their own 
R&D centers imply that their affiliated firms have 54.34% of pursuing NLB assets in 
foreign acquisition deals. More importantly, BGA is simply significant and positive in 
the POE sample (model 15-mar). It means business group affiliation plays a significant 
role on the NLB assets seeking of Chinese POEs other than SOEs.  
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Table 2.4.2.5 Marginal effects-NLB assets seeking FDI 7 
  Model 1-
mar 
Model 2-
mar 
Model 3-mar Model 4-
mar 
Model 5-mar 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.1059** 0.1246*** 0.0234 0.1174* 0.1331** 
  0.0330 0.0311 0.0523 0.0565 0.0468 
1.BG_FIN 
  
-0.0062 
  
  
  
0.0363 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.1453*** 
  
  
  
0.0375 
  
  Model 11-
mar 
Model 12-
mar 
Model 13-
mar 
Model 14-
mar 
Model 15-
mar 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.4129** 0.5189** 0.0817 0.7864 0.4254* 
  0.1573 0.1656 0.2181 0.4894 0.1928 
1.BG_FIN 
  
0.0575 
  
  
  
0.1491 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.5434** 
  
  
  
0.1786 
  
Notes: The marginal effect results on models 1-5 are displayed in from Model 1-mar to Model 5-
mar; The marginal effect results on models 11-15 are displayed in from Model 11-mar to Model 
15-mar;  
Significance: +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001; Robust standard error (italic); 
coefficient (underline); i.BGA, i.BG_FIN, and i.BG_RD represent the three variables are dummy 
variables in modelling estimations. 
 
Below, I display two further charts relating to the average marginal effects on the 
probability of patents seeking FDI. I also added variables about industry control 
variables (Figure 2.4.2.1 and Figure 2.4.2.2). Obviously, Chinese firms involved in the 
higher technology manufacturing industry have the highest likelihoods of seeking NLB 
assets (i.e. Patents).  
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Figure 2.4.2.1 NLB assets seeking FDI–BGA and Industry types (Model 12-mar) 3 
 
 
Figure 2.4.2.2 NLB assets seeking FDI- Business group characteristics (Model 13-mar) 4 
 
Results from models 11-15 are mainly used to test hypotheses in this study. On balance, 
I accept the Hypothesis 1-a, Hypothesis 1-c and reject Hypothesis 1-b. In short, the 
business group affiliation significantly facilitates CMNEs’ both likelihoods and 
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amounts of NLB assets seeking FDI (i.e. patents) via CBM&As. Such positive 
influence would be further enhanced if business groups had their own R&D centers.  
 
2.4.3 LB asset seeking orientation 
Table 2.4.3.1 presents results of the probit regression model for testing the likelihood 
of LB assets seeking FDI (i.e. trademarks) from model 21 to model 25. Models 21-25 
were made to test hypothesis 2-a, 2-b and 2-c. Model 21 was the base model without 
employing industry control variables. I added the control variables into the Models 22-
25. Equally, I added BG_FIN and BG_RD variables into model 23 equally, further 
exploring the influence of business group characteristics on Chinese firms’ likelihood 
of LB assets seeking FDI (i.e. trademarks). Model 24 and Model 25 are split samples 
including SOE sample and POE sample.  
 
Compared to previous models studying the likelihood of patent seeking orientation, I 
did not find significant results on BGA affecting the likelihood of trademark seeking 
orientation from models 21-23. The BG_RD is positive and significant (0.3850 at 95% 
confidence level). It means Chinese business groups which have their own R&D centers 
significantly assist member firms to acquire target firms having trademarks. Hence, I 
can reject hypothesis 2-c, but accept hypothesis 2-a and hypothesis 2-b in terms of 
likelihood of trademark seeking.  
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Table 2.4.3.1 Probit model-LB assets seeking FDI 1 
Variable Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25  
Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 0.7862*** 0.8019*** 0.7859*** 0.5378** 1.1577***  
0.1399 0.1461 0.1482 0.2036 0.2147 
BGA 0.1067 0.1045 -0.1436 -0.4408 0.1792  
0.1521 0.1587 0.2143 0.4773 0.1880 
BG_FIN 
  
0.0193 
  
   
0.1490 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.3330* 
  
   
0.1658 
  
STATE -0.3842** -0.3679** -0.4159** 
  
 
0.1295 0.1297 0.1370 
  
LAGE -0.0634 -0.1194 -0.1478 -0.1883 -0.0691  
0.1051 0.1045 0.1063 0.1548 0.1540 
PROFIT 0.0022 0.0023 0.0020 -0.0042 0.0078**  
0.0020 0.0021 0.0022 0.0037 0.0030 
LTASSET -0.0206 0.0110 0.0161 0.0628 -0.0527  
0.0280 0.0295 0.0311 0.0432 0.0443 
LANPAT 0.0213 0.0143 0.0127 -0.0282 0.0613  
0.0213 0.0252 0.0253 0.0362 0.0402 
LANTRADM 0.1469* 0.1610* 0.1444* 0.1679 0.1750*  
0.0606 0.0656 0.0661 0.1115 0.0882 
FEXPE 0.0345 0.0015 -0.0016 -0.1233 0.0441  
0.1291 0.1308 0.1317 0.2023 0.1799 
PUBLIC -0.1523 -0.2183+ -0.2054+ -0.1578 -0.1027  
0.1119 0.1135 0.1149 0.1603 0.1743 
OWNTRANS -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0028+ 0.0015 -0.0093***  
0.0016 0.0017 0.0017 0.0024 0.0025 
HITECH 
 
0.4626* 0.4801* -0.1117 1.3988**   
0.2296 0.2331 0.3890 0.4716 
MEDTEC 
 
0.3376+ 0.3729+ 0.1658 1.2211**   
0.1883 0.1930 0.2319 0.4465 
LOWTEC 
 
0.7374** 0.7951** 0.8353* 1.3649**   
0.2726 0.2764 0.3668 0.5089 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0174 0.0755 -0.1260 0.8747+   
0.2226 0.2253 0.2788 0.4772 
LEKNIN 
 
0.0536 0.1169 -0.0582 0.8586+   
0.2421 0.2465 0.3194 0.4819 
Constant -0.5837 -1.2767+ -1.3262+ -1.7818 -0.7680  
0.6317 0.7219 0.7414 1.1843 1.2905 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 77.58 88.82 89.55 39.91 80.26 
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Prob>chi2 0 0 0 0.0218 0 
Pseudo R2 0.1085 0.1269 0.1319 0.107 0.2023 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-381.9872 -374.0721 -371.9212 -176.8035 -177.6241 
Mean vif 2.34 2.38 2.42 2.38 2.38 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
 
Table 2.4.3.2 presents modelling results on studying the amount of CMNEs’ trademark 
seeking FDI using the negative binomial regression model. Models 26-30 used the 
number of target firms’ trademarks as proxies of LB assets, seen as dependent variables. 
I found significant and positive results on BGA in model 26. However, model 26 did 
not factor in industry control variables. Models 27-30 which add industry control 
variables, have better fitting models in terms of Pseudo R2 values. In models 27-30 
BGA was significant in all models. Then I can accept hypothesis 2-a that Chinese 
business group affiliated firms have weaker orientation of seeking amounts of 
trademarks-orientated FDI. Selecting the 90% confidence interval allowed us to 
achieve the significant variable of BG_FIN. Then I reject hypothesis 2-c in terms of 
amounts of trademark seeking. In short, an internal capital market within a business 
group can facilitate member firms’ LB assets acquisitions (i.e. trademarks). Also, I 
accept hypothesis 2-c since BG_RD in model 28 is also insignificant.  
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Table 2.4.3.2: Negative binomial regression-LB assets seeking FDI 2 
Variable Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 1.8893*** 1.9139*** 1.9472*** 1.5066** 3.2802*** 
  0.3407 0.3597 0.3561 0.5443 0.4313 
BGA 1.0553** 0.5786 0.0022 -0.7616 0.2502 
  0.3688 0.3793 0.5016 0.9555 0.3957 
BG_FIN 
  
0.9051* 
  
  
  
0.3854 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.2768 
  
  
  
0.3871 
  
STATE -0.4792 -0.5738+ -0.7024* 
  
  0.3389 0.3209 0.3222 
  
LAGE 0.1746 -0.2184 -0.2833 -0.4141 0.0766 
  0.2910 0.2886 0.2881 0.3979 0.3161 
PROFIT 0.0054 0.0063 0.0055 -0.0091 0.0126 
  0.0060 0.0056 0.0059 0.0121 0.0092 
LTASSET 0.1157 0.1578* 0.1053 0.2706* 0.0797 
  0.0738 0.0768 0.0812 0.1135 0.1112 
LANPAT 0.1455* 0.1241* 0.1379* -0.0784 0.3533*** 
  0.0585 0.0617 0.0622 0.0854 0.0783 
LANTRADM 0.0316 0.2246 0.1434 0.8195*** -0.3175 
  0.1606 0.1710 0.1737 0.2108 0.2002 
FEXPE -0.3259 -0.1290 -0.3290 -1.1695* -0.2918 
  0.3344 0.3292 0.3264 0.4740 0.4041 
PUBLIC -0.1695 -0.7134** -0.7578** -0.3346 -0.6264+ 
  0.2789 0.2713 0.2772 0.4387 0.3703 
OWNTRANS -0.0008 -0.0042 -0.0045 0.0060 -0.0154** 
  0.0040 0.0039 0.0040 0.0058 0.0050 
HITECH 
 
-0.2477 -0.2017 -2.3919* 3.4348** 
  
 
0.5906 0.5806 0.9910 1.0587 
MEDTEC 
 
0.2037 0.3415 -0.4679 2.9538** 
  
 
0.5774 0.5828 0.8361 1.0030 
LOWTEC 
 
1.7292* 2.0134** 1.0141 5.1935*** 
  
 
0.7073 0.7193 1.0060 1.1733 
KNINTEN 
 
-0.5431 -0.3939 -1.3514+ 2.5443* 
  
 
0.5762 0.5804 0.7449 1.0502 
LEKNIN 
 
-1.1726* -1.1014+ -2.9171*** 3.7657** 
  
 
0.5993 0.6074 0.8201 1.1412 
Constant -4.7914** -3.9685* -2.8849 -5.5366+ -3.2686 
  1.7443 1.8384 1.8852 3.3031 2.0520 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 145.85 174.63 185.63 143.05 175.93 
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Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.0429 0.0445 0.0477 0.0858 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-1078.3804 -1070.6902 -1068.9548 -472.9467 -561.6452 
LR test of alpha=0 
Prob>=chibar2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean vif 2.34 2.38 2.42 2.38 2.38 
Voung test of zinb vs standard negative binomial (inflate _cons) 
z -0.91 -2.01 -3.25 1.02 0.22 
Pr>z 0.8187 0.9778 0.9994 0.1542 0.4143 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
 
 
 
Table 2.4.3.3 reports results on studying the likelihood of trademarks seeking via 
Ivprobit regression model. In models 31-35 the Wald test of exogeneity was significant 
in all models, meaning DEVOPED is an endogenous variable for studying Chinese 
firms’ foreign trademark seeking FDI. As for hypotheses tests, I accept hypothesis 2-a, 
hypothesis 2-b, and hypothesis 2-c, since I found BGA, BG_FIN, and BG_RD were 
insignificant.  
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Table 2.4.3.3: Ivprobit regression model-LB assets seeking FDI 3 
Models Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
DEVOPED 1.3757*** 1.4417*** 1.4277*** 1.1974** 1.8607*** 
  0.2230 0.2235 0.2261 0.3730 0.2572 
BGA 0.0808 0.0658 -0.1691 -0.3429 0.0818 
  0.1473 0.1554 0.2094 0.4353 0.1855 
BG_FIN 
  
0.0906 
  
  
  
0.1439 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.2727 
  
  
  
0.1668 
  
STATE -0.3678** -0.3422** -0.3956** 
  
  0.1254 0.1257 0.1321 
  
LAGE -0.0015 -0.0546 -0.0791 -0.1143 -0.0453 
  0.1047 0.1038 0.1052 0.1544 0.1517 
PROFIT 0.0031 0.0032 0.0028 -0.0010 0.0071* 
  0.0021 0.0022 0.0022 0.0042 0.0029 
LTASSET -0.0200 0.0148 0.0147 0.0709+ -0.0390 
  0.0279 0.0293 0.0309 0.0421 0.0433 
LANPAT 0.0081 0.0043 0.0045 -0.0359 0.0517 
  0.0214 0.0247 0.0249 0.0352 0.0386 
LANTRADM 0.1316* 0.1359* 0.1204+ 0.1207 0.1396+ 
  0.0599 0.0641 0.0642 0.1106 0.0844 
FEXPE -0.0357 -0.0728 -0.0816 -0.1769 -0.0317 
  0.1290 0.1294 0.1304 0.1993 0.1748 
PUBLIC -0.0698 -0.1262 -0.1153 -0.0663 -0.0274 
  0.1118 0.1142 0.1150 0.1641 0.1666 
OWNTRANS -0.0028+ -0.0027+ -0.0029+ 0.0015 -0.0096*** 
  0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0024 0.0025 
HITECH 
 
0.5075* 0.5304* 0.1384 1.3447** 
  
 
0.2258 0.2287 0.3830 0.4623 
MEDTEC 
 
0.3449+ 0.3822* 0.2124 1.2269** 
  
 
0.1861 0.1903 0.2249 0.4370 
LOWTEC 
 
0.7801** 0.8352** 0.9062* 1.3805** 
  
 
0.2728 0.2760 0.3656 0.5016 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0452 0.0955 -0.1002 0.8900+ 
  
 
0.2202 0.2230 0.2788 0.4662 
LEKNIN 
 
0.2026 0.2509 0.0684 1.0398* 
  
 
0.2414 0.2447 0.3117 0.4791 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -1.0329 -1.8446* -1.8098* -2.6385* -1.4373 
  0.6353 0.7152 0.7304 1.1757 1.2240 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 93.36 112.72 112.75 52.89 112.35 
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Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-633.68222 -614.42136 -610.9337 -312.01875 -265.63016 
Wald test of exogeneity 
chi2 10.15 11.65 11.4 4.48 10.97 
Prob>chi2 0.0014 0.0006 0.0007 0.0342 0.0009 
Mean vif 2.4 2.42 2.46 2.43 2.43 
Notes: DEVOPED is endogenous variable, LTGDP and IPRI are instrumental variables; Robust 
standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4.3.4 presents the IVgmm regression model. The DWH test (models 36-40) also 
revealed that DEVOPED is an endogenous variable. Hansen J results also supported 
that there were no overidentified problems for two instrumental variables. Equally, I 
found that BGA, BG_FIN, BG_RD were all insignificant for testing the amounts of 
trademarks seeking FDI. Then I have more convincing evidence to accept hypothesis 
2-a, hypothesis 2-b, and hypothesis 2-c. 
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Table 2.4.3.4: IV(GMM) regression-LB asset seeking FDI 4 
Models Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
DEVOPED 0.8389*** 0.8742*** 0.8591*** 0.7883** 1.0345*** 
  0.1549 0.1552 0.1587 0.2721 0.1871 
BGA 0.1662 0.1531 -0.0264 0.1213 0.1296 
  0.1100 0.1140 0.1433 0.2858 0.1436 
BG_FIN 
  
0.1674 
  
  
  
0.1136 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.1562 
  
  
  
0.1133 
  
STATE -0.2785* -0.2608* -0.3125** 
  
  0.1148 0.1131 0.1165 
  
LAGE 0.0602 0.0172 -0.0013 -0.0518 0.0173 
  0.0780 0.0746 0.0748 0.0988 0.1128 
PROFIT 0.0011 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0017 0.0011 
  0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0026 0.0016 
LTASSET 0.0004 0.0239 0.0190 0.0364 0.0117 
  0.0183 0.0193 0.0188 0.0266 0.0327 
LANPAT 0.0162 0.0212 0.0231 -0.0347 0.1006** 
  0.0186 0.0205 0.0208 0.0239 0.0361 
LANTRADM 0.0950+ 0.0804 0.0649 0.1968* -0.0562 
  0.0500 0.0510 0.0510 0.0811 0.0649 
FEXPE -0.0607 -0.0861 -0.0958 -0.1295 -0.0524 
  0.0988 0.0983 0.0985 0.1369 0.1364 
PUBLIC -0.0627 -0.1024 -0.0947 -0.0131 -0.1000 
  0.0898 0.0881 0.0880 0.1155 0.1359 
OWNTRANS -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0052* 
  0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0021 
HITECH 
 
0.3297* 0.3516* 0.0424 0.4642+ 
  
 
0.1659 0.1675 0.2570 0.2642 
MEDTEC 
 
0.1507 0.1870 -0.0122 0.4077+ 
  
 
0.1222 0.1259 0.1360 0.2291 
LOWTEC 
 
0.6893** 0.7257** 0.6870* 0.7986* 
  
 
0.2194 0.2199 0.2698 0.3184 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0755 0.1111 -0.0364 0.3157 
  
 
0.1319 0.1370 0.1702 0.2340 
LEKNIN 
 
0.1453 0.1690 -0.1349 0.5018* 
  
 
0.1429 0.1459 0.1583 0.2536 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Constants -0.1464 -0.6784 -0.5768 -0.9222 -0.2919 
  0.4245 0.4893 0.4786 0.8021 0.8156 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 70.25 87.12 88.35 45.58 81.24 
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Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0050 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0602 0.0746 0.0807 0.0496 0.1577 
DWH test 
Robust score chi2 15.7367 
(p=0.0001) 
16.5541 
(p=0.0000) 
15.5668 
(p=0.0001) 
7.95127 
(p=0.0048) 
9.69682 
(p=0.0018) 
Robust regression 
F 
16.984 
(p=0.0000) 
18.1246 
(p=0.0000) 
16.8755 
(p=0.0000) 
8.57929 
(p=0.0036) 
9.29759 
(p=0.0025) 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansens J chi2 2.4295 
(p=0.1191) 
1.99474 
(p=0.1578) 
2.18521 
(p=0.1393) 
0.81768 
(p=0.3659) 
0.231171 
(p=0.6307) 
Mean vif 2.4 2.42 2.46 2.43 2.43 
Notes: DEVOPED is endogenous variable, LTGDP and IPRI are instrumental variables; GMM 
weight matrix: robust; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
To address the self-selection bias in defining business groups, I also added the lambda 
from previous probit estimation results into models 21-40 (seen from Table A2.4.3.1 to 
Table A2.4.3.4 in the appendix). I still obtained quite consistent and similar results on 
the main variables of BGA, BG_FIN, and BG_RD.  
 
 
 
For the purpose of further explanations, Table 2.4.3.5 displayed the marginal effect 
results on models 21-25 and models 31-35. Given the endogeneity problem, we mainly 
relied on the modelling results that employed IV regression approaches. According to 
model 31-mar to model 35-mar, none of them are significant. Above all, I can support 
the argument that business group affiliation did not significantly determine CMNEs’ 
both likelihood and amounts of LB assets seeking FDI, reject hypothesis 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
Table 2.4.3.5 Marginal effects-LB assets seeking FDI 5 
Models Model 21-
mar 
Model 22-
mar 
Model 23-mar Model 24-
mar 
Model 25-
mar 
Variables Full sample Full 
sample 
Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.0289 0.0277 -0.0396 -0.1209 0.0495 
  0.0403 0.0412 0.0603 0.1475 0.0514 
1.BG_FIN 
  
0.0052 
  
  
  
0.0400 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.0872* 
  
  
  
0.0416 
  
  Model 31-
mar 
Model 32-
mar 
Model 33-mar Model 34-
mar 
Model 35-
mar 
  Full sample Full 
sample 
Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.0808 0.0658 -0.1691 -0.3429 0.0818 
  0.1473 0.1554 0.2094 0.4353 0.1855 
1.BG_FIN 
  
0.0906 
  
  
  
0.1439 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.2727 
  
  
  
0.1668 
  
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
 
 
2.5 Discussion  
Drawing from the location boundedness of FSAs (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992), this 
study is likely the first to explore whether business group affiliation determines EMNEs’ 
specific type of SAS FDI strategies. I have found that business group affilia t ion 
significantly facilitates CMNEs’ NLB assets seeking FDI as opposed to LB assets. How 
does this provide further insights into EMNE related theory and improve our 
understanding of how EMNEs (e.g. CMNEs) achieve competitive positions and 
compete with DMNEs? Firstly, I mainly discuss the theoretical implications drawn 
from my findings. Secondly, based on my findings, business groups as one main aspect 
of home country effects in emerging economies is discussed. Thirdly, my study partially 
contributes to the relevance of new internalization theory. Fourthly, the novelty of this 
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study, as noted above, is about disaggregating strategic assets into technologies and 
brands, which could be another methodological contribution. In conclusion, other 
managerial implications and limitations in this study are discussed.  
 
2.5.1 Theoretical implications 
EMNEs’ increasing internationalization via acquisitions has significant implicat ions 
from the theory building perspective (Peng, 2012). To argue Dunning’s OLI model, 
Hennart (2012:168) highlights that “Some CSAs [country specific advantages] have 
owners, usually local firms, who can sometimes derive significant gains from the 
monopoly control of these resources. They can use this monopoly power to finance 
intangible-seeking investments in developed countries to obtain the firms specific 
advantages (FSAs) they lack and, hence compete with FSA-rich MNEs in their own 
market, and then internationally.” As noted above, Chinese group affiliated firms 
relatively control more complementary local resources (CLRs) (i.e. financial and 
human resources) than independent firms. My findings suggest that business group 
affiliated firms with R&D centers have a higher likelihood of seeking NLB assets via 
foreign acquisitions. Thus, these research findings partially support Hennart’s (2012) 
bundling model argument.  
 
Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick, and Forsans (2016) used the value of acquisitions and the 
number of acquisitions as dependent variables, studying whether Indian MNEs are asset 
exploiting or asset augmenting. If the explanatory variable ‘strategic assets 
augmentation’ (dummy variable) is significant, then Indian MNEs are considered to be 
asset augmentation; if the explanatory variables such as ‘Financial resource’ (retained 
earnings as a proxy) and ‘Technical intensity’ (Ratio of R&D expenditure to sales) are 
significant, then Indian MNEs are considered to be asset exploiting (Buckley, Munjal, 
Enderwick, and Forsans, 2016). Buckley and colleagues (2016) believe that their work 
supports Dunnings’ (2006) argument that asset exploitation and asset augmenta t ion 
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activities can be complementary. In this study I directly used target firms’ number of 
patents and trademarks as dependent variables, and acquirers’ number of patents and 
trademarks as explanatory variables respectively. Therefore, my findings provide 
stronger evidence supporting the EMNE asset augmentation perspective.  
 
In the context of emerging economies, the prevailing assumption about business groups 
suggests that their emergence is to internalize various transactions as a response to 
address market failures or institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Business 
groups have been regarded as a ‘catch-up’ mechanism so as to imitate and absorbing 
foreign technologies (Carney, 2008a; Kock and Guillen, 2001), as significantly 
supported by my findings.  
 
In the NLB assets seeking models, Chinese group affiliated firms have greater amounts 
and greater propensity for acquiring foreign patents via CBM&As than independent 
firms, which partly supports Luo and Tung (2007)’s springboard perspective and Rui 
and Yip (2008)’s strategic intent perspective. According to the subsample analyses, 
however, business group affiliation simply plays a significant role on Chinese POEs’ 
NLB assets seeking. In other words, my findings reveal that internationalization of 
POEs from emerging economies are a better fit to the explanations by Luo and Tung’s 
(2007) springboard perspective and Rui and Yip’s (2008) strategic intent perspective.  
 
2.5.2 Home country effects and Business group affiliation 
Previous studies suggest that firms need to own FSAs when expanding foreign markets 
(Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1977, 1983) and also need to address the ‘liability of 
foreignness’ (LOF) (Zaheer, 1995). EMNEs’ increasing internationalization largely 
poses a challenge for IB theories due to their FSAs differing from traditional ownership 
advantages of DMNEs (Bhaumik, Driffield, and Zhou, 2016; Meyer and Xia, 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2008). However, the firm-specific advantages (FSAs) of EMNEs are 
unlikely to be the same as those of DMNEs, the former “possess some unique and 
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sustainable resources, capabilities or favoured access to markets which, if they chose 
to engage in asset augmenting foreign direct investment, they might expect to protect 
or augment” (Dunning, 2006:139).  
 
Moreover, owing to the distinctive home market conditions in emerging markets, 
Ramamurti (2012) argues that EMNEs may have differing ownership advantages. 
There are FSAs and country-specific advantages (CSAs) that EMNEs can exploit when 
undertaking OFDI (Ramamurti, 2009; Rugman, 2009). The EMNE literature suggests 
that CSAs, including access to natural resources, have been seen as an alternative to 
traditional firm-specific ‘ownership’ advantages (Bhaumik, Driffield, and Zhou, 2016). 
Also, Hennart (2012) suggests that CSAs can facilitate EMNEs’ foreign acquisit ion 
deals for their asset augmentation purposes. In this study I found that business group 
affiliation significantly facilitates CMNEs’ NLB asset-seeking via foreign acquisitions. 
Chinese business group-affiliated firms with R&D centres have a higher likelihood of 
seeking NLB assets from foreign firms. As a consequence, I may regard business group 
affiliation as one unique ‘ownership’ advantage or FSA.  
 
Furthermore, why should technology seeking be more common in business group 
affiliated businesses? In my hypothesis development I argued that current business 
group related theory shows how business groups developed what Amsden and Hikino 
(1994) referred to as ‘project execution capability’. It was defined as ‘the skills required 
to establish or expand operating and other corporate facilities, including undertaking 
preinvestment feasibility studies, project management, project engineering (basic and 
detailed), procurement, construction and start-up of operations’ (Amsden and Hikino, 
1994:129). Business groups in emerging markets become experts at internalis ing 
technology acquisition. They have strong incentives to do so, moreover, in part because 
they have access to local complementary resources, i.e. their domestic markets 
(Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Hennart, 2012; Petersen and Seifert, 2014). There are 
therefore very strong incentives for them to go overseas and acquire foreign 
technologies. Such codified technologies are relatively easily transferable. They can 
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then be exploited in their domestic markets. Herein, it further supports that CMNEs 
tend to acquire foreign technologies for repatriation and exploitation in their home 
markets. Prior study has also proven that acquiring DMNEs significantly enhances 
Chinese business groups’ patenting activity in the domestic market (Anderson, 
Sutherland and Severe, 2015). Chen and Shapiro (2012) empirically have found that 
increasing foreign R&D investments in host countries that are rich in technologica l 
resources significantly improves EMNEs’ technological capabilities (i.e. using firm-
level R&D spending as a proxy). Also, my findings support that Chinese business 
groups having their own R&D centres are more likely to seek patent-based assets from 
DMNEs. 
 
The very earliest research on Chinese business groups identified internal capital 
markets as having a positive impact on the performance of group affiliated firms 
(Keister, 2000; Guest and Sutherland, 2010; Sutherland, 2001). More recent evidence 
also supports this finding. He, et al. (2013)’s study, for example, has also found that 
Chinese business groups assisted their affiliated firms by alleviating financ ia l 
constraints via the group’s internal capital market.11 However, my findings reveal that 
internal capital market within a business group is not significantly related to member 
firms’ both patents and trademarks seeking FDI. 
 
Also, this study identified that business group affiliation is only significantly related to 
SAS activities by Chinese POEs rather than SOEs. To address domestic and 
international competition, Chinese POEs use business group affiliation as a 
‘springboard’ to catch up with DMNEs. 
 
2.5.3 Relevance of new internalization theory  
The EMNE literature frequently alludes to the strong orientation of EMNEs towards all 
                                                                 
11 This, moreover, was found to play a more significant role on state-owned firms in raising finance 
than privately owned firms (He et al. 2013). 
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types of strategic assets (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 
2007; Rui and Yip, 2008). For instance, advanced technologies and known brands are 
invariably bundled together under the single term of ‘strategic assets’ (Deng, 2009; Luo 
and Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012). It makes little attempt to disaggregate firms’ 
strategic assets by their types or properties, largely neglecting the new internaliza t ion 
theory’s suggestion proposed by Rugman and Verbeke (1992). However, in factual 
cases, it may lose value and be costly to transfer reputational resource-based assets to a 
foreign and unknown market (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992; Verbeke and Kano, 2015). 
 
Accordingly, groups have capacities of combining financial, technical and manageria l 
resources into business operations (Carney, 2008b). This study provides empirica l 
evidence showing the positive and significant relationship between business group 
affiliation and Chinese firms’ NLB related FDI (i.e. patent seeking), but not for LB  
(trademark seeking) FDI. This is an interesting finding and one that warrants further 
discussion.  
 
Brands, however, are somewhat considered to be LB assets, especially in the firm’s 
infancy. EMNEs relatively do not have stronger global brands, like DMNEs. Hence, 
EMNEs’ brands are somewhat regarded as LB assets which are appropriately used in 
the home markets. As known, the Chinese domestic market is so huge that Chinese 
firms have to focus mainly on it. Chinese business groups often have their own 
renowned domestic brands. To maintain the competitive position in the home country 
markets, Chinese business group affiliates should be more likely to acquire NLB assets 
such as sophisticated technologies rather than LB assets (e.g. trademarks).  
 
As discussed above, in terms of CLRs (Hennart, 2012), Chinese business groups may 
own greater monopoly resources and advantages than independent firms. As such, their 
brands wield considerable power in the domestic market, which remains partially 
closed to foreign competitors owing to their access to CLRs. Some of the most famous 
brands in China, for example, are such brands like China Mobile, ICBC, Baidu, Haier, 
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Sinopec, Lenovo and so forth.12 Arguably, in many of these sector foreign investors 
have been excluded, thus allowing large domestic groups to benefit from CLRs. These 
groups may leverage the value of their brand across different product lines, and in doing 
so act as an important signalling mechanism to potential customers. In this case, 
Chinese business groups largely have local brand reputation and may not actively 
acquire foreign brands. Drawing on ‘New Internalization Theory’ (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 1992), this study helps us realize the most importance of domestic market 
position for EMNEs, especially for those large emerging economies such as China, 
Indian.   
 
In addition, this is not to say some LB assets could still be of great interests for EMNEs. 
EMNEs are likely seeking foreign market expansion. LB assets are likely to be more 
easily exploited between MNEs from geographic areas in which there are similarit ies 
and shorter physical distances. CMNEs, however, are likely to undertake rapid 
acquisition deals in comparatively distant developed markets (Child and Rodrigues, 
2005; Deng, 2009; Kedia, Gaffney, and Clampit, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007). 
Subsequently, the difference in patent seeking and trademark seeking should be given 
more attention as it can further assist the understanding the true antecedents of EMNEs’ 
OFDI behaviours. 
 
My findings regarding the location boundedness of strategic assets assist us further in 
understanding Petersen and Serfert’s (2014) related propositions. Petersen and Serfert 
(2014) suggest that the assumption of asymmetrical LOF between EMNEs and DMNEs 
can adequately explain the springboard perspective, and the key to understanding the 
springboard perspective is not EMNEs’ access to country-specific resource that 
facilitate FDI, but the high LOF addressed by DMNEs expanding in emerging markets 
relative to EMNEs in developed markets. In other words, the use of the LOF concept is 
based on the assumption that all EMNEs have an advantage over DMNEs regarding the 
                                                                 
12 In it, China Mobile has achieved the first position in the annual top 50 Most Valuable Chinese 
Brands, reaching a brand value of US$ 50,589 million (Allchin, 2012).  
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exploitation of acquired foreign assets in the home market. Specifically, foreign firms 
may be akin to local firms in emerging economies that do not have privileged treatment 
by the government and experience a liability of outsidership (LOO) (Petersen and 
Serfert, 2014). Moreover, Petersen and colleagues argued that EMNEs are subject to 
LOO in their home market that make them difficult to sufficiently exploit acquired 
strategic assets from developed markets, but EMNEs that are affiliated to a business 
group or state-owned have ‘insiders’ advantages that do not have to address LOO in 
their home market. In this study we testified that Chinese business groups, especially 
for those that possess R&D centers, have a higher likelihood of acquiring patents. Since 
patents are of NLB attributes discussed previously, business groups are more able to 
transfer them and exploit them in the home markets. Such findings significantly support 
Petersen and Serfert’s (2014) propositions. 
 
2.5.4 Other influential factors 
In this research I have found that firms’ prior technology innovation performance 
significantly determines foreign patents seeking activities via M&As by Chinese POEs 
rather than SOEs. It may imply that Chinese POEs would tend to acquire foreign patents 
if they had enough absorptive capacities. But for Chinese SOEs, they have favourable 
access to financial resources, supporting their activities of integrating foreign patents 
they sought. In addition, this finding is certainly consistent with and further contribute s 
to many extant studies. For instance, there is significant empirical evidences showing 
that private ownership is significantly and positively related to Chinese firms’ foreign 
SAS M&As (e.g. Cui, Meyer, and Hu, 2014; Huang and Chi, 2014; Lu, Liu, and Wang, 
2011). This research contributes to the disaggregation of strategic assets as a gap in the 
literature of Chinese FDI.  
 
In terms of the industry factor, Cui, Meyer, and Hu (2014) show that Chinese listed 
manufacturing firms tend to have a general SAS FDI based on survey research. My 
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findings have shown that CMNEs in the manufacturing industry are more likely to seek 
foreign patents via M&As. Further, I have found that only those related to lower 
technology levels have a higher likelihood of acquiring foreign trademarks. Thus, my 
findings contribute significant evidence to existing research.  
 
2.5.5 Methodological contribution 
CMNEs’ SAS FDI behaviors have often been investigated by employing the case study 
method, which refers to a small group of high profile CMNEs (Wei, 2010). In particula r, 
Wei (2010) listed the cases like Haier (Liu and Li, 2002; Duysters et al. 2009), Lenovo 
(Liu, 2007), Huawei (Sun, 2009), and Galanz (Ge and Ding, 2008). Their findings 
reveal that many large CMNEs have actively acquired sophisticated technologies and 
established global brands. For example, Geely acquired the entire equity of Volvo cars 
and related intellectual property in 2010 (Guo and Tao, 2013); Wanda Group acquired 
AMC Theatres in 2012 (Kung and Back, 2012); Lenovo Group acquired IBM personal 
computing division in 2004 which largely augments its global brand value (Deng, 2007; 
He, Wang, and Tian, 2011).  
 
Since CMNEs practically acquire foreign technologies and brands, we may need to add 
both patents and trademarks as SAS proxies into the empirical research. Existing studies 
to date have mainly used country level proxies (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; De Beule and 
Duanmu, 2012; Li, Li, and Shapiro, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012). In 
this study, firm-level data rather than aggregated host country-level data was used, in 
contrast to empirical work by Buckley et al. (2007), De Beule and Duanmu (2012), 
Drogendijk and Blomkvist (2013), Li, Li and Shapiro (2012), and Ramasamy, Yeung, 
and Laforet (2012)). To a considerable extent, this study marks a methodological step 
forward in exploring the SAS FDI activity of CMNEs in great detail. Consequently, my 
findings contribute to methodological issues in measuring strategic assets and studying 
EMNEs’ specific SAS FDI. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
To date, no empirical research has been developed to investigate what specific SAS FDI 
that CMNEs seek. In this research, the use of firm-level data largely assist in finding 
out the real determinants of CMNEs’ SAS FDI. It may contribute a lot on the 
econometric analysis about EMNEs’ distinct FDI strategies. Moreover, my findings 
suggest that business group affiliation is positively and significantly associated with 
affiliated firms’ patent seeking, but not brand seeking. However, existing studies have 
provided evidence showing that CMNEs do acquire foreign brands (eg. Deng, 2009; 
Rui and Yip, 2008; Zheng et al. 2016). Therefore, the brand seeking FDI may lead IB 
scholars to a new research area such as EMNEs’ brand development process during 
internationalization.  
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Chapter 3: State ownership types and 
Chinese MNEs’ specific foreign direct 
investment strategies 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
“The role of SOEs [State-owned Enterprises] in the global economy is rising, 
reflecting not only the internationalization of SOEs but the fact that these 
enterprises make up for a significant proportion of many of the world’s fastest-
growing economies.” 
                                                    (OECD, 2016:20) 
 
Ramamurti (2012:41) has challenged us to ask the question: “What is really different 
about emerging market multinationals?” In terms of institutional contexts, there has 
been an increase in studies attempting to address this question. They consider, for 
example, the perspective that home country regulatory institutions in emerging markets 
may play a pivotal role (Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008; Rui 
and Yip, 2008; Sauvant and Chen, 2014; Xiao and Sun, 2005). Further, Chen, Li and 
Hambright (2016) argue that these studies imply, or call for, an institution-based view 
(RBV), specifically that governmental institutions in emerging economies may 
interactively affect multinational enterprises (MNEs) in undertaking outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) activities. Specifically: “the internationalization of state-
owned enterprises from a wide range of countries constitutes an important component 
of FDI” (UNCTAD, 2017:30). A recent literature review by Luo and Zhang (2016)13, 
                                                                 
13 Luo and Zhang (2016) systematically reviewed 166 articles from 11 leading IB and management 
journals published between 1990 and 2014.  
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reveals that Chinese (C) MNEs are leading the research on Emerging-country (E) 
MNEs. Luo, Xue and Han (2010) suggest that China, as the leading emerging economy 
in the world, is an ideal nation for exploring how government involvement affects its 
OFDI activities. A number of existing studies support the view that government 
involvement facilitates Chinese firms’ increasing OFDI by promoting its ‘Go Global’ 
policy (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007; Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010; Wang, 
Hong, Kafouros, and Wright, 2012). 
 
According to one of the most widely cited IB studies on EMNEs14, Buckley, Clegg, 
Cross, Liu, Voss and Zheng (2007) identify three special factors that may explain the 
determinants of Chinese OFDI. These include: capital market imperfections, the special 
ownership advantages of CMNEs, and the role of institutional factors. In the context of 
emerging-markets, both Chinese SOEs and POEs have to address market imperfections. 
However, Buckley (2004) argued that emerging market firms might have ‘special’ 
ownership advantages. For instance, SOEs may get easier access to below-market rates 
to raise funds (Scott, 2002). Such benefits may give SOEs a significant competit ive 
advantage over POEs when undertaking OFDI. Furthermore, Luo, Xue and Han (2010) 
identify multiple advantages for state-sector CMNEs, including financial support and 
privileged treatment in support of their OFDI. For example, the number of Chinese 
SOEs ranked on the Fortune Global 500 has increased from 2 in 1996 to 86 in 2017 
(105 Chinese mainland-based firms in total) (Fortune, 2017).  
 
In contrast, “the private sector may find it considerably harder to raise capital to 
undertake OFDI” (Ning and Sutherland, 2012:171). Nevertheless, scholars argued that 
SOEs face greater institutional pressures than POEs when investing abroad (Cui and 
Jiang, 2012; Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). By and large, however, as Chen, Li and 
Hambright (2016) suggest, extant related literature reveals that there are inconsistent 
results as regards the role of government involvement and its effects on Chinese OFDI. 
                                                                 
14 This information is based on a literature review study by Luo and Zhang (2016).  
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These mixed results further motivate an exploration of the extent to which government 
involvement determines CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies.  
 
Dunning (1992) identified four main purposes of FDI strategies including: resource 
seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset seeking (SAS). It is 
often argued that CMNEs are actively acquiring the strategic assets they lack via foreign 
acquisitions, so as to alleviate their competitive weaknesses (Luo and Tung, 2007; 
Mathews, 2006; Rui and Yip, 2008). They may do this via ‘spring-boarding’, or 
alternatively (but similarly) ‘linking, leveraging and learning’ (Mathews, 2006). In 
comparison with DMNEs, Chinese groups today, however, still lack competit ive 
strengths in areas such intangible assets, including advanced technologies or known 
brands (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Lu, Liu, Wright, and Filatotchev, 2014). To address 
this deficit, Peng (2012:100) argued that CMNEs prefer acquisitions in order to ‘acquire 
existing world-class brands, such as IBM’s PC brand or Volvo.’ This is also the 
dominant view in the LLL model and the springboard perspective. Both stress that 
CMNEs are in a ‘rush’ to catch-up and that they engage in ‘accelerated’ 
internationalization. Although Greenfield FDI may also help acquire intangibles, it is a 
relatively more time consuming process than acquisition. Thus the latter approach, 
many have suggested, is the dominant entry mode used to acquire strategic assets. In 
the past two decades, EMNEs have expanded in foreign countries by mostly using 
M&A as the main entry mode (Buckley, Elia, and Kafouros, 2014; Deng and Yang, 
2015). 
 
Scott (1995) argues that there are three pillars of institutions including the regulat ive 
pillar, the normative pillar, and the cognitive pillar. In spite of the increasing 
development of its market economy, China somewhat maintains a political economy 
wherein government involvement plays a significant role in business by ownership and 
regulation (Deng, 2007). Government affiliation likely affects Chinese firms’ resource 
use going abroad by posing coercive pressures and normative expectations (Wang et al. 
2012), which are consistent with Scott’s (1995) explanations of the regulative and 
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normative pillars. Thus, there are significant differences between China’s state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Also, governments in 
different levels may have differing strategic interests and purposes on their controlled 
enterprises’ strategies. A recent study by Huang, Xie and Reddy (2017), verifies that 
central SOEs have a lower likelihood of engaging in OFDI than local SOEs in the 
Chinese manufacturing sector. The important role of national team affiliation (mainly 
Central SOEs), moreover, may influence Chinese SAS orientation, as these central 
government-owned firms may receive greater support (although simultaneously may, 
be less entrepreneurial due to their closer links to the central government which 
necessitates greater consideration of non-business related interests such as employment, 
social stability and so on). In comparison, based on in-depth interviews with senior 
managers, Huang and Chi (2014) have found that Chinese POEs15 are more likely to 
undertake both market- and SAS FDI.  
 
Wang et al. (2012) distinguish two types of government involvement includ ing 
government affiliation level and state ownership. The former construct reflects that 
governments want to engage in EMNEs’ internationalization by establishing 
relationships with companies (Wank, 1995). In China’s context, government affilia t ion 
levels refer to central-government level, provincial-government level, and municipa l-  
or county-government level. The second construct means that the government is one of 
the shareholders of the firm (Wang et al. 2012). Furthermore, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2009) defines SOEs as ‘business 
entities established by central and local governments, and whose supervisory officia ls 
are from the government’. Moreover, considering several reformed records on Chinese 
SOEs in past decades, I offer an additional condition that SOEs’ main controlling 
shareholder be the central, provincial, municipal or county level government. Notably, 
the two concepts are sometimes not correlated. A private firm may be affiliated to a 
higher government level, while the state-owned firm may be affiliated to a lower 
                                                                 
15 Here, POEs refer to Chinese Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) (Huang and Chi, 
2014). 
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government level. To deal with this issue, this paper will use the term ‘state ownership 
types’ by dividing Chinese firms into 4 levels according to the ultimate owner or the 
largest shareholder, can be the central government, provincial government, munic ipa l 
government or county government, and private ownership.  
 
No quantitative research, however, has addressed the question as to what extent Chinse 
firms with different state ownership types behave differently in terms of specific FDI 
strategies. OECD (2016) suggests that the first critical stage to explaining Chinese 
SOEs’ investment is to identify the distinction between Chinese central SOEs, and the 
provincially and locally owned SOEs. UNCTAD (2017:36) “The degree to which 
governments influence the decisions of SO-MNEs does not depend only on percentage 
ownership, but also on foreign expansion strategy.” Herein, this further raises the 
question of to what extent does the state ownership types (hereafter government 
affiliation levels instead) affect CMNEs specific FDI strategies.  
 
Recent data on CMNEs’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) (recorded 
between 2006 and 2015) was used. The findings reveal that Chinese POEs have a 
greater likelihood of augmenting both their technology and brand-based assets, and 
Chinese firms owned by a higher government affiliation level are actually less likely to 
seek both technological assets (i.e. a target firm’s patents) and brand assets (i.e. a target 
firm’s trademarks), but have a higher inclination to acquire target firms involved in the 
natural resources sector.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: after discussing the broader theoretical framework 
in detail, firstly hypotheses are developed; secondly, the methodology is outlined. After 
presenting the empirical findings, I reflect upon this study’s contributions to relevant 
EMNE specific FDI theories and practices.  
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3.2 Literature review  
Institutional contexts, for example, vary considerably in emerging economies but are 
generally thought to be different from those of developed economies (Gammelto ft, 
Pradhan, and Goldstein, 2010). A number of scholars argue that EMNEs may use OFDI 
to escape domestic ‘institutional voids’ (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Luo and 
Tung, 2007; Witt and Lewin, 2007). Specifically, institutional voids refer to the fact that 
there are inefficient or volatile institutions in emerging economies (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008; Gammeltoft, Pradhan, and Goldstein, 2010). This context results in 
competitive disadvantages of firms incorporated in emerging economies (Stoian and 
Mohr, 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, not all firms in emerging economies lack competitive advantages. To 
illustrate, Luo, Xue and Han (2010) state that SOEs in emerging economies have 
multiple advantages including financial support and privileged treatment that may 
largely support their OFDI activities. Given the importance of financial resources for 
EMNEs, Buckley, Munjal, Enderwick and Forsans (2016) prove that Indian MNEs that 
accumulate more of their own financial resources are more likely to acquire foreign 
companies. In contrast, POEs in emerging economies may have to address more 
competition from SOEs in terms of access to home country resources. In that case, to 
escape unfair competition, firms, especially POEs are actively engaging in OFDI 
strategy (Stal and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011).  
 
Moreover, SOEs also achieve network advantages in that they can receive support and 
protection from government institutions (Li and Zhang, 2007); and priority advantages 
such as access to critical policy and aggregated industrial information (Sheng, Zhou, 
and Li, 2011). Such privileged benefits assist EMNEs, (especially for SOEs), 
counterbalancing their ownership and location disadvantages when expanding 
internationally (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990).  
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On the other hand, both SOEs and POEs may actively engage the OFDI strategy to 
escape resource dependence on government support from the home country 
(Choudhury and Khanna, 2014; Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio and Ramaswamy, 
2014). Especially for SOEs, Xia, Ma, Lu, and Yiu (2014) argue that significant state 
ownership largely makes them more dependent on governments for securing vital 
resources. It may lead to governments’ intervention in SOEs’ FDI strategy (Huang, Xie, 
and Reddy, 2017). Furthermore, Cui and Jiang (2012:265) emphasize that “SOEs are, 
by definition, assets of home-country governments which makes them a part of their 
home-country institutions.” In other words, strategic initiatives that SOEs make should 
be relatively in accordance with the general policy of the state. SOEs are thus, at least 
somewhat, required to support home institutions’ interests (Zhang, Zhou, and Ebbers, 
2011) rather than pursue own market orientation or SAS strategies. Residences in target 
countries also regard SOEs as representative of home country governments (Globerman 
and Shapiro, 2009). As a result, host country institutions may have more concerns when 
foreign investors are state-owned entities. For example, Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers (2011) 
have found that the likelihood of CMNEs that successfully complete a cross-border 
acquisition is lower if they are SOEs.  
 
As such, there are likely three aspects of dark-side effects stemming from SOEs’ higher 
dependence on domestic resources: firstly, it may reduce SOEs’ willingness to expand 
abroad; secondly, it makes SOEs suffer lower levels of autonomy and market 
orientation due to more government’ intervention (Huang, Xie, and Reddy, 2017; 
Lioukas, Bourantas, and Papadakis, 1993); thirdly, it may decrease SOEs’ legitimacy 
in the target countries as they may be regarded as political instruments of governments 
(Cui and Jiang, 2012; Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). On the contrary, POEs are 
relatively driven to expand abroad by the need to mitigate unfavorable domestic 
institutional contexts, and especially the difficulties of raising capital (Luo and Tung, 
2007). In particular, by surveying 51 Chinese POEs, Sutherland and Ning (2011) have 
found that these companies’ main purposes of foreign expansion via a tax haven were 
both to raise financial capital to support foreign trade and business, but also for 
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domestic purposes.  
 
Thus, Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2014) argued that existing theory does not present a 
consistent prediction of state ownership influence on MNEs’ OFDI. Many other 
empirical studies provide either an insignificant or negative effect of state ownership 
on EMNEs’ OFDI (Huang, Xie, Li, and Reddy, 2017; Hu and Cui, 2014; Lu, Liu, 
Filatotchev, and Wright, 2014; Xia, Ma, Lu and Yiu, 2014). These mixed findings imply 
that the linkages between state ownership influence and CMNEs’ OFDI may be more 
complex than presumed.  
 
In addition, owing to differences between SOEs and POEs, these firms may have to 
address different institutional pressures meanwhile pursuing different IB strategies. For 
example, “In countries with strong technological development, concerns might arise 
about losing critical technologies to foreign competitors as well as to foreign 
governments.” (Meyer, Ding, Li, and Zhang, 2014:1006). In comparison with POEs, 
SOEs (especially for those central-government controlled enterprises) comparative ly 
face more pressures in engaging in SAS FDI strategies and have a lower possibility of 
doing so. As far as I know, no empirical research has investigated whether different  
state ownership types (i.e. central-, provincial- and municipal- level government, and 
private ownership) affect CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies, such as resource seeking, 
strategic asset seeking, market seeking, and efficiency seeking strategies.  
 
 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
Existing research deals less with whether state ownership types determine CMNEs’ FDI 
strategies in which properties. As discussed above, this study mainly discusses whether 
CMNEs with different state ownership types tend to have different motivations for FDI.  
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3.3.1 Natural resources seeking 
From the lens of resource dependence theory (RDT), firms may use M&As to acquire 
resources for addressing environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 2003). 
EMNEs likely undertake foreign acquisitions to acquire and secure the stable supply of 
natural resources (Deng and Yang, 2015; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013). Such natural 
resources mainly refer to minerals, petroleum, agricultural commodities etc. (Morck et 
al. 2008). For instance, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired a 
Canada-based oil firm Petrokazakhstan in 2005 (Wu and Sia, 2002). Existing studies 
have suggested that one important antecedent of Chinese OFDI is to achieve greater 
security of access to natural resources (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; Deng, 2004, 2007; 
Hong and Sun, 2006; Kang and Jiang, 2012; Li, Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro, and 
Chen, 2013; Morck et al., 2008).  
 
Moreover, Kolstad and Wiig (2012) argue that if Chinese investment is directed to seek 
overseas natural resources it likely reveals political objectives. For example, Chinese 
SOEs follow home country governments’ strategic needs and invest more in natural 
resource sectors, while POEs have more interests on the target market size and strategic 
assets of host countries (Amighini, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo, 2013; Huang and Chi, 
2014). SOEs have been regarded as an instrument for reaching national objectives 
(Zheng and Scase, 2013). In that case, SOEs are relatively required to realize 
governmental goals as opposed to the profit maximization that most POEs pursue. 
Under the supervision of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra t ion 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC), China’s central SOEs largely focus on the 
‘strategic’ sectors (i.e. energy, transportation, etc.) which are important to the nationa l 
economy (OECD, 2016). Ramasamy et al. (2012) also provide the strong evidence that 
Chinese SOEs are more attracted to the host countries which have large endowments 
of natural resources. For example, CNOOC16 spent $15.1 billion on the acquisition of 
                                                                 
16 China National Offshore Oil Corporation (‘CNOOC’) is the largest offshore oil and gas producer 
in China, which operates directly under the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
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Nixon (a Canadian oil and gas company) in 2012 and Minmetals 17  acquired OZ 
Minerals in Australia in 2009 for $1.4 billion (Huang and Chi, 2014). 
 
Additionally, as Song, Yang, and Zhang (2011:39) state, “managers of SOEs can use 
overseas investments to demonstrate their ability to manage international business, and 
claim credit for themselves and their organizations for undertaking activities that serve 
the national interests.” However, to what extent do Chinese POEs and SOEs with 
different state ownership types tend to seek natural resource-driven FDI? In this study 
I focus on the influence of natural resource dependence on CMNEs. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1-a: Chinese privately owned MNEs are less likely to acquire target 
firms in the natural resources sector 
 
Hypothesis 1-b: Chinese MNEs owned by a higher government affiliation level 
are more likely to acquire target firms in the natural resources sector 
 
Testing these two hypotheses also assists us in responding to the claim of Globerman 
and Shapiro (2009:173) that “given the relatively dispersed sources of supply for 
natural resources, outward FDI from China to this sector would have to be massive 
indeed to create any real threat of control of supply in the hands of Chinese companies.”  
 
3.3.2 Technology seeking 
In the late 1990s, the Chinese government started to adjust the core technology sourcing 
policy18 in place since the 1980s (Gao, 2014), because this technology sourcing policy 
negatively affected local firms’ development of internal technology capabilit ies. 
                                                                 
Commission of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.  
17 Chinese Minmetals Corporation is also supervised by the Chinese central government.  
18 The key technology sourcing policy in China also means Chinese firms at that time can rely on 
external technology transfer (Gao, 2014).  
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Government agencies began to promote domestic Chinese innovation by inviting a 
huge number of experts to join in relevant national science and technology development 
programs. In 2006, at the National Science and Technology Conference, President Hu 
Jintao put forward the national strategy of building an innovative nation, which is 
named the “2006-2020 National Information Technology Development Strategy” 
(Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2006). The following year, the Chinese central 
government issued an innovative national strategy that led enterprises’ future 
innovation (MOFST19 , 2007). Gross domestic spending on R&D (i.e. % of GDP) 
increased from 1.369% in 2006 to 2.067% in 2015 (OECD, 2017). Obviously, this 
national strategy may influence CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies.  
 
Specifically, state ownership may affect firms’ technology innovation in two ways. First, 
Yi et al. (2017) argue that the government exerts institutional pressures on firms as a 
main controlling shareholder. It is a general approach for governments in emerging 
economies to determine firms’ innovation strategies (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). 
Second, Chinese governments introduce relevant industrial policies to encourage firms’ 
active investments in innovation and enhance competitiveness in the high-tech sectors 
(Liu et al. 2011). As such, POEs should better exploit those supportive industria l 
policies to develop their own innovation strategies and strengthen their competit ive 
positions.  
 
Given the national strategy of promoting indigenous innovation, although Chinese 
firms controlled by a higher government level are likely under governments’ pressure 
to develop their own national innovation strategy, they will be better able to receive 
diversified support including finance, technical talents and so on in the mean time. Then 
Chinese SOEs may comparatively have a lower propensity of acquiring advanced 
technology from developed countries. Since governments launch supportive industria l 
innovation policies, POEs should more actively grasp opportunities to acquire 
                                                                 
19 MOFST refers to Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of  China.  
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advanced technologies. If so, then it is interesting to explore the extent to which 
different government affiliation levels (i.e. from central government level to private 
investors or individuals) determine CMNEs’ technology-seeking FDI.  
 
However, without addressing the core sources of firm-level competitive advantage, the 
understanding of EMNEs is more or less incomplete. By using firm level data from the 
Chinese electronics industry, Bhaumik, Driffield, and Zhou (2016) confirmed that 
CMNEs derive their advantages from country-level advantages including economies of 
scale, rather than traditional firm-level advantages such as technology. As mentioned 
above, Chinese SOEs owned by a higher government affiliation level enjoy the most 
privileged access to natural resources, financial resources and any other strategic 
resource, as opposed to POEs. Possessing financial resources can establish a firm’s 
competitive advantages by investing more on R&D, marketing campaigns, and 
employing skilled talents (Buckley, et al., 2016). For example, owing to government 
linkages, Chinese SOEs can have preferential access to financial capital and domestic 
R&D resources (e.g. local universities and research institutions) and hence are less 
likely to seek foreign strategic assets (Chen, Sun, Tang, and Wu, 2011; Luo, Xue, and 
Han, 2010).  
 
Moreover, SOEs possess the information advantage for government subsidies via the 
political communication that enables them achieve more subsidies than Chinese POEs 
(Wu, 2017). Due to this information advantage, Chinese SOEs can increase their R&D 
input by obtaining more government subsidies. Observing 193,506 Chinese firms, Yi, 
Hong, Hsu, and Wang (2017) find a positive relationship between state ownership and 
the effect of R&D intensity on innovation performance. Despite the fact that there is an 
increasing number of CMNEs’ CBM&As, little empirical research has examined 
possible linkages between Chinese SOEs and foreign technology-asset-seek ing 
acquisitions.  
 
From the host country perspective, DMNEs may not be willing to sell their technologies 
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to Chinese firms especially to those with higher government involvement. As for 
Chinese acquirers, government intervention may cause public worries and politica l 
sensitivity in the host countries, though their obtaining of government support assists 
in their competitiveness in M&A deals (Zhang, Zhou, and Ebbers, 2011). Target 
countries with a higher technological development level may have more concerns about 
losing core technologies to foreign SOEs (Meyer, Ding, Li and Zhang, 2014). On that 
account, SOEs may prefer Greenfield investments or acquire targets through lower 
equity shares (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li and Zhang, 2014). Furthermore, 
Wang et al. (2012) highlighted that different government affiliation levels could bring 
Chinese SOEs’ different degrees of institutional pressures therefore affecting their 
internationalization strategies.  
 
In addition, other scholars also argued that there are regulatory restrictions that the 
Chinese government exerts on SOEs’ OFDI for safeguarding state assets (Cui and Jiang, 
2010; Deng, 2004). Namely, little government involvement may facilitate Chinese 
firms’ further growth and success of foreign expansion. For example, Rugman and Li 
(2007:337) suggest, “The more promising candidates for successful Chinese MNEs are 
companies in industries with strong domestic competition and little government 
intervention and control. These firms are more willing to improve R&D, managerial, 
and marketing capabilities and to take risks for long term development.” In the context 
of market driven efficiency, Chinese SOEs that largely rely on domestic monopoly 
protection probably may become reluctant to reform and focus on the domestic 
development of R&D and brand names (Rugman and Li, 2007). Meanwhile, SOEs 
relatively have to pursue political objectives in their OFDI as they obtain state’s 
financial support (Cui and Jiang, 2012; Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, 2008).  
 
Rugman and Verbeke (2001) identified firm-specific advantage (FSA) flows from home 
to the target countries, while Rudy et al. (2016) further proposed that SOEs would 
transfer acquired technology from the host country to the home country to reach the 
state’s purpose. During the 1990s, Chinese SOEs were encouraged to build joint 
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ventures with DMNEs so as to obtain advanced technology (Alon, 2012). Moreover, 
“Government involvement and technological resources can also jointly affect EMNEs’ 
ability to expand abroad, either by increasing marginal effects of EMNEs’ existing 
technology or by facilitating new technology acquisition.” (Wang et al. 2012:662). As 
such, SOEs can increase their technological base and expand global markets by 
achieving governmental funding of R&D, patents and other state-owned assets that are 
not easily available to any other POEs. Also, governments subsidize CMNEs that are 
affiliated to a higher government affiliation level, engaging in acquiring advanced 
technology (Wang et al. 2012).  
 
In contrast, if firms do not have relationships with high-level government, they will find 
it harder to obtain advanced technology abroad. According to Lu et al.’s (2011) survey 
findings, however, Chinese POEs’ own technology-based advantages largely affect 
their OFDI strategy. The larger Chinese home market has facilitated business survivo rs 
developing their own competitive advantages to compete with MNEs that active in 
China (Lu et al. 2011). More significantly, since POEs can be comparatively free from 
much political influence, they tend to have a more strategic intent to improve long- term 
profitability, competitive market position and other strategic assets (Luo, Zhao, Wang, 
and Xi, 2011), such as technological assets. 
 
Therefore, I may reasonably formulate the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2-a: Chinese privately owned MNEs are more likely to seek foreign 
technologies in developed countries 
 
Hypothesis 2-b: Chinese MNEs owned by a higher government affiliation level 
are less likely to seek foreign technologies in developed countries 
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3.3.3 Brand seeking 
Frey et al. (2015) found out that EMNEs (such as Lenovo from China, and Tata Motors 
from India) are increasingly acquiring foreign established brands. “Chinese goods are 
everywhere it seems. But few are name brands and most are associated with being 
cheap consumer electronics or white goods.” (Yueh20 , 2014) Many extant studies 
suggest CMNEs are actively seeking both technologies and brands via CBM&As (Deng, 
2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008).  
 
It seems surprising that no empirical studies have been sufficiently developed providing 
a comprehensive analysis of what specific factors determine CMNEs’ foreign brand 
assets seeking strategy. As for brand-related assets, Ramamurti (2012:43) suggested 
‘how could any firm have global brands to begin with, given that brands are location-
bound assets that have to be replicated in each new market?’ Namely, firms may need 
to acquire foreign brands so as to enter foreign countries’ markets. Therefore, following 
Ramamurti’s (2012) assumption may lead to our next question of to what extent do 
brand assets attract Chinese SOEs or POEs in their course of undertaking OFDI?  
 
Drawn from the previous ‘open door’ policy, China’s central government is not simply 
concentrated on attracting inward FDI, but also exporting ‘Made-in-China’ goods 
across the globe (Ding, Akoorie, and Pavlovich, 2009). As discussed above, many 
scholars have found that SOEs could access to strategic resources that governments 
provide including state-owned banks’ capital support and political support, and they 
could also maintain a monopolistic position in the domestic market (Amighini et al., 
2013; Zou and Adams, 2008). Namely, SOEs have stronger competitive brand positions 
in the home markets in terms of government’s stable support. Specifically, the 
ownership advantages that EMNEs possess include the familiarity of customer needs 
in their home market, capacities of operating in an inefficient institutional environment, 
                                                                 
20 A Chief business correspondent from BBC News 
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capacities of providing products and services with minimal cost and so forth (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc, 2008). Moreover, one key country-specific advantage that largely 
facilitate EMNEs’ OFDI lies in the economies of scale they benefit from in home 
markets (Bhaumik et al. 2016). Then, the extent of an EMNEs’ own brand recognit ion 
in the domestic market is relatively higher than foreign brands. As such, Chinese SOEs 
are more likely encouraged by the governments to go abroad for developing indigenous 
brands. In contrast, to address fierce domestic competition, Chinese POEs may be 
forced to acquire foreign brands.  
 
In terms of government affiliation levels, however, Wang et al. (2012) stated that local 
governments simply control limited resources available in local regions while central 
governments control the major parts of core resources available in the whole country. 
However, this advantage that central SOEs hold may hinder their willingness to uncover 
their assets to foreign markets. Namely, central-SOEs may be more vulnerable to 
central governments’ intervention. As Walder (1995) contended that, central-SOEs 
have more responsibility to fulfil social and political objectives. Moreover, 
governments’ demands may carry more weight than customers’ needs for SOEs with 
higher government affiliation level, owing to their heavier reliance on governments for 
critical resources (Child and Tes, 2001). For instance, Chinese central SOEs (i.e. 
Sinopec and PetroChina) have more interests in acquiring natural resources such as 
crude oil, and natural gas to ensure domestic industrial needs and country-level security 
(Ding, Akoorie, and Pavlovich, 2009). As a consequence, central SOEs may be less 
likely to achieve foreign brands at the target market.  
 
On the other hand, POEs may encounter discriminatory policies concerning the access  
to resources in the home market (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012). This domestic context may 
somewhat prompt POEs to look for foreign markets where there is relatively no policy 
discrimination (Ramasamy et al. 2012). Moreover, POEs are relatively interdependent 
with governments and are to a larger degree, driven by their own commercial interests 
or purposes in the course of internationalization (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Luo, Xue, 
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and Han, 2010). As a consequence, I may expect that POEs are more than likely to 
achieve brand-related assets in the target market for foreign market expansion. 
According to a survey of 632 Chinese POEs, Lu, Liu and Wang (2011) provided the 
evidence that firms in higher technology- involved industries have a higher likelihood 
of seeking both advanced technology and internationally known brands. Drawing on 
case studies by Huang and Chi (2014), Chinese POEs actively acquired foreign firms’ 
technology, distribution channels, and brand names. In 2010, Zhejiang Aokang, a 
Chinese privately-owned shoe manufacturer, bought an Italian shoe brand, the 
Valleverde so as to expand local markets (Huang and Chi, 2014).  
 
Recently, an increasing number of Chinese POEs have owned world powerful brands 
that are ranked on the top 500 Global brand list from 1 in 2009 to 16 in 2017 (as shown 
in Table 3.3.3.1). Moreover, many well-known Chinese brands (i.e. Alibaba, Tencent, 
Baidu, and Xiaomi) are also POEs (Cendrowski, 2015).  
 
Table 3.3.3.1 Top 500 Global brand – Chinese firms 1 
Year Top 500 
Global brand 
Chinese SOEs Chinese POEs 
 
Total Number Share Number Share 
2017 53 37 69.81% 16 30.19% 
2016 45 32 71.11% 13 28.89% 
2015 36 27 75.00% 9 25.00% 
2014 29 24 82.76% 5 17.24% 
2013 27 22 81.48% 5 18.52% 
2012 25 21 84.00% 4 16.00% 
2011 18 16 88.89% 2 11.11% 
2010 18 15 83.33% 3 16.67% 
2009 15 14 93.33% 1 6.67% 
2008 11 11 100.00% 0 0.00% 
Source: Brand Finance (http://brandirectory.com/) 
 
In terms of industry types, Huang and Chi (2014:396) claimed that ‘Most Chinese POEs 
operate in competitive industries (such as textile, electronics, and machinery) and still 
are not permitted to operate in many industries where most large SOEs operate (such 
as oil and gas, power supply, and telecommunications services)’. In respect to these 
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competitive industries, domestic brand names or trademarks may already take a 
dominant position in home markets. Therefore, Chinese POEs are more likely to 
acquire internationally known brands if they want to expand to foreign markets. To 
illustrate, Cendrowski (2015) suggests that Chinese firms that want to expand to foreign 
markets may be impeded due to the lack of experiential knowledge in target markets 
and experience in creating internationally-recognised brands.  
 
Consequently, I could launch a third group of two separated hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 3-a: Chinese privately owned MNEs are more than likely to seek 
foreign brands in developed countries 
 
Hypothesis 3-b: CMNEs owned by higher-level governments are less likely to 
seek foreign brands in developed countries 
 
Above all, since relevant government policies facilitate Chinese POEs’ SAS activit ies 
(Lu et al. 2011) and governments support Chinese firms’ cross-border acquisit io ns 
(Xiao and Sun, 2005), then I need to investigate whether SOEs with higher government 
affiliation are engaging more actively in technology-asset or brand-asset seeking 
activities. More importantly, existing studies cannot provide us with a clear prediction 
of whether different government affiliation levels determine CMNEs’ brand seeking 
FDI.  
 
 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 Data collection 
EMNEs generally undertake foreign acquisitions to acquire technology and known 
brands (Deng, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008; Mutinelli and Piscite llo, 
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1998; Sauvant, 2005). The literature on CMNEs also suggests that acquisition has been 
the primary mode of entering foreign markets (Nian, 2017; Peng, 2012; Sun et al. 2012). 
Peng (2012) argues that CBM&As provide an ideal setting for investigation of to what 
extent state ownership influences CMNEs’ OFDI. Consequently, this study focuses on 
Chinese CBM&As completed between 2006 and 2015, exploring the extent to which 
government affiliation level influences CMNEs’ natural resource seeking and SAS FDI 
strategies.  
 
The Thomson One Banker (TOB) database provides global M&As which has been 
widely used by a number of scholars, exploring Chinese MNEs’ internationaliza t ion 
(Nicholson and Salaber, 2013; Tao, Liu, Gao, and Xia, 2017; Zhang, Zhou, and Ebbers, 
2011). Thus, the first data source about acquisition deals was from the TOB database. 
After we obtained the target firms and acquirers from TOB database, I matched their 
names in the Orbis21 database for achieving further firm-level details including target 
firms’ number of patents and trademarks, and Chinese acquirers’ number of patents and 
trademarks, financial performance, age and ownership information. Orbis has been 
widely used in International Business research due to its international coverage (Jones 
and Temouri, 2016). I made 843 valid observations on 486 CMNEs’ CBM&As.   
 
3.4.2 Variables 
3.4.2.1 Dependent variable 
To study natural resources-driven FDI, scholars traditionally use the export share of 
fuels, ores and metals exports as a proxy of country-level natural resources (e.g. 
Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012). Related work also suggests using indices 
of resource endowments instead of export shares (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). As 
noted above, I accessed to the TOB database containing information on CMNEs’ 
                                                                 
21 Orbis is a database covering data on over 200 million companies around the world (ORBIS, 
2017).  
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CBM&As. This database can allow us to achieve Standard Industrial Classifica t ion 
(SIC) code with respect to target firms and Chinese acquirers. The first two digits 
represent the major group. I regarded the Mining (SIC codes between 1000 and 1499) 
as the main proxy of the natural resources sector (Table 3.4.2.1).  
 
Table 3.4.2.1 Natural resources –details about SIC codes 2 
Range of SIC codes-Mining 1000-1499 
SIC code Industry 
1000 Metal Mining 
1040 Gold and Silver Ores 
1090 Miscellaneous Metal Ores 
1220 Bituminous Coal & Lignite Mining 
1221 Bituminous Coal & Lignite Surface Mining 
1311 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 
1381 Drilling Oil & Gas Wells 
1382 Oil & Gas Field Exploration Services 
1389 Oil & Gas Field Services, NEC 
1400 Mining & Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals (No Fuels) 
 
In this study, a dummy variable (T_NATURE) was built whereby ‘1’ refers to the target 
firm operates in the natural resource sector, ‘0’ if otherwise.  
 
To identify the drivers of SAS orientation, studies using different proxies of strategic 
assets may provide inconsistent results. For example, Amighini, Rabellotti and 
Sanfilippo (2013) found that Chinese POEs are attracted by a target country’s strategic 
assets (by using the share of R&D on GDP as a proxy) and Chinese SOEs tend to invest 
more in the host country’s natural resources. Based on survey findings, Lu, Liu and 
Wang (2011) confirmed that Chinese domestic POEs involved in technology- intens ive 
industries have more intensities of seeking advanced technology, and internationa lly 
recognised brands. In contrast, using a number of registered patents and the proportion 
of technology exports to total exports of the host countries as strategic asset proxy, 
Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet (2012) concluded that Chinese SOEs are more likely to 
acquire strategic assets than POEs. Obviously, scholars commonly consider patents as 
the main proxy of strategic assets, but fail to add brands into factual measurement. 
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Notably, Frey et al. (2015) used a number of trademark applications to measure brand 
assets that EMNEs are increasingly seeking. Thus, a proper way of measuring strategic 
assets is critically important for studying firms’ real determinants of FDI strategies. 
Equally, I focused on target firms and utilized both their number of patents and 
trademarks available prior to M&As as proxies of technology and brands respectively.  
 
Therefore, as for the model studying CMNEs’ technology-seeking or brand-seeking 
orientation, I use two dummy variables to measure acquirers’ technology (T_PAT) and 
brand seeking (T_TRADM) with a value of ‘1’ referring to whether the target firm has 
at least one patent or trademark, and ‘0’ if otherwise. Also, I use target firms’ count of 
patents (TNPAT) prior to M&As as dependent variable. Likewise, target firms’ number 
of trademarks (TNTRADM) is seen as another dependent variable for the model 
studying Chinese MNEs’ brand-seeking orientation.  
 
3.4.2.2 Independent variables and other control variables 
Wang et al. (2012) argue that government involvement may affect EMNEs’ OFDI based 
on two firm-level dimensions which are their degree of state ownership and government 
affiliation level respectively. Due to the complicated ownership change and SOE reform 
occurring over the past two decades, identifying Chinese SOEs itself has not become 
easier (Yiu, 2011; Zou and Adams, 2008). A number of scholars suggested that the main 
condition for identifying a SOE is whether the firm’s largest shareholder is a state entity 
(Liang, Ren, and Sun, 2015; Meyer, Ding, Li, and Zhang, 2014; Ramasamy, Yeung, and 
Laforet, 2012; Wang, Wong, and Xia, 2008). To illustrate, Ramasamy, et al. (2012) 
classified four types of Chinese firms based on the nature of the majority shareholder, 
including the state asset management bureau, the State-owned Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) controls 157 listed firms which are directly 
affiliated to the central government, SOEs affiliated to provincial-, municipal-leve l 
government, and private firms. As such, I included three dummy variables to represent 
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Chinese SOEs’ different levels of government affiliation: variable CENG, ‘1’ refers to 
central-level government-owned enterprises, and ‘0’ if otherwise; variable PROG, ‘1’ 
refers to CMNEs owned by a provincial government, and ‘0’ if otherwise; variable 
CITYG, ‘1’ refers to CMNEs are owned by municipal-level government or county-leve l 
government, and ‘0’ if otherwise.  
 
Also, I used government affiliation level (GOVAL) as one core independent variable. 
Following prior studies (Hong, Wang, Kafouros, 2015; Wang et al. 2012), I also 
assigned a value to each government affiliation level. To be specific, a value of ‘3’ 
indicates that the firm is affiliated to the central government; value of ‘2’ denotes that 
the firm is affiliated to the provincial government, and ‘1’ represents the target firm 
belongs to the group of municipal or county-level government, and ‘0’ if otherwise.  
 
Zheng et al. (2016) thought that CMNEs’ own capacities may critically determine their 
new SAS strategy. Also, Lu et al. (2011) found that EMNEs should be equipped with 
related technological capacities to assimilate foreign technologies for ensuring 
successful SAS FDI. If Chinese acquirers have some competitive brands in the domestic 
or world markets, they will be less likely to acquire foreign brands. So, I consider 
acquirers’ log-transformed number of patents (LANPAT) and trademarks (LANTRADM) 
as explanatory variables, exploring their influence on Chinese MNEs’ SAS orientation. 
Moreover, Wang et al. (2012) stated that firms’ age may also determine their FDI as it 
somewhat reflects experiential knowledge and experience. Hence, in this study I 
included the firm’s age (LAGE) as an explanatory variable. It is measured by the number 
of years available since its establishment (Lu et al. 2011; Huang, Xie, and Reddy, 2017). 
Longer established firms have a greater propensity to engage in SAS FDI than 
traditional FDI (Cui, Meyer and Hu, 2014; Xia, Ma, Lu, and Yiu, 2014; Yang et al. 
2014). I added firms’ profit margin (PROFIT) and log-transformed total assets 
(LTASSET) as control variables. Public status (PUBLIC), as a control variable, was 
measured as a dummy variable whereby ‘1’ means the acquirer is a listed company, and 
‘0’ if otherwise. In this study I also used the ownership level of acquirers after M&A 
 145 
 
deals (OWNTRANS) as one of the control variables, exploring whether there are some 
differences about acquirers’ ownership level in between patent seeking and trademark 
seeking activities. 
 
Specifically, following Hong et al.’s (2015) and Huang et al. (2017)’s approach, I added 
another two control variables which are the Chinese acquirers’ M&A year and industry 
types that they were involved with. In terms of industry types, I followed Jones and 
Temouri (2016)’s approach in classifying two-digit NACE industry codes into high 
technology (HITECH), medium technology (MEDTEC) and low technology (LOWTEC) 
manufacturing industries, knowledge intensive (KNINTEN) and less knowledge 
intensive (LEKNIN) service industries.  
 
3.4.3 Research models 
As noted above, I obtained 843 effective CBM&As from 2006 to 2015 by 486 Chinese 
acquirers. This study used a cross-sectional data set. As for dependent variables, there 
are two groups: one group is about dummy variables including T_NATURE, T_PAT, 
and T_TRADM; the second group is about counts of target firms’ patents (TNPAT) and 
trademarks (TNTRADM).  
 
Jones and Temouri (2016) employ a probit model identifying the determinants of a tax 
haven FDI, using dummy variable as the dependent variable that equals ‘1’ if a MNE’s 
subsidiary is located in a tax haven and equals ‘0’ if otherwise. This study aimed to 
explore the firm-level determinants of CMNEs’ natural resource seeking, technology 
seeking or brand seeking FDI. Thus I also firstly used the probit model, seeking to 
construct a specification from IB theory.  
 
The probability of engaging in natural resources-, patent- or trademark seeking FDI == 
1
{1+𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝛾 }
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Where  
𝛾(𝑇_𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝑇_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡/𝑇_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡)  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2 ×
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 × 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1  +𝛽4 × 𝐵𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝛽5 × 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽7 × 𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 ,𝑡−1  + 𝛽8 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽9 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽10 ×
𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1  + 𝛽11 × 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽12 × 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽13 × 𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽14 × 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽15 × 𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽16 × 𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽17 ×
𝐿𝐸𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝛽18 × 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑂𝑃𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
𝑇_𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 means the in year t the target firm i was involved in the sector of natural 
resources. 𝑇_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡  represents the target firm i in year t has at least one patent. 
𝑇_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 refers to the target firm i in year t has at least one trademark. Except for 
the variable DEVOPED, all other independent variables and control variables were 
lagged one year prior to M&A year.  
 
In addition, the number of patents or trademarks was both count and discrete variable, 
which ranges from zero to a certain positive number. It largely has an over-dispersion 
problem. As for count data regression models, the econometric literature suggests that 
the Poisson or negative binomial regression model is more appropriate (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2013). I therefore selected the negative binomial regression model as a better 
choice based on likelihood-ratio (LR) test results. Furhermore, I still followed Greene’s 
(2003) suggestion to apply the Vuong test (Vuong, 1989) and then made the final choice 
between the standard negative binomial regression model and the zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression model. Since the Vuong Z-scores were insignificant, I fina lly 
adopted the negative binomial models. The model equation is displayed below: 
 
𝑇𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇/𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 × 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽4 × 𝐵𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 × 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽7 × 𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽8 ×
𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽9 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽10 × 𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽11 × 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽12 × 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽13 × 𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽14 × 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽15 ×
𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  +𝛽16 × 𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  +𝛽17 × 𝐿𝐸𝐾𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1  +𝛽18 × 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑂𝑃𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝜀 
𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡  represent the number of patents and trademarks 
respectively that the target firm i has in year t. 
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3.4.4 Estimations 
The existence of heteroscedasticity may result in invalid variance estimation 
(Goldberger, 1964). Then we introduced the Breusch-Pagan test to identify the problem 
of heteroscedasticity in a linear regression (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). Since I found 
thatthe BP test result was significant meaning tgat the heteroscedasticity occurred, the 
robust standard error analysis in estimations was added. Moreover, I needed to check 
whether there was a multicollinearity problem in the estimations. The average value of 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) should be below 10 (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 
1985; Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter, 2004), suggesting that the estimations have no 
serious multicollinearity problem. Lastly, to better avoid possible endogeneity with the 
dependent variable in the model, I followed Deng and Yang (2015) to lag all 
independent variables by one year. For example, I measured Chinese acquirers’ 
absorptive capacity by using the number of patents that they already had prior to M&As.  
 
3.4.5 Robustness checks 
As for robustness checks, this study introduced some Instrument-variable (IV) 
regression models to run estimations. Firms’ foreign market seeking can be seen as an 
endogenous decision due to certain firm characteristics (He, Zhang, and Wang, 2015; 
Hult, Ketchen, et al. 2008). In this study, the market seeking variable ‘DEVOPED’ is 
likely an endogenous variable. I introduced two instrument variables: the target 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and International Property Rights Index 
(IPRI). Later, I tested whether these two instrumental variables were not significantly 
correlated with dependent variables. As for dependent variables (T_NATURE, T_PAT 
and T_TRADM), I ran an Instrument-variable (IV)probit model to run data estimations.  
 
As for testing the amounts of patents and trademarks, I further added the IV Two-State 
Least Squares (2SLS) regression model for robustness tests. For the purpose of solving 
the over-dispersion problem, I used the IV_GMM regression model. Given the presence 
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of heteroscedasticity, GMM estimation would be more efficient than standard IV 
regression (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003). Moreover, to further observe the 
influence of firm heterogeneity on the CMNEs’ location choices, we followed Wang, et 
al.’s (2012) approach and split the full sample to two subsamples for robustness checks 
including developed countries and developing countries.  
 
3.5 Research results 
3.5.1 Descriptive analyses 
Table 3.5.1.1 describes this study’s sample firms’ characteristics. There are 486 
effective observations of CMNEs, which had completed 843 CBM&As from 2006 to 
2015. Specifically, 195 target firms were involved in the sector of natural resources, 
177 target firms have patents, and 196 target firms have trademarks. The majority of 
target firms are located in developed countries, reaching 609 (Table 3.5.1.1).  
 
Table 3.5.1.1 Sample characteristics 3 
Acquirers-State ownership types Number of 
firms 
Number of 
M&A deals 
Chinese Central government owned enterprises 89 248 
Chinese Provincial government owned 
enterprises 
29 60 
Chinese City-level owned enterprises  
(County-leve) 
81(2) 125 
Chinese privately-owned enterprises 287 410 
Total 486 843 
Target firms 
  
Target firm in natural resources 195 195 
Target firm has one patent at least 177 177 
Target firm has one trademark at least 196 196 
Target firm located in developed countries 609 609 
Target firm located in developing countries 234 234 
 
Table 3.5.1.2 reports matrix pairwise correlations on all relevant variables. I selected a 
5 percent confidence level.  
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Table 3.5.1.2 Matrix pairwise correlations 4 
 
 
No. Variables Obs Mean
Standard
deviation
Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 T_NATURE 843 0.2313 0.4219 0 1 1.0000
2 T_PAT 843 0.2100 0.4075 0 1 -0.1585* 1.0000
3 T_TRADM 843 0.2325 0.4227 0 1 -0.1754* 0.5023* 1.0000
4 TNPAT 843 470.9514 5602.1270 0 103490 -0.0370 0.1632* 0.1499* 1.0000
5 TNTRADM 843 6.9953 46.0536 0 819 -0.0147 0.2458* 0.2761* 0.2564* 1.0000
6 PRIVATE 843 0.4864 0.5001 0 1 -0.3368* 0.1044* 0.1218* 0.0018 0.0088 1.0000
7 CENG 843 0.2942 0.4559 0 1 0.1274* -0.0835*-0.1027* -0.0374 0.0307 -0.6282* 1.0000
8 PROG 843 0.0712 0.2573 0 1 0.3733* -0.1087*-0.1305* -0.0233 -0.0416 -0.2694*-0.1787* 1.0000
9 CITYG 843 0.1483 0.3556 0 1 0.0403 0.0390 0.0548 0.0622 -0.0216 -0.4060*-0.2694*-0.1155* 1.0000
10 GOVAL 843 1.1732 1.3063 0 3 0.2914* -0.1197*-0.1440* -0.0314 0.0099 -0.8745* 0.9034* 0.1753* -0.0554 1.0000
11 BGA 843 0.7556 0.4300 0 1 0.1417* 0.0356 -0.0138 0.0447 0.0474 -0.4850* 0.3429* 0.1145* 0.1596* 0.4476* 1.0000
12 LAGE 843 2.8046 0.5776 0 5.1059 0.0735* -0.0652 -0.0558 0.0315 0.0176 -0.2476* 0.2120* 0.0383 0.0487 0.2503* 0.1948* 1.0000
13 PROFIT 780 8.5092 26.9266 -253 150 -0.1312* 0.0479 0.0463 -0.0071 0.0248 -0.0012 0.0588 -0.0712* -0.0239 0.0281 0.0462 0.0613 1.0000
14 LTASSET 798 22.0067 2.6377 10.17 28.861 0.1101* -0.0322 -0.0190 0.0392 0.0659 -0.4570* 0.4623* 0.0921* -0.0228 0.5159* 0.4548* 0.2914* 0.2083* 1.0000
15 LANPAT 843 2.0056 2.8485 0 10.591 0.0336 0.1486* 0.1051* 0.1325* 0.1072* -0.1314* 0.0296 0.1784* 0.0179 0.1061* 0.1909* 0.1524* 0.0500 0.3370* 1.0000
16 LANTRADM 843 0.5573 0.9819 0 4.9698 -0.1029* 0.1217* 0.1498* 0.1258* 0.0812* -0.0146 0.0860* -0.0802* -0.0317 0.0498 0.1592* 0.1754* 0.1219* 0.3578* 0.5255* 1.0000
17 FEXPE 843 0.7331 0.4426 0 1 0.0957* -0.0050 0.0401 -0.0316 0.0227 -0.1587* 0.1777* 0.0627 -0.0501 0.1971* 0.1873* 0.1062* 0.0381 0.2803* 0.1473* 0.1573* 1.0000
18 PUBLIC 843 0.5314 0.4993 0 1 -0.1558* 0.0113 -0.0290 -0.0668 0.0434 0.0861* -0.0772* -0.0174 -0.0096 -0.0903* -0.0582 -0.0771* 0.0277 0.0286 0.1016* 0.0299 0.1643* 1.0000
19 OWNTRANS 843 73.5354 32.8628 10 100 -0.2287* 0.0211 -0.0047 0.0452 -0.0173 0.1529* -0.1055*-0.1030* -0.0053 -0.1524* -0.0152 0.0045 0.0910* -0.1407* -0.0374 0.0262 -0.0652 0.0576 1
Notes: significant at 95% confidence level
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3.5.2 Natural resource seeking FDI strategy 
Table 3.5.2.1 reports the results of the probit regression model for testing the likelihood 
of natural resource seeking. Models 1-3 test the full sample. Models 4-6 observe target 
firms that are located in developed countries, and models 7-9 are developed to observe 
target firms located in developing countries. Model 1 simply adds the PRIVATE 
variable and model 2 uses CENG, PROG, and CITYG instead of PRIVATE testing the 
influence of different government affiliation levels on CMNEs’ natural resource-
seeking FDI. In model 3, we used one categorical variable GOVAL instead. From 
Model 1 to Model 9, each mean VIF value is less than 3, meaning there was no 
multicollinearity problem affecting estimations. In Model 1, the PRIVATE variable is 
negative but significant (-1.2622, p<0.001). Then hypothesis 1-a that Chinese POEs are 
less likely to acquire target firms involved in natural resources can be accepted. In 
model 2, CENG, PROG, and CITYG are all positive and significant at 1 percent 
confidence level. GOVAL (0.2594, p<0.001) in model 3 is also positive and significant, 
which indicates that CMNEs affiliated to a higher government level are more likely to 
seek natural resource endowments. Thus, Hypothesis 1-b can be accepted.  
 
In comparison, these four variables PRIVATE, CENG, PROG, and CITYG achieved 
consistent results from model 4 to model 9. It means Chinese SOEs are likely to choose 
both developed countries and developing countries for natural resources seeking FDI.   
 
Additionally, according to models 1-6, OWNTRANS is significant but negative ly 
related to CMNEs’ natural resource seeking FDI via foreign M&As. It largely reveals 
that CMNEs are likely allowed to maintain a smaller ownership percentage if they tend 
to acquire foreign firms which have natural resources.  
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Table 3.5.2.1 Probit regression model-natural resource seeking FDI strategy 5  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Variables World World World Developed 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
DEVOPED 0.3350* 0.3493* 0.3757** 
      
 
0.1427 0.1481 0.1394 
      
PRIVATE -1.2622*** 
  
-1.3025*** 
  
-1.7818*** 
  
 
0.1569 
  
0.1811 
  
0.5003 
  
CENG 
 
1.0551*** 
  
1.0581*** 
  
1.8678*** 
 
  
0.1792 
  
0.2179 
  
0.4240 
 
PROG 
 
2.4444*** 
  
2.5507*** 
  
3.7881*** 
 
  
0.2641 
  
0.3195 
  
0.6418 
 
CITYG 
 
1.1003*** 
  
1.1923*** 
  
1.0653* 
 
  
0.1860 
  
0.2108 
  
0.5358 
 
GOVAL 
  
0.2954*** 
  
0.3023*** 
  
0.4668***    
0.0494 
  
0.0622 
  
0.1144 
BGA -0.2126 -0.2791 0.1403 0.0855 0.0093 0.4032* -1.2972* -1.4034* -0.6601  
0.2111 0.2133 0.1836 0.2367 0.2396 0.2062 0.6523 0.5731 0.5654 
LAGE 0.0480 0.0754 0.0724 -0.0469 -0.0152 -0.0344 0.2384 0.2938 0.3144  
0.1153 0.1189 0.1139 0.1387 0.1433 0.1375 0.2290 0.2351 0.2092 
PROFIT -0.0062** -0.0054** -0.0059** -0.0060* -0.0054+ -0.0064* -0.0116** -0.0078+ -0.0098*  
0.0019 0.0019 0.0020 0.0030 0.0032 0.0030 0.0040 0.0042 0.0041 
LTASSET -0.0166 -0.0030 -0.0146 -0.0512 -0.0304 -0.0500 0.1199 0.0752 0.0845  
0.0310 0.0337 0.0315 0.0363 0.0405 0.0378 0.0753 0.0772 0.0728 
LANPAT 0.0478* 0.0042 0.0613** 0.0461 -0.0066 0.0631* 0.0413 0.0023 0.0676  
0.0233 0.0247 0.0232 0.0288 0.0302 0.0286 0.0479 0.0553 0.0459 
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LANTRADM -0.3210*** -0.2207** -0.3658*** -0.4443*** -0.3490** -0.4719*** 0.0005 0.1641 -0.1003  
0.0787 0.0773 0.0767 0.1013 0.1012 0.0981 0.1872 0.1847 0.1732 
FEXPE 0.3279* 0.3386* 0.2753+ 0.1611 0.1328 0.1267 1.0447* 1.1746** 0.9978*  
0.1555 0.1643 0.1511 0.1789 0.1867 0.1736 0.4143 0.3983 0.4185 
PUBLIC -0.3698** -0.3769** -0.3344** -0.2007 -0.1963 -0.1592 -0.9067** -1.0493** -0.9730**  
0.1243 0.1287 0.1223 0.1437 0.1511 0.1416 0.2811 0.3160 0.2827 
OWNTRANS -0.0054** -0.0051** -0.0058** -0.0067** -0.0069** -0.0067** -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0054  
0.0017 0.0018 0.0017 0.0021 0.0021 0.0020 0.0040 0.0042 0.0040 
Constant 0.5650 -0.9314 -0.7362 1.9769* 0.3637 0.7211 -2.9278 -3.8799* -4.1186*  
0.7901 0.7847 0.7401 0.9422 0.9297 0.8778 1.8448 1.6839 1.6121 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 563 563 563 217 217 217 
Wald chi2 165.84 197.05 149.17 169.72 189.2 145.22 47.84 72.64 48.18 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 
Pseudo R2 0.254 0.3019 0.2135 0.292 0.3429 0.2452 0.3421 0.4362 0.3311 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-308.8558 -289.0194 -325.6018 -225.1276 -208.9313 -239.9997 -59.7174 -51.1727 -60.7111 
Mean vif 2.34 2.3 2.37 2.4 2.35 2.42 2.4 2.35 2.42 
Correct 
predictions 
80.00% 83.46% 77.05% 79.40% 80.64% 77.09% 88.48% 89.40% 86.64% 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<0.001 
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Table 3.5.2.2 achieved average marginal effects on models 1-9. The marginal effects of 
CENG in models 5 and 8 are 0.2269 (p<0.001) and 0.2626 (p<0.001) respectively, and  
PROG in models 5 and 8 are 0.6250 (p<0.001) and 0.7469 (p<0.001) respectively. Thus, 
I can find that Chinese central government-owned firms and provincial government-
owned firms tend to choose developing countries for natural resources seeking as 
opposed to developed countries. Conversely, Chinese municipal- level government 
owned firms have higher likelihood of choosing developed countries for natural 
resource seeking. As discussed above, the market-seeking variable (DEVOPED) may 
be an endogenous variable. But I found an insignificant result from Wald test on 
exogeneity and reject the pull hypothesis that DEVOPED is an exogeneous variable.   
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Table 3.5.2.2 Average marginal effects – natural resource seeking FDI 6  
Model 1-
mar 
Model 2-
mar 
Model 3-
mar 
Model 4-
mar 
Model 5-
mar 
Model 6-
mar 
Model 7-
mar 
Model 8-
mar 
Model 9-
mar 
i.PRIVATE -0.2770*** 
  
-0.2908*** 
  
-0.2400*** 
  
 
0.0317 
  
0.0371 
  
0.061 
  
i.CENG 
 
0.2307*** 
  
0.2269*** 
  
0.2626*** 
 
  
0.0398 
  
0.0469 
  
0.0681 
 
i.PROG 
 
0.6521*** 
  
0.6250*** 
  
0.7469*** 
 
  
0.0498 
  
0.0561 
  
0.079 
 
i.CITYG 
 
0.2587*** 
  
0.2665*** 
  
0.1693+ 
 
  
0.0448 
  
0.0463 
  
0.1021 
 
GOVAL 
  
0.0685*** 
  
0.0714*** 
  
0.0726***    
0.0113 
  
0.0143 
  
0.0178 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); + P<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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3.5.3 Technology seeking FDI strategy 
Table 3.5.3.1 displays the probit regression estimation results on CMNEs’ technology 
seeking FDI. Models 10-12 test the full sample, models 13-15 and models 16-18 test 
samples regarding target firms located in developed countries and developing countries 
respectively. In terms of VIF values, there were no multicollinearity problems in 
estimations. First of all, DEVOPED variables in models 10-12 is all significant and 
positive, meaning CMNEs are significantly attracted to choosing developed countries 
for seeking technology. PRIVATE (0.3356, p<0.05) is positively and significantly at 95% 
confidence level in model 10. In model 13 and model 16, PRIVATE is still positive and 
significant. The Hypothesis 2-a can be accepted that Chinese POEs are more likely to 
acquire patents via CBM&As. More importantly, I found that Chinese POEs can go to 
both developed countries and developing countries for technology-seeking FDI. In 
Model 11 and model 14, I simply found PROG (-1.3856, p<0.001; -1.3338, p<0.001) 
is equally significant but negative, and both CENG and CITYG are insignificant. In 
model GOVAL (-0.1051, p<0.10) in model 12 is negative but significant if I choose a 
10 confidence level. GOVAL in model 18 is also negative but significant. It means 
higher government-affiliated firms are less likely to seek technology-driven FDI. Hence, 
I may accept Hypothesis 2-b.  
 
In terms of industry factors, Table 3.5.3.1 clearly displays that CMNEs involved in 
manufacturing industry have a higher likelihood of seeking foreign technologies via 
M&As.  
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Table 3.5.3.1 Probit regression model-technology seeking FDI strategy 7 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Variables World World World Developed 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
DEVOPED 1.1064*** 1.1306*** 1.0952*** 
      
  0.1619 0.1657 0.1615 
      
PRIVATE 0.3356* 
  
0.2797+ 
  
1.2323* 
  
  0.1339 
  
0.1445 
  
0.6089 
  
CENG 
 
-0.2208 
  
-0.0542 
  
-1.8815* 
 
  
 
0.1661 
  
0.1840 
  
0.8654 
 
PROG 
 
-1.3856*** 
  
-1.3338*** 
  
- 
 
  
 
0.3202 
  
0.3325 
    
CITYG 
 
-0.2275 
  
-0.2403 
  
-0.9024 
 
  
 
0.1657 
  
0.1771 
  
0.7133 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.1051+ 
  
-0.0530 
  
-0.7254* 
  
  
0.0562 
  
0.0618 
  
0.3205 
BGA 0.5861** 0.5992*** 0.5220** 0.4701* 0.4917** 0.3995* 2.0685** 2.0628** 2.0273*** 
  0.1689 0.1688 0.1655 0.1846 0.1859 0.1813 0.6254 0.6197 0.5689 
LAGE -0.1139 -0.1525 -0.1197 -0.1406 -0.1864 -0.1417 -0.4694 -0.5801 -0.6197 
  0.1196 0.1202 0.1192 0.1308 0.1318 0.1310 0.3826 0.4523 0.4441 
PROFIT 0.0038 0.0034 0.0040 0.0063* 0.0060+ 0.0066* -0.0019 -0.0027 -0.0031 
  0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0038 0.0036 0.0037 
LTASSET -0.0153 -0.0152 -0.0137 -0.0270 -0.0355 -0.0332 0.0225 0.0749 0.0889 
  0.0332 0.0337 0.0338 0.0363 0.0371 0.0370 0.0827 0.0902 0.0890 
LANPAT 0.0571* 0.0788** 0.0537* 0.0670* 0.0958** 0.0656* -0.0985 -0.1266 -0.1406 
  0.0258 0.0266 0.0261 0.0277 0.0286 0.0277 0.0938 0.1066 0.1055 
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LANTRADM 0.0665 0.0291 0.0752 0.0786 0.0374 0.0904 -0.3597 -0.3328 -0.2839 
  0.0713 0.0726 0.0715 0.0777 0.0789 0.0774 0.2561 0.2593 0.2478 
FEXPE -0.2527+ -0.2491+ -0.2361+ -0.1939 -0.1948 -0.1885 -0.4134 -0.2167 -0.1830 
  0.1372 0.1377 0.1367 0.1504 0.1522 0.1501 0.3771 0.3725 0.4013 
PUBLIC 0.0132 0.0155 0.0050 0.0035 0.0145 0.0075 -0.1313 -0.2091 -0.2915 
  0.1181 0.1204 0.1181 0.1268 0.1304 0.1273 0.3882 0.4204 0.3984 
OWNTRANS -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0200** -0.0191* -0.0187* 
  0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0075 0.0079 0.0073 
HITECH 1.0868*** 1.1288*** 1.0663*** 0.8817** 0.9760** 0.9048** 6.7210*** 6.5140*** 6.3659*** 
  0.2466 0.2586 0.2485 0.2654 0.2808 0.2681 0.8907 0.9434 0.7204 
MEDTEC 0.6540** 0.7562*** 0.6325** 0.6483** 0.8022*** 0.6535** 4.4099*** 4.4116*** 4.2954*** 
  0.1934 0.2085 0.1963 0.2028 0.2214 0.2060 0.9493 1.0239 0.9259 
LOWTEC 0.8026** 0.8853** 0.7727** 0.8406** 1.0038** 0.8462** 5.0540*** 4.7485*** 4.5826*** 
  0.2867 0.3033 0.2897 0.3138 0.3358 0.3172 0.9109 0.9910 0.8453 
KNINTEN 0.2647 0.3234 0.2646 0.1642 0.2554 0.1892 5.0259*** 4.7475*** 4.5438*** 
  0.2329 0.2388 0.2336 0.2497 0.2577 0.2500 0.7462 0.8929 0.7191 
LEKNIN 0.2379 0.2648 0.2313 0.2761 0.3312 0.2876 4.1225*** 3.7247*** 3.5077*** 
  0.2623 0.2712 0.2649 0.2863 0.2950 0.2874 0.7606 0.9573 0.7757 
Constant -1.7141* -1.3913+ -1.3711+ -0.2898 0.0884 0.0500 -5.2670* -4.4961* -4.3792* 
  0.8532 0.8366 0.8272 0.9024 0.8928 0.8810 2.5277 2.1443 2.1046 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 563 563 563 118 110 118 
Wald chi2 139.32 148.11 135.67 69.8 86.41 66.08 412.88 386.59 413.23 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pesudo R2 0.1763 0.1950 0.1732 0.1124 0.1367 0.1082 0.4149 0.4170 0.4239 
Log -335.8141 -328.1722 -337.0825 -295.776 -287.669 -297.1676 -22.7021 -22.1008 -22.3528 
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pseudolikelihood 
Mean vif 2.38 2.36 2.41 2.42 2.4 2.45 2.42 2.4 2.45 
Correct predictions 80.00% 80.26% 79.36% 74.78% 75.49% 74.60% 91.53% 91.82% 92.37% 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<0.001 
 
Table 3.5.3.2 displays average marginal effects on models 10-18. The marginal effect of PRIVATE (p<0.10) in model 13 is 0.0844, and its margina l 
effect of PRIVATE in model 16 is 0.0573 (p<0.05). It reveals that Chinese POEs have a higher likelihood of seeking technology in developed 
countries than in developing countries.  
 
Table 3.5.3.2 Average marginal effects – technology seeking FDI 8  
Model 10-
mar 
Model 11-
mar 
Model 12-
mar 
Model 13-
mar 
Model 14-
mar 
Model 15-
mar 
Model 16-
mar 
Model 17-
mar 
Model 18-
mar 
i.PRIVATE 0.0822* 
  
0.0844+ 
  
0.0573* 
  
 
0.0332 
  
0.044 
  
0.0272 
  
i.CENG 
 
-0.051 
  
-0.0156 
  
-0.0457+ 
 
  
0.0376 
  
0.0527 
  
0.0234 
 
i.PROG 
 
-0.2047*** 
  
-0.2572*** 
  
- 
 
  
0.0239 
  
0.0342 
  
- 
 
i.CITYG 
 
-0.0509 
  
-0.0663 
  
-0.0317 
 
  
0.0351 
  
0.0465 
  
0.0271 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.0254+ 
  
-0.0158 
  
-0.0260*    
0.0135 
  
0.0184 
  
0.012 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); + P<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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When choosing target firms’ amounts of patents as a dependent variable, the negative 
binomial regression did not achieve a significant result on PRIVATE (Table 3.5.3.3). I 
still found GOVAL that the variable is negatively and significantly related to CMNEs’ 
amounts of patent seeking (Table 3.5.3.3). 
 
Table 3.5.3.3 Negative binomial regression-technology seeking FDI 9 
Variable Model 19 Model 20 Model 21  
Full sample Full sample Full sample 
DEVOPED 2.6052*** 2.4564*** 2.5657***  
0.6110 0.6194 0.5809 
PRIVATE 0.6779 
  
 
0.4849 
  
CENG 
 
-0.5924 
 
  
0.5090 
 
PROG 
 
-8.2058*** 
 
  
0.8662 
 
CITYG 
 
0.8937 
 
  
0.7740 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.3718*    
0.1661 
BGA 1.8118** 2.1018*** 1.7875**  
0.6022 0.5975 0.5754 
LAGE -0.3275 -0.6526 -0.3931  
0.4079 0.4460 0.4031 
PROFIT -0.0057 -0.0012 -0.0053  
0.0073 0.0071 0.0071 
LTASSET 0.0042 -0.0392 0.0294  
0.0876 0.0949 0.0927 
LANPAT 0.4033*** 0.5220*** 0.4122***  
0.0842 0.0868 0.0817 
LANTRADM 0.5270* 0.3146 0.4894*  
0.2352 0.2196 0.2310 
FEXPE -0.7911* -0.4536 -0.7115+  
0.4031 0.4212 0.3998 
PUBLIC -0.4140 0.0784 -0.3453  
0.4374 0.4456 0.4473 
OWNTRANS 0.0014 0.0020 0.0019  
0.0057 0.0060 0.0057 
HITECH 1.5216+ 1.3863 1.1336  
0.8008 0.8521 0.8583 
MEDTEC 1.8068** 2.1047** 1.5384* 
 160 
 
 
0.6783 0.6584 0.7172 
LOWTEC 0.0870 -0.3390 -0.3733  
0.9819 1.0462 1.0298 
KNINTEN -1.4338+ -1.1030 -1.5552*  
0.7369 0.7107 0.7567 
LEKNIN -0.7412 -0.7452 -0.9829  
0.7997 0.7473 0.8119 
Constant -2.2374 -0.3830 -1.3675  
2.2419 2.0678 2.0567 
Year control Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 
Wald chi2 458.71 534.18 459.27 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.0668 0.0573 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-1242.2101 -1229.2747 -1241.765 
LR test of alpha=0 
Prob>chibar2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean vif 2.38 2.36 2.41 
Voung test of zinb vs standard negative binomial (inflate constant) 
z 0.25 0.31 0.66 
Pr>z 0.4032 0.3781 0.2541 
Notes: LR test shows standard negative binomial regression model is better than 
possion model; the z scores via voung test are all insignificant, which means standard 
negative binomial model is appropriate; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient 
(underline); + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<0.001 
 
Likewise, the Wald test via the IVprobit regression method proved that DEVOPED is 
actually an endogenous variable (Table 3.5.3.4). Nevertheless, I found that PRIVATE 
(0.3029, p<0.05) in model 22 is still positive and significant, indicating that Chinese 
POEs are more than likely to seek technology seeking FDI, therefore, hypothesis 2-a is 
strongly supported.  
 
Although I found PROG was negative and significant in model 23, GOVAL in model 
24 was not significant. Thus, the hypothesis 2-b cannot be fully accepted. With regards 
to amount of patent seeking, the IVgmm regression estimations achieved consistent 
results about the variable of PRIVATE (Table 3.5.3.5). Consequently, my findings 
strongly supported that Chinese POEs are likely to seek technology-based acquisit ions 
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and acquire target firms with greater amounts of patents. Chinese SOEs had no 
significant inclinations for seeking technology-based acquisitions.  
 
Table 3.5.3.4 IVprobit estimation-technology seeking FDI 10 
Variable Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
DEVOPED 1.8309*** 1.8422*** 1.8333***  
0.2267 0.2354 0.2261 
PRIVATE 0.3029* 
  
 
0.1297 
  
CENG 
 
-0.1609 
 
  
0.1623 
 
PROG 
 
-1.3201*** 
 
  
0.3075 
 
CITYG 
 
-0.2373 
 
  
0.1587 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.0807    
0.0544 
BGA 0.5189** 0.5438** 0.4507**  
0.1656 0.1658 0.1623 
LAGE -0.0291 -0.0634 -0.0353  
0.1122 0.1133 0.1119 
PROFIT 0.0048* 0.0045+ 0.0050*  
0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 
LTASSET -0.0098 -0.0136 -0.0109  
0.0326 0.0334 0.0332 
LANPAT 0.0400 0.0614* 0.0373  
0.0248 0.0253 0.0249 
LANTRADM 0.0463 0.0109 0.0557  
0.0675 0.0682 0.0674 
FEXPE -0.3290* -0.3317* -0.3187*  
0.1340 0.1346 0.1333 
PUBLIC 0.1185 0.1261 0.1174  
0.1139 0.1160 0.1138 
OWNTRANS -0.0023 -0.0028+ -0.0022  
0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 
HITECH 1.1094*** 1.1631*** 1.1005***  
0.2412 0.2514 0.2418 
MEDTEC 0.6349** 0.7424*** 0.6217**  
0.1878 0.2014 0.1900 
LOWTEC 0.8058** 0.8979** 0.7873**  
0.2786 0.2942 0.2822 
KNINTEN 0.2738 0.3365 0.2819  
0.2233 0.2295 0.2233 
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LEKNIN 0.3927 0.4160 0.3978  
0.2522 0.2618 0.2541 
Year control Included Included Included 
Constant -2.3365** -1.9947* -2.0039*  
0.8268 0.8170 0.8019 
Observations 776 776 776 
Wald chi2 191.3 198.09 188.72 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-575.21905 -566.10982 -576.62528 
Wald test of exogeneity 
chi2 15.43 13.41 15.98 
Prob>chi2 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 
Mean vif 2.42 2.4 2.45 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.0001 
 
Table 3.5.3.5 Ivregress GMM estimation-technology seeking 11 
Variable Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
DEVOPED 1.3262*** 1.2587*** 1.3174***  
0.2029 0.1948 0.2025 
PRIVATE 0.3354+ 
  
 
0.1772 
  
CENG 
 
-0.2796 
 
  
0.1922 
 
PROG 
 
-1.1183*** 
 
  
0.2175 
 
CITYG 
 
-0.1454 
 
  
0.2361 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.1150+    
0.0635 
BGA 0.3448 0.3517* 0.2936+  
0.1546 0.1525 0.1550 
LAGE 0.1034 0.0673 0.0988  
0.1146 0.1138 0.1129 
PROFIT 0.0023 0.0020 0.0024  
0.0018 0.0017 0.0018 
LTASSET 0.0016 0.0020 0.0050  
0.0294 0.0302 0.0304 
LANPAT 0.0813** 0.1011** 0.0776*  
0.0311 0.0322 0.0307 
LANTRADM 0.0645 0.0229 0.0741  
0.0815 0.0817 0.0800 
FEXPE -0.2394 -0.2345 -0.2281 
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0.1573 0.1540 0.1580 
PUBLIC -0.0734 -0.0933 -0.0797  
0.1234 0.1258 0.1273 
OWNTRANS -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0013  
0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 
HITECH 0.6908* 0.6301* 0.6649*  
0.2693 0.2585 0.2647 
MEDTEC 0.4502* 0.4611* 0.4237*  
0.1911 0.1879 0.1907 
LOWTEC 0.5334* 0.5034* 0.5007*  
0.2208 0.2164 0.2193 
KNINTEN 0.0254 0.0157 0.0140  
0.2017 0.1979 0.2004 
LEKNIN 0.2477 0.1767 0.2359  
0.2191 0.2216 0.2202 
Year control Included Included Included 
Constant -1.1761 -0.6929 -0.8603  
0.8232 0.7421 0.7498 
Observations 776 776 776 
Wald chi2 92.69 100 90.9 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0802 0.1021 0.0804 
DWH test 
Robust score chi2 24.7525 (p=0.0000) 23.8391 
(p=0.0000) 
24.9948 (p=0.0000) 
Robust regression F 25.4433 (p=0.0000) 23.3162 
(p=0.0000) 
25.7205 (p=0.0000) 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansens J chi2 1.11971 (p=0.2900) 0.818907 
(p=0.3655) 
1.12928 (p=0.2879) 
Mean vif 2.42 2.4 2.45 
Notes: GMM weight matrix: robust; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient 
(underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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3.5.4 Brand seeking FDI strategy 
Table 3.5.4.1 displays probit model estimations on CMNEs’ likelihood of undertaking 
brand-seeking FDI. Models 28-30 achieved positive and significant results on 
PRIVATE, so hypothesis 3-a can be accepted. Based on the comparison between 
samples that target firms located in developed countries and developing countries 
respectively, I found that Chinese POEs are more likely to acquire brands of firms from 
developed countries rather than developing countries. The GOVAL in both model 30 
and model 33 is significant but negative. Such results reveal that CMNEs owned by a 
higher level of government are less likely to seek brand-based acquisitions.  
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Table 3.5.4.1 Probit regression model-brand seeking FDI strategy 12 
  Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 
Variables World World World Developed 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
DEVOPED 0.8019*** 0.8185*** 0.7921*** 
      
  0.1461 0.1479 0.1456 
      
PRIVATE 0.3679** 
  
0.4223** 
  
-0.2630 
  
  0.1297 
  
0.1438 
  
0.3303 
  
CENG 
 
-0.3912* 
  
-0.4262* 
  
0.2784 
 
  
 
0.1578 
  
0.1794 
  
0.3597 
 
PROG 
 
- 
  
- 
  
- 
 
  
 
- 
  
- 
  
- 
 
CITYG 
 
-0.1011 
  
-0.1634 
  
0.5095 
 
  
 
0.1596 
  
0.1725 
  
0.4683 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.1651** 
  
-0.1824** 
  
0.0698 
  
  
0.0529 
  
0.0601 
  
0.1127 
BGA 0.1045 0.0897 0.0659 0.1006 0.0869 0.0525 -0.2583 -0.2851 -0.2018 
  0.1587 0.1592 0.1547 0.1833 0.1838 0.1781 0.3856 0.3916 0.3720 
LAGE -0.1194 -0.1695 -0.1221 -0.0608 -0.1190 -0.0638 -0.4658* -0.5105* -0.4493+ 
  0.1045 0.1059 0.1051 0.1212 0.1225 0.1215 0.2368 0.2407 0.2376 
PROFIT 0.0023 0.0020 0.0024 0.0025 0.0023 0.0027 0.0008 0.0001 0.0009 
  0.0021 0.0022 0.0021 0.0027 0.0028 0.0027 0.0033 0.0035 0.0033 
LTASSET 0.0110 0.0245 0.0230 0.0019 0.0170 0.0151 0.0483 0.0637 0.0465 
  0.0295 0.0302 0.0300 0.0340 0.0351 0.0348 0.0683 0.0679 0.0668 
LANPAT 0.0143 0.0353 0.0087 0.0206 0.0456 0.0142 0.0154 0.0435 0.0162 
  0.0252 0.0261 0.0256 0.0273 0.0285 0.0278 0.0647 0.0682 0.0654 
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LANTRADM 0.1610* 0.1173+ 0.1653* 0.1718* 0.1221 0.1755* 0.0533 -0.0260 0.0437 
  0.0656 0.0676 0.0664 0.0734 0.0758 0.0745 0.1785 0.1876 0.1776 
FEXPE 0.0015 0.0298 0.0202 -0.0388 -0.0106 -0.0181 0.1185 0.1741 0.1202 
  0.1308 0.1334 0.1311 0.1491 0.1524 0.1496 0.3298 0.3471 0.3274 
PUBLIC -0.2183+ -0.2578* -0.2423* -0.2243+ -0.2749* -0.2532* -0.0031 0.0559 -0.0311 
  0.1135 0.1187 0.1135 0.1258 0.1324 0.1260 0.2980 0.3312 0.2967 
OWNTRANS -0.0025 -0.0030+ -0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0064+ -0.0074+ -0.0065+ 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0039 0.0040 0.0039 
HITECH 0.4626* 0.4126+ 0.3968+ 0.6004* 0.5915* 0.5432* -0.0510 -0.2847 -0.0387 
  0.2296 0.2423 0.2304 0.2603 0.2740 0.2601 0.5660 0.6204 0.5548 
MEDTEC 0.3376+ 0.3807+ 0.2778 0.4556* 0.5280* 0.3973+ -0.2796 -0.2958 -0.2674 
  0.1883 0.2081 0.1898 0.2072 0.2301 0.2090 0.4304 0.4801 0.4240 
LOWTEC 0.7374** 0.7416* 0.6602* 0.8641** 0.8910** 0.7630* 0.4972 0.4160 0.4983 
  0.2726 0.2941 0.2772 0.3113 0.3330 0.3108 0.5452 0.5651 0.5526 
KNINTEN 0.0174 0.0185 -0.0258 0.0744 0.1124 0.0440 -0.0228 -0.1058 -0.0075 
  0.2226 0.2322 0.2241 0.2426 0.2547 0.2453 0.5276 0.5246 0.5197 
LEKNIN 0.0536 0.0067 -0.0051 0.1195 0.0912 0.0654 -0.0300 -0.1346 -0.0294 
  0.2421 0.2520 0.2424 0.2757 0.2862 0.2762 0.5056 0.5203 0.4980 
Constant -1.6445* -1.3766+ -1.3760+ -0.7680 -0.4641 -0.4745 -4.6280** -5.1960** -4.8706** 
  0.7448 0.7393 0.7222 0.8201 0.8219 0.8022 1.5588 1.5667 1.4665 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 726 780 563 520 563 164 155 164 
Wald chi2 88.82 93.37 90.22 60.69 57.71 59.96 663.72 514.03 690.61 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pesudo R2 0.1269 0.1346 0.1284 0.0948 0.0953 0.0953 0.1631 0.1848 0.1611 
Log -374.0721 -357.5149 -373.4223 -309.8392 -295.3092 -309.6601 -49.2159 -47.0086 -49.3346 
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pseudolikelihood 
Mean vif 2.38 2.36 2.41 2.42 2.4 2.45 2.42 2.4 2.45 
Correct predictions 77.95% 76.17% 78.72% 73.18% 71.54% 73.00% 88.41% 87.74% 88.41% 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); + p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<0.001 
 
Furthermore, based on average marginal effect results, there are a total 10.15% of Chinese POEs significantly involved in overseas brand-driven 
acquisitions; 13.55% of brand-driven acquisitions occurred in developed countries, and Chinese POEs are less likely to acquire target firms located 
in developing countries for brand seeking FDI. (Table 3.5.4.2).  
 
Table 3.5.4.2 Average marginal effects – brand seeking FDI 13  
Model 28-
mar 
Model 29-
mar 
Model 30-
mar 
Model 31-
mar 
Model 32-
mar 
Model 33-
mar 
Model 34-
mar 
Model 35-
mar 
Model 36-
mar 
i.PRIVATE 0.1015** 
  
0.1355** 
  
-0.0329 
  
 
0.0359 
     
0.042 
  
i.CENG 
 
-0.0267 
  
-0.0329 
  
0.0692 
 
  
0.0385 
  
0.0512 
  
0.0492 
 
i.PROG 
 
- 
  
- 
  
- 
 
  
- 
  
- 
  
- 
 
i.CITYG 
 
0.032 
  
0.0224 
  
0.1005 
 
  
0.044 
  
0.0537 
  
0.081 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.0446** 
  
-0.0569** 
  
0.0087    
0.014 
  
0.0183 
  
0.014 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); + P<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Choosing counts of trademarks as dependent variable enables us to use the negative 
binomial regression model (Table 3.5.4.3). I found that PRIVATE (0.5739, p<0.10) is 
positive and significant if selecting a 10 confidence level in model 37. GOVAL in model 
39 is not significant, meaning that different government affiliation levels do not 
significantly determine Chinese SOEs’ seeking amounts of brands.  
 
Table 3.5.4.3 Negative binomial regression-brand seeking FDI 14 
Variable Model 37 Model 38 Model 39  
Full sample Full sample Full sample 
DEVOPED 1.9139*** 1.9948*** 1.9628***  
0.3597 0.3538 0.3562 
PRIVATE 0.5738+ 
  
 
0.3209 
  
CENG 
 
-0.1824 
 
  
0.3946 
 
PROG 
 
-31.9155*** 
 
  
0.5592 
 
CITYG 
 
-0.4092 
 
  
0.3590 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.0666    
0.1334 
BGA 0.5786 0.6487+ 0.4232  
0.3793 0.3742 0.3722 
LAGE -0.2184 -0.2917 -0.2224  
0.2886 0.2844 0.2893 
PROFIT 0.0063 0.0063 0.0077  
0.0056 0.0056 0.0057 
LTASSET 0.1578* 0.1202 0.1208  
0.0768 0.0827 0.0804 
LANPAT 0.1241* 0.1806** 0.1343*  
0.0617 0.0623 0.0614 
LANTRADM 0.2246 0.0943 0.2386  
0.1710 0.1644 0.1723 
FEXPE -0.1290 -0.0083 -0.0545  
0.3292 0.3248 0.3322 
PUBLIC -0.7134** -0.7540** -0.7010*  
0.2713 0.2745 0.2744 
OWNTRANS -0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0055  
0.0039 0.0039 0.0040 
HITECH -0.2477 -0.1219 -0.0722  
0.5906 0.5933 0.5981 
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MEDTEC 0.2037 0.4357 0.3283  
0.5774 0.5842 0.5871 
LOWTEC 1.7292* 1.8791** 1.9111**  
0.7073 0.6974 0.7126 
KNINTEN -0.5431 -0.3988 -0.4878  
0.5762 0.5725 0.5741 
LEKNIN -1.1726* -1.0141+ -0.9702  
0.5993 0.6022 0.6118 
Constant -4.542309 -3.2319+ -3.4323+  
1.9508 1.9016 1.8524 
Year control Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 
Wald chi2 174.63 9062.21 168.53 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0429 0.0597 0.0423 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-1070.6902 -1051.95 -1071.4132 
LR test of alpha=0 
Prob>chibar2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean vif 2.38 2.36 2.41 
Voung test of zinb vs standard negative binomial (inflate constant) 
z -2.01 1.42 -1.54 
Pr>z 0.9778 0.0775 0.9382 
Notes: the likelihood-ratio (LR) tests for over-dispersions (H0:α=0) for the negative 
binomial models were significant, implying that the Negative binomial models may be 
more appropriate. Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); + p<0.10, 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***P<0.001 
 
Likewise, I also used the IVprobit regression method to estimate the likelihood of brand 
seeking FDI (Table 3.5.4.4). The Wald test of exogeneity achieved a significant result, 
meaning that DEVOPED is an endogenous variable. Therefore, IV-based regression 
methods can be better employed to test hypothesis 3-a and hypothesis 3-b. For model 
40 I found significant and positive PRIVATE (0.3422, p<0.01), and model 42 I found a 
significant but negative GOVAL (-0.1383, p<0.01). Therefore, both hypothesis 3-a and 
hypothesis 3-b can be accepted. IVgmm regression further support hypothesis 3-a and 
hypothesis 3-b (Table 3.5.4.5).  
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Table 3.5.4.4 IVprobit estimation-brand seeking 15 
Variable Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
DEVOPED 1.4417*** 1.4005*** 1.4296***  
0.2235 0.2287 0.2244 
PRIVATE 0.3422** 
  
 
0.1257 
  
CENG 
 
-0.3199* 
 
  
0.1561 
 
PROG 
 
- 
 
  
- 
 
CITYG 
 
-0.1257 
 
  
0.1553 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.1383**    
0.0519 
BGA 0.0658 0.0646 0.0210  
0.1554 0.1569 0.1515 
LAGE -0.0546 -0.1073 -0.0586  
0.1038 0.1058 0.1043 
PROFIT 0.0032 0.0028 0.0032  
0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 
LTASSET 0.0148 0.0232 0.0231  
0.0293 0.0303 0.0298 
LANPAT 0.0043 0.0282 0.0001  
0.0247 0.0255 0.0251 
LANTRADM 0.1359* 0.0963 0.1411*  
0.0641 0.0656 0.0646 
FEXPE -0.0728 -0.0435 -0.0587  
0.1294 0.1327 0.1298 
PUBLIC -0.1262 -0.1661 -0.1433  
0.1142 0.1199 0.1146 
OWNTRANS -0.0027+ -0.0031+ -0.0027+  
0.0016 0.0017 0.0016 
HITECH 0.5075* 0.480* 0.4590*  
0.2258 0.2401 0.2271 
MEDTEC 0.3449+ 0.4053* 0.2985  
0.1861 0.2063 0.1880 
LOWTEC 0.7801** 0.8056** 0.7203*  
0.2728 0.2965 0.2790 
KNINTEN 0.0452 0.0591 0.0160  
0.2202 0.2313 0.2215 
LEKNIN 0.2026 0.1590 0.1600  
0.2414 0.2536 0.2418 
Year control Included Included Included 
Constant -2.1868** -1.8540* -1.9018** 
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0.7356 0.7356 0.7149 
Observations 776 723 776 
Wald chi2 112.72 110.94 113.57 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-614.42136 -575.6939 -614.36649 
Wald test of exogeneity 
chi2 11.65 9.58 11.57 
Prob>chi2 0.0006 0.002 0.0007 
Mean vif 2.42 2.4 2.45 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, ***p<0.0001 
 
 
Table 3.5.4.5 IVregress GMM estimation-brand seeking 16 
Variable Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 
DEVOPED 0.8742*** 0.8309*** 0.8670***  
0.1552 0.1514 0.1549 
PRIVATE 0.2608* 
  
 
0.1131 
  
CENG 
 
-0.2006 
 
  
0.1325 
 
PROG 
 
-0.8028*** 
 
  
0.1300 
 
CITYG 
 
-0.1638 
 
  
0.1364 
 
GOVAL 
  
-0.0793+    
0.0437 
BGA 0.1531 0.1617 0.1062  
0.1140 0.1133 0.1086 
LAGE 0.0172 -0.0056 0.0128  
0.0746 0.0739 0.0746 
PROFIT 0.0008 0.0006 0.0009  
0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 
LTASSET 0.0239 0.0229 0.0244  
0.0193 0.0195 0.0196 
LANPAT 0.0212 0.0359+ 0.0189  
0.0205 0.0212 0.0206 
LANTRADM 0.0804 0.0509 0.0891+  
0.0510 0.0510 0.0504 
FEXPE -0.0861 -0.0851 -0.0801  
0.0983 0.0979 0.0994 
PUBLIC -0.1024 -0.1122 -0.1042  
0.0881 0.0885 0.0896 
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OWNTRANS -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0017  
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 
HITECH 0.3297* 0.3011+ 0.3172+  
0.1659 0.1664 0.1671 
MEDTEC 0.1507 0.1679 0.1364  
0.1222 0.1241 0.1251 
LOWTEC 0.6893** 0.6801** 0.6728**  
0.2194 0.2211 0.2218 
KNINTEN 0.0755 0.0742 0.0741  
0.1319 0.1320 0.1338 
LEKNIN 0.1453 0.1049 0.1428  
0.1429 0.1444 0.1442 
Year control Included Included Included 
Constant -0.9392+ -0.5811 -0.6684  
0.5254 0.4857 0.4870 
Observations 776 776 776 
Wald chi2 87.12 110.72 86.97 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0746 0.0956 0.0723 
DWH test 
Robust score chi2 16.5541 
(p=0.0000) 
14.8885 
(p=0.0001) 
16.6596 
(p=0.0000) 
Robust regression 
F 
18.1246 
(p=0.0000) 
15.569 
(p=0.0001) 
18.2628 
(p=0.0000) 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansens J chi2 1.99474 
(p=0.1578) 
1.55334 
(p=0.2126) 
1.99137 
(p=0.1582) 
Mean vif 2.42 2.4 2.45 
Notes: GMM weight matrix: robust; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient 
(underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Overall, these findings testified that Chinese POEs have a lower likelihood of seeking 
natural resources. In contrast, Chinese SOEs with a higher government affiliation have 
a higher likelihood of seeking natural resources. Moreover, I found that Chinese POEs 
are more than likely to acquire target firms that have both patents and trademarks. From 
2006 to 2015, however, I did not find significant results regarding the relationship 
between government affiliation level and Chinese SOEs’ both technology-seeking and 
brand- seeking FDI.  
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3.6 Discussion 
In the context of the increasing importance of CMNEs in OFDI (Deng, 2012; Peng, 
2012; Ramasamy, et al. 2012; Wang, et al. 2012), this study focused on CMNEs’ 
specific FDI strategies via rapid CBM&As. My results have suggested that all Chinese 
government-owned enterprises are more likely to acquire target firms that are involved 
in the natural resources sector, as opposed to both technology-seeking and brand-
seeking FDI strategies. In contrast, Chinese POEs have a higher likelihood of seeking 
foreign technologies and brands via CBM&As. Also, target firms’ amounts of patents 
and trademarks significantly attract Chinese POEs’ FDI. In light of location choices, 
my findings testify that Chinese POEs are likely to choose both developed countries 
and developing countries for technology-seeking FDI, but only developed countries 
significantly attract Chinese POEs’ brand-seeking FDI.  
 
3.6.1 Theoretical implications  
As for MNE theories, research on FDI has traditionally provided a stronger basis (e.g. 
Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1992; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981; Rugman 
and Verbeke, 2001). Due to the emergence of EMNEs, however, such theories may need 
further extension (Buckley et al., 2007; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2012; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet, 2012). The state-owned MNEs’ increasing 
globalization has become a significant and important phenomenon in IB area, yet it has 
not been paid enough attention to in the EMNE literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen et 
al., 2014).  
 
Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008:923) argue that “it is research on emerging economies 
that has pushed the institution-based view to the cutting edge of strategy research, 
which is becoming the third leg in the strategy ‘tripod’ (the other two legs being 
industry- and resource-based views)”. My findings suggest that Chinese SOEs owned 
by a higher government affiliation level were neither attracted by target firms’ 
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technology- nor brand-based assets, but by natural resource endowments. On the other 
hand, Chinese POEs have a higher likelihood of seeking both technology- and brand-
based assets. The institution-based view (IBV) suggests that national institutions can 
be regarded as the rules of the game that influence firms’ strategies (North, 1990). Thus, 
my findings firstly contribute to extending the IBV by investigating the role of state 
ownership type on CMNEs’ differing FDI strategies.  
 
Extant research suggests that EMNEs’ SAS has been regarded as a catch-up strategy by 
acquiring DMNEs’ ownership advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Deng, 
2009; Mathews, 2006; Rui and Yip, 2008). Moreover, the springboard perspective 
suggests that EMNEs acquiring strategic assets are not only to mainta in 
competitiveness in developed markets, but also largely for further exploitation in home 
markets (Luo and Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2012). In the period of 2006 and 2015, we 
found that more than half of Chinese firms’ CBM&As (i.e. Chinese SOEs) were less 
likely to seek technologies and brands. To some extent, the ‘late-comer’ or ‘springboard’ 
perspective is relatively ill-advised to explain Chinese SOEs’ increasing FDI. As a 
consequence, our findings may further testify Cuervo-Cazurra et al.’s (2014) and Peng 
et al.’s (2016) argument that SOE research can contribute to existing theories regarding 
MNE literature, especially for EMNE literature. Specifically, SOE research in the 
context of emerging economies can extend current comprehension of the existence of 
SOEs with respect to the two logics including market imperfects and political/ideo logy 
strategy (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2014). To illustrate, this study provided the stronger 
evidence that Chinese SOEs with three different government affiliation levels are all 
significantly attracted by target firms’ natural resource endowments. Chinese POEs are 
more significantly involved with SAS acquisitions based on my findings, which largely 
fit the explanations of the ‘springboard’ perspective in the aspects of allevia t ing 
resource constraints in the home markets.  
 
Moreover, this study concentrating on CMNEs’ CBM&As in the past ten years may 
also contribute to the understanding of the resource-dependence theory (RDT). The 
 175 
 
core argument of RDT stresses that firms can implement various viable strategies to 
mitigate external constraints and achieve critical resources through depending on 
certain environment (Pfeffer and Salncik, 1978, 2003). RDT has been seen as one of 
the mainstream theoretical logics for exploring the determinants of acquisit ions 
(Hillman et al. 2009). Based on RDT, EMNEs’ increasing CBM&As are thought to 
minimize environmental dependence on host countries by securing strategic resources 
(Peng, 2012; Rabbiosi, Stefano, and Bertoni, 2012). Deng and Yang (2015) argue that 
EMNEs’ dependence on host countries is affected by the extent to which critical 
resources that acquires want to possess. My findings show that natural resources carry 
more weight than strategic assets for Chinese SOEs. In other words, Chinese SOEs’ 
current FDI is largely dependent on target firms’ or target countries’ natural resource 
endowments as opposed to strategic assets. Relatively speaking given market 
imperfects in the emerging economies, Chinese POEs have a large dependence on 
advanced technologies and known brands. By focusing on the firm-level specific FDI 
strategies, our findings further contribute to the understanding of the M&A logic from 
EMNEs’ CBM&As.  
 
Drawing from RDT, Deng and Yang (2015) suggest that host country-based factors are 
likely to have a ‘pull’ effect on M&As, whereas home country-based factors will have 
a ‘push’ effect. Drawing on bundling model by Hennart (2009, 2012), control of some 
CSAs could assist local firms in obtaining benefits from the monopoly control of these 
resources. Chinese MNEs that are owned by a higher-level government likely control 
more monopoly resources. Likewise, I could employ RDT and postulate that having 
privileged financial treatment in the home country enables Chinese SOEs to go abroad 
for natural resources-seeking FDI; Given relative resource constraints, Chinese POEs 
would be pushed to use internationalization as a ‘springboard’ for acquiring strategic 
assets they lack in the domestic market. My study rightly supports these arguments and 
consequently contributes to the understanding of RDT in explaining EMNEs’ FDI 
strategies.  
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3.6.2 Government affiliation level and differing FDI strategies 
Wang et al. (2012) argued that government involvement may exert influence on EMNEs’ 
ability and willingness to internationalize. To illustrate, the influence of a higher 
government affiliation level being more important, to Chinese firms’ OFDI in 
developed markets; moreover, both state ownership and government affiliation level 
had no significant influence on Chinese OFDI in developing markets (Wang, et al. 
2012). In this study, however, I proved relative sufficient evidence that higher 
government affiliation more significantly facilitates Chinese SOEs’ natural resource-
seeking FDI in developing countries via CBM&As. Such improvements on research 
findings may largely depend on the researchers’ choices of dependent variables. 
Traditionally, a number of related studies used Chinese firms’ actual amount of annual 
OFDI (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; Hong, et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2012) or counts of 
Chinese investment projects in target countries (Ramasamy, et al. 2012). This study 
specifically used different firm-level strategies as dependent variables, following a 
micro-econometric estimation method.  
 
Prior research also suggests that compared with SOEs, Chinese POEs relatively operate 
in competitive industries, but are also constrained by resource allocations and lack of 
government support such as finance to a large extent (Huang and Chi, 2014). Given the 
different industry contexts in which CMNEs are embedded, CMNEs with different 
government affiliation levels could be postulated that they are likely pursuing differ ing 
FDI strategies. Chinese POEs, as the lowest government affiliation level, may be forced 
to acquire certain capabilities or resources that make them competitive. For example, 
Geely, a private car manufacturer from China, acquiring Swedish carmaker Volvo was 
mainly to strengthen its competitiveness in the domestic markets (Meyer, 2015).  
 
Recently, China’s POEs are dominating the ‘Go Global’ era 4.022 in which POEs are 
                                                                 
22 “Go Global” eras (Nian, 2017) by CGTN.COM, affiliated to China Central Television (CCTV), 
the China’s state-controlled media 
Since 2001, Chinese enterprises have gone global as a proactive part of the country’s opening up 
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becoming the main driving forces of exploring the global market (Nian, 2017). For 
example, Dalian Wanda Group, a China’s privately owned entertainment conglomera te, 
acquired the US Hollywood production company ‘Legendary Entertainment’ in 2016; 
in the same year, the world’s largest coupon website, the Chicago-based Groupon was 
bought by another privately owned e-commerce giant in China, the Alibaba Group with 
33 million shares, which makes Alibaba become its fourth-biggest stakeholder (Nian, 
2017). in contrast, Chinese SOEs owned by higher-level governments were suffering 
more institutional pressure and tended to guarantee governments’ political objectives  
or home country-level security objectives such as investing more in the natural resource 
sectors. Interestingly, my findings strongly supported these arguments.  
 
Moreover, the ‘springboard perspective’ suggests that EMNEs use internationa l 
acquisition to acquire strategic assets they think are lacking in the domestic market (Luo 
and Tung, 2007). Our findings largely support the hypotheses that I postulated in the 
beginning that EMNEs with different government affiliation levels may choose distinct 
SAS strategies or other FDI strategies. However, these findings are somewhat 
inconsistent with the results of existing studies. For example, Yang and Deng (2017) 
provided the evidence that government involvement further enhances the main effects 
of SAS on CMNEs’ CBM&As in developed economies. Furthermore, they employed 
the number of patents in the host country as the proxies of strategic assets. To be specific, 
we know little about what kind of strategic assets Chinese firms sought via CBM&As 
based on Yang and Deng (2017)’s empirical findings. Notably, according to Chinese 
firms’ CBM&As between 2006 and 2015, findings revealed that Chinese POEs were 
more than likely to acquire both foreign technologies (i.e. patents) and brands (i.e. 
trademarks), while Chinese SOEs with three different government affiliation levels had 
                                                                 
strategy.  
During “Go Global” era 1.0 over 10 years ago, many Chinese enterprises simply set up sales 
networks abroad, engaging in low-end international trade. 
“Go Global” era 2.0 was dominated by state-owned enterprises that mainly aimed at overseas oil 
and natural gases, as well as infrastructure projects. 
“Go Global” era 3.0 saw Chinese private enterprises begin to rise in foreign markets, with “Made 
in China” received globally. 
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lower likelihood of seeking both technologies and brands.  
 
One possible explanation is that the Chinese government was largely encouraging 
Chinese firms’ indigenous innovation, especially for SOEs. Gao (2014:13) has claimed 
that “China, and other countries like it, are not satisfied with being developing 
countries; they want to move forward to join the developed countries. The pursuit of 
indigenous innovation is part of that effort, and the Chinese government has both the 
incentive and the capabilities to intervene in the market.” Meanwhile, as discussed 
above, Chinese SOEs may their have own unique ownership advantages in accessing 
various home country resources including financial support (i.e. R&D investment), 
human resources (i.e. lower labour costs and economies of scale) and so forth, which 
have probably enabled them to maintain competitive positions and then decreased their 
tendencies to seek foreign strategic assets. “However, we must be open to the possibility 
that EMNEs have different ownership advantages than DMNEs, reflecting the 
distinctive conditions of their home market” (Ramamurti, 2012:45). 
 
Another possible explanation is that Chinese SOEs had completed the majority of SAS 
CBM&As prior to 2006 in which the Chinese government took great efforts in 
supporting domestic innovation as mentioned above. For example, Chinese state-
owned Dalian Machine Tool Group (DMTG) is an obvious example: in 2002, DMTG 
acquired the Ingersoll Production Systems located in Illinois, United States for its 
advanced technology and well-known brands (Fey, Nayak, Wu, and Zhou, 2016). 
However, in this study the M&A data only covers the period between 2006 and 2015.  
 
In addition, Meyer et al. (2014) argued that Chinese SOEs relatively have to address 
more host country institutional pressures specifically directed at SOEs. Host societies 
may be worried about foreign acquirers impairing the local economy’s competitiveness 
by exploiting the acquired technology (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). In that case, 
Chinese SOEs would be likely to find fewer opportunities to seek strategic assets via 
CBM&As. SOEs, therefore, are advised to pursue ‘low profile strategies’ in order to 
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avoid much attention from critical stakeholders (Meyer and Thein, 2014). “The lower 
an entrant’s profile in terms of media attention, the less likely its legitimacy will be 
challenged” (Meyer, Ding, Li and Zhang, 2014:1007). In the factual context of Chinese 
CBM&As, SOEs do not engage in the deals directly, but continually facilitate via the 
POEs’ foreign subsidiary as a minority shareholder (Guo, Clougherty, and Duso, 2016).  
 
3.6.3 Other influential factors 
Interestingly, my findings have shown that firms’ prior profit margins are significantly 
but negatively related to foreign natural resource-seeking FDI strategy. This finding 
may indicate that CMNEs in the natural resource sector focus on more the accumula t ion 
of future natural resource endowments than their own financial performance.  
 
Moreover, my research findings have shown that there is a significant but negative 
linkage between Chinese acquirers’ ownership percentage after M&As and their 
likelihood of seeking natural resources. Hence, my findings may imply that foreign 
target firms in the natural resource sector are less likely to allow themselves to lose 
more ownership control after the M&As. Existing studies provide a relatively limited 
contribution regarding the relationship between China’s general FDI and natural 
resource seeking FDI (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; Deng and Yang, 2015; Ramasamy, et 
al. 2012). My findings therefore further contribute to existing studies. 
 
3.6.4 Methodological contributions on identifying real 
determinants of Chinese firms’ FDI 
With respect to natural resource seeking FDI, my findings support that all types of 
Chinese SOEs significantly tend to acquire target firms that possess natural resources. 
This study supported Huang and Austin’s (2011) claim that Chinese firms’ overseas 
acquisitions in natural resources sector have been largely completed by SOEs. In terms 
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of the methodological aspect, this study may contribute considerably to existing related 
research. 
 
Using aggregate proxies of natural resources, prior studies achieved mixed results about 
CMNEs’ inclinations of natural resources-seeking FDI (Buckley, et al. 2007; Kang and 
Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012; Yang and Deng, 2017). In this study 
my findings can further contribute to existing related research on natural resource 
seeking FDI. Specifically, prior research found that Chinese outward FDI flow between 
1992 and 2001 was significantly and positively associated with host country 
endowments of natural resources using the ratio of ore and metal exports to other 
exports as proxy (Buckley et al. 2007). By using the same proxy, Kang and Jiang (2012) 
found that Chinese firms’ FDI (i.e. aggregate FDI stock) were only significantly related 
to natural resource endowments in developing countries but not in developed countries. 
Likewise, Kolstad and Wiig (2012) testified that Chinese FDI was simply significantly 
interested in natural resource endowment (i.e. using the share of fuels, ores and metals) 
with poor institutions such as non-OECD countries. On the contrary, Chinese firms 
were found to be likely to conduct CBM&As in the developed countries that are rich in 
natural resources (i.e. using the same proxy) (Yang and Deng, 2017). In light of firm-
level data, this study found that all Chinese SOEs significantly tend to choose both 
developed and developing countries for acquiring natural resources.  
 
Furthermore, using a host country’s exports of ores and minerals as a proxy of natural 
resources, Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet (2012) found that Chinese firms includ ing 
both SOEs and POEs are significantly attracted to natural resource rich countries. 
Although none of the Chinese POEs in the sample are mining firms, Ramasamy, et al. 
(2012:24) suggest that “private companies follow their state-owned counterparts by 
investing in natural resource rich countries and provide related products and services 
to the deals already made by their respective governments.” According to Ramasamy, 
et al.’s (2012) findings, Chinese POEs were not seeking natural resources, but attracted 
by the target countries that they can provide complementary services or products since 
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SOEs have made acquisition deals there. Consequently, it obviously further supports 
the importance of using micro-level data in studying real determinants of Chinese firms’ 
OFDI and their unique FDI strategies due to firms’ differing ownership.  
 
Using annual patent registrations in host countries as proxies of strategic assets, 
Buckley et al. (2007) did not find significant results regarding the relationship between 
China’s OFDI and strategic asset-seeking FDI. Ramasamy, et al. (2012) achieved 
inconsistent results with regards to strategic asset seeking FDI by using different 
proxies of strategic assets. Firstly, they found that Chinese FDI was not significantly 
attracted to countries for strategic asset seeking FDI if using number of registered 
patents as a dependent variable; however, they found a positive and significant 
relationship by using alternate proxy that refers to the exports of high technology 
products divided by the host country’s total exports. In addition, Chinese POEs were 
not attracted by technical superiority (Ramasamy, et al. 2012).  
 
Moreover, by using number of patents in the host country as proxies of strategic assets, 
Yang and Deng (2017) found that both government-and non-government-invo lved 
Chinese firms are significantly pursuing SAS acquisitions in developed markets. 
According to in-depth interviews, Huang and Chi (2014) found that Chinese POEs are 
increasingly pursuing market and strategic asset-seeking OFDI. In this study I gathered 
stronger evidence that Chinese POEs were more likely to seek strategic assets includ ing 
both patents and trademarks via CBM&As.  
 
I extended the proxies of strategic assets by factoring in trademarks. Deng and Yang 
(2015:170) argued that “as strategic assets also include brands and supplier networks, 
future studies should include ‘brand’ or ‘marketing skill’ measures, which might 
account for the inconsistent results for our hypothesis of strategic assets.” As a result, 
this study considerably contributes to existing related studies. Being consistent with 
Deng and Yang’s (2015) findings regarding macro-level determinants of EMNEs’ FDI, 
I also found that all hypotheses are accepted, but for developing markets hypotheses 
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are only partially accepted. In terms of limitations and future research directions, Deng 
and Yang (2015) admitted that their research only focuses on the macro-level 
determinants of CBM&As by EMNEs and suggests more micro-level factors can be 
explored in future. Specifically, this study, concentrating on micro-level Chinese firms’ 
CBM&As, does further improve Deng and Yang’s (2015) empirical research. My 
findings considerably reveal that identifying firm-level evidence is critically important 
on studying firms’ specific FDI strategies.  
 
Identifying firms’ specific FDI strategies could equally be seen as the classification of 
detailed investment motives. This is critically important for FDI research on studying 
firms’ internationalization performance as Meyer (2015:57) argued that ‘the objectives 
of an action determine how the performance should be assessed’.   
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
By observing CMNEs’ CBM&As between 2006 and 2015, this study has found the 
significant role government involvement plays on CMNEs’ differing FDI strategies. 
These empirical results further verify that government involvement critica lly 
determines EMNEs’ CBM&A decisions (Hurst, 2011; Xia et al. 2014). In short, my 
findings revealed that SOEs with higher government affiliation level are more likely to 
acquire target firms involved with natural resource endowments as opposed to 
technologies and brands. Conversely, and more importantly, I found that Chinese POEs 
tend to seek for both technology- and brand-based FDI via M&As. On balance, this 
study largely provides us with a better understanding of CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies 
between Chinese POEs and SOEs with three different government affiliation levels.  
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Chapter 4: Home country effects and 
International diversification strategy  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
“Although acquiring unrelated business is not a strategy which fits all companies, 
the strategy itself is of growing importance in understanding the development of 
the large and complex business organizations which play such an important role in 
the economy” (Leontiades, 1979:41).  
 
In spite of increasing research on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) by emerging-
country multinational enterprises (EMNEs), few scholars have studied which potential 
factors determine EMNEs’ international diversification strategy. Du, Lu and Tao (2015) 
suggest that firms’ product market diversification activities have been found to be 
pervasive in emerging economies including China, India, and Mexico. In contrast, 
developed-country multinational enterprises (DMNEs) prefer focused strategies rather 
than corporate diversification strategies (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). This strategic 
approach can allow DMNEs to exploit their ownership advantages such as 
technological and brand advantages in emerging markets. Thus, do EMNEs, which 
largely lack ownership advantages, prefer international diversification strategies to 
focused strategies?  
 
Earlier scholarship posited that ‘labels such as internationalization, geographic 
diversification, international expansion, globalization, and multinationality tend to 
refer to the same strategic management construct’ of international diversifica t ion 
(emphasis added) and these terms are used interchangeably (Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, and 
Connelly, 2006:832; Sahaym and Nam, 2013:422). There are many practical ways in 
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which firms may diversify internationally including exporting, overseas manufacture, 
and licensing (Majocchi and Strange, 2012). Yip (1982) suggests that there are two 
main types of corporate diversification, including internal development and external 
acquisition. In this study I choose external acquisition as one kind of corporate 
diversification, focusing on firms’ international diversification strategy via cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As). For example, in the earlier period between 1950 
and 1970, an increasing proportion of U.S. companies pursued diversification strategy 
via acquisition, which resulted in a lower number of single-business companies 
comprising Fortune 500, from 30% in 1950 to 8% in 1970 (Salter and Weinhold, 1978). 
Hence, for U.S. companies, acquisition had become a standard approach to 
diversification and further growth. According to recent news by CGTN23, “M&A is the 
major approach of overseas investment for Chinese enterprises; about 88 percent of 
over 2,858 agreements by Chinese companies overseas were completed via M&A 
between 2000 and 2016. [Center for China and Globalization]” (Nian, 2017). Do 
CMNEs also seek for international diversification purpose via CBM&As? 
 
This is a particularly relevant question when considering EMNEs, as many theories of 
EMNE catch-up stress the importance of acquiring strategic assets for the purposes of 
developing firm- level capabilities (i.e. ‘ownership advantages’) (Matthews, 2006; Luo 
and Tung, 2007; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). It is not clear, however, how firms can 
develop ownership advantages if they require unrelated assets. In such cases, it is hard 
to see how CMNEs could efficiently integrate and harness acquired unrelated assets. 
This would suggest that perhaps other motives are in play. The development of large 
but highly diversified international groups is a strategic direction quite dissimilar to the 
strategy followed by the largest DMNEs today. These have focused on core businesses, 
divesting from unrelated activities (which are sub-contracted to larger suppliers) (Nolan, 
2012). In spite of the academic ‘goldilocks debate’ on the applicability of existing 
theory or the need for a new theory (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012), I purposively design a 
                                                                 
23 CGTN refers to China Global Television Network, which is owned by China Central Television 
or Government of the People’s Republic of China.  
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framework utilizing existing theories to analyze CMNEs’ international diversifica t ion 
FDI via CBM&As. I extend and refine the diversification logic by investigating how 
home country effects (mainly referring to business group affiliation and state ownership 
types) influence the extent to which CMNEs engage in outward FDI, which can be 
regarded as a form of diversification in the context of internationalization. Do CMNEs 
internationally diversify abroad for the same reasons? Are there significant differences 
regarding the target country destinations of international diversification? To address 
these questions, I employ a sample of CMNEs’ international acquisitions completed 
between 2006 and 2015.  
 
The findings suggest that business group affiliation is a significant moderator of the 
private ownership influencing CMNEs’ extent of international diversification (i.e. 
acquiring unrelated businesses). CMNEs owned by higher government affiliation levels 
are more than likely to acquire unrelated businesses. It is suggested that industry factors 
have significant influence over the location choices of CMNEs’ internationa l 
diversification strategy. On balance, this study contributes to understanding CMNEs’ 
international diversification strategy in the context of increasing internationalization.  
 
 
4.2 Literature review  
International diversification has been defined as ‘a strategy through which a firm 
expands the sales of its goods or services across the borders of global regions and 
countries into different geographic locations or markets’ (Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson, 
2007: 251). Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, and Connelly (2006) stress that one critical part of the 
study of international diversification is to discover the antecedents. Lu and Beamish 
(2004) suggest that International diversification likely brings firms benefits and costs 
simultaneously.  
 
Diverse benefits drive firms to pursue international diversification including economies 
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of scale (Gaur and Delios, 2015; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim, 1997; Kogut, 1985; Wan 
and Hoskisson, 2003), access to new markets and the opportunity for greater firm 
growth (Buhner, 1987; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim, 1997), the 
opportunity to exploit the benefits of internalization (Rugman, 1981; Wan and 
Hoskisson, 2003), knowledge acquisition (Hisey and Caves, 1985; Hitt, Hoskisson, and 
Kim, 1997), and the diversification of investment risk across countries (Amit and 
Livnat, 1988; Boateng and Glaister, 2003; Gaur and Delios, 2015; Wan and Hoskisson, 
2003). In contrast, costs rise because MNEs encounter the challenges of operating 
abroad in an uncertain context (Hymer, 1976). These costs are also referred to as the 
liability of foreignness (LOF), due to the unfamiliarity of the environment such as 
cultural, political, and economic differences (Zaheer, 1995).  
 
Further, MNEs need to possess some firm-specific advantages (FSAs) to overcome the 
LOF and then compete with local incumbents, driving extant MNE theories (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977; Hennart, 1982). Compared to DMNEs, EMNEs 
have a relatively lack of the ownership advantages that DMNEs possess such as 
advanced technologies, known brands (e.g., Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rui 
and Yip, 2008). Given these benefits and costs, what factors may drive EMNEs (i.e. 
CMNEs) to pursue international diversification strategies?  
 
Table 4.2.1 lists related research on Chinese firms’ international diversification.  
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Table 4.2.1 Key empirical studies on the diversification of Chinese firms 17 
Research 
study 
Sample Underping 
theories 
Dependent variable-measurement of 
international diversification 
Main research findings 
Li and Wong, 
2003 
106 Chinese listed 
companies in 1996 
resource-based 
view and 
institution-
based view 
SIC counts:  
1. a related SIC count, which captures the 
number of four-digit SIC segments 
within the same major two digit SIC 
group a firm is engaged in 
2. an unrelated SIC count, which captures 
the number of two-digit groups a 
company is engaged in 
Both resource building and utilization (through 
concentration and related diversification) and 
institutional environmental management (through 
unrelated diversification) are of significant importance 
for the performance firms from emerging economies 
but they must be considered together. 
Fan, Huang,  
Oberholzer-
Gee, Smith, 
and Zhao, 
2008 
58,752 listed companies 
from nine countries 
including Brazil, China,  
France, Germany, India, 
Italy, Japan, UK, and 
the USA 
unknown number of business segments Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) diversify their 
operations more aggressively than other Chinese firms. 
China aside, eight other countries' firms have become 
less diversified over time 
Jiang, 2008 895 Chinese listed 
companies 
economic 
rationality, 
individual 
rationality and 
organizational 
rationality  
Four approaches: 
1.N: the number of industries a firm engaged 
in,  
2.HHI: the ratio of revenue from an industry 
to the total revenue of a firm,  
3.EI: it is the opposite of HHI, and  
4.DIV: the dummy variable for 
diversification 
The choice of diversification mode is largely based on 
organizational rationality motivation (to reduce 
company risks) and individual rationality motivation 
(in the self-serving interests of the top management); 
company size, ownership structure, age and industry all 
have significant effects on degree of diversification 
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Li, He, Lan, 
and Yiu,  
2012 
1,280 Chinese public  
firms over 2002–2005 
resource-based 
view 
1. entropy measure: the share of sales in 
segment*the weight for each segment;  
2. a company's specialization ratio: the 
fraction of revenues by its largest single 
four-digit business segment 
1. A strong positive relationship between politic al 
connections and corporate diversification.  
2. The relationship is significantly and positively 
moderated by the level of state ownership in firms 
and regional institutional development 
Zhou and 
Delios, 2012 
1,186 Chinese listed 
firms from 1991 to 2002 
network theory;  
institutional 
theory 
six diversification categories:  
single business, dominant vertical, dominant 
unrelated, dominant linked, related linked,  
conglomerate 
Chinese listed firms are more likely to diversify into 
conglomerates if: 
1. they occupy a central position in the network;  
2. they have higher levels of government 
shareholding; and  
3. The firms with which they have network ties  
diversify. 
Lu, Liu,  
Filatotchev, 
and Wright,  
2014 
1027 Chinese  listed 
firms during 2003–2009 
on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges 
knowledge-
based view  
The extent of firms’ investment across 
countries (the share of investment stock in 
one country to total investment stock 
1. Chinese listed firms' international diversification 
is positively affected by their domestic industrial 
and domestic regional diversification.  
2. Top management team’s prior international 
experience strengths the impact. 
Du, Lu and 
Tao, 2015 
2,798 privately owned 
enterprises; plus two 
case studies 
resource-based 
view 
Dummy variable: 1 means the firm has 
investment in more than one industries, and 
0 otherwise.  
Firms reporting more severe government expropriation 
are more diversified 
Wu, 
Pangarkar 
and Wu, 2016 
625 Chinese 
manufacturing 
multinationals across 
multiple industries 
experiential 
learning; 
resource-based 
view 
entropy measure:  
sales in regional market as a proportion of  
total overseas sales*the weight to the target 
region 
1. Regional diversification positively and 
significantly predicts global diversification, and 
that  
2. Firm-specific technology and marketing know-
how both increase the likelihood of a firm’s 
moving from regional to global operations.  
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3. Technology know-how was found to be more 
influential than marketing know-how. 
Sun, Peng, 
and Tan, 
2017 
11,992 firm-year 
observations on 
Chinese listed firms 
between 2001 and 2011 
Institutional 
relatedness 
Herfindahl index: sales attributed to foreign 
region 
1. State control during institutional transitions  
promotes CEOs with political ties to engage in 
more product diversification;  
2. CEOs with international experience 
institutionalize the power from economic freedom 
via more international expansion 
Notes: entropy measure: Jacquemin and Berry (1979) developed an entropy diversification measure 
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As noted above, Chinese firms’ international diversification research is mainly about 
firms’ internal development (Table 4.2.1). No empirical research mentions that CMNEs 
pursue international diversification by acquiring unrelated businesses abroad. Above 
Chinese firms’ international diversification activities are mainly relevant about interna l 
development (Table 4.2.1).  
 
Moreover, Lu, Liu, Filatotchev, and Wright (2014) found that domestic industrial and 
domestic regional diversification positively determines Chinese listed firms' 
international diversification. Do Chinese firms’ domestic diversification via M&As also 
significantly affect their international diversification?  
 
Many scholars identified the significant influence of state ownership on Chinese firms’ 
international diversification activities (Fan, Huang, Oberholzer-Gee, Smith, and Zhao, 
2008; Li, He, Lan, and Yiu, 2012; Sun, Peng, and Tan, 2017; Zhou and Delios, 2012). 
Does state ownership determine CMNEs’ international diversification (i.e. degree of 
unrelatedness) via M&As?  
 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) identified five specific factors in institutional environments, 
including the product market, capital market, labour market, laws and regulations, and 
contract enforcement. Comparing with developed economies, these authors argue that 
in emerging economies the five factors are relatively ineffective, which results in the 
increasing emergence of conglomerate companies or business groups defined as 
“collections of firms bound together in some formal and informal ways” (Granovetter, 
1994:454). These differing characteristics have to be carefully considered while 
exploring the determinants of EMNEs’ international diversification strategies (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1997). Put simply, specific capacities or resources that EMNEs have 
accumulated to address specific institutional environments may determine their 
international diversification strategies. As such, business group affiliation would likely 
be another critical influential component.  
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4.3 Hypotheses development 
As discussed above, this study is designed to use some specific theories to address 
EMNEs’ international diversification activities. First of all, I apply the resource-based 
view (RBV) because Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991:34) explained that “a resource-
based approach allows us to adopt the perspective of the diversifying firm's managers.” 
Drawing on RBV logic, I propose here that both business group affiliation and 
government affiliation may influence EMNEs’ international diversification strategies. 
More significantly, a substantial body of literature has suggested the importance of 
studying relatedness in product diversification and international diversification strategy 
(Barney, 1988; Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Kumar, 2009; Lu and Beamish, 2004; 
Sakhartov and Folta, 2015). In this study I mainly focus on three important influentia l 
factors including the extent of domestic diversification, business group affiliation and 
government affiliation level.  
 
4.3.1 Domestic diversification and unrelated internationa l 
diversification 
An advantage established by a resource in the home country may not still represent an 
advantage in other countries (Cuervo- Cazurra, Maloney and Manrakhan, 2007). To 
illustrate, this is particularly true in emerging economies if firms’ competit ive 
advantages are domestically specific, provided that their competitive sources stem from 
domestic social networks or political ties (Wright, Hoskisson, Filatotchev, and Peng, 
2005). Prior to foreign diversification however, firms diversifying businesses in the 
home market may accumulate valuable experiences and knowledge, competit ive 
advantages and develop teamwork on different levels (Chandler, 1990). For example, 
domestic diversification likely helps firms develop experiential knowledge about how 
to reach effects of scope economies and their abilities for integrating business sectors 
across different countries (Lu, Liu et al. 2014). If firms had completed several deals to 
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acquire unrelated businesses in the domestic market, this domestic diversifica t ion 
would allow them to accumulate certain coordination skills and knowledge in managing 
an increased diversity of domestic activities. Such skills and knowledge may underpin 
firms’ international diversification. Lu, Liu et al. (2014) identified that Chinese firms’ 
international diversification is positively and significantly influenced by their domestic 
regional diversification. 
 
From another perspective, Chinese firms may concentrate on economies of scale and 
acquire the businesses most important for further enlarging market share in the home 
market; afterwards, they may continually seek for overseas acquisitions of related 
businesses so as to better exploit their advantages of economies of scale. In that case, 
Chinese firms’ domestic diversification activities would also significantly determine 
international diversification activities.  
 
“China offers a great opportunity to investigate the relationship between domestic 
regional diversification and international diversification.” (Lu, Liu, Filatotchev, and 
Wright, 2014:459). Thus, it motivates us to explore whether Chinese firms’ domestic 
diversification activities via M&As also determine their international diversifica t ion 
strategy via CBM&As. Accordingly, I formulate the first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The domestic diversification of CMNEs is positively related to their 
level of international product diversification.    
 
4.3.2 Business group affiliation and internationa l 
diversification 
Firms that operating in emerging economies have larger scope economies so as to better 
address institutional voids which largely refer to those conglomerate firms or business 
groups (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). One main purpose of 
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China’s economic reform is to build large business groups, which can strengthen 
reputation and public profile and which could also foster firm-level competit ive 
advantages (Zhou and Delios, 2012). Do these competitive advantages foster the 
domestic diversification or the international diversification of Chinese business group 
affiliated firms?  
 
Prior findings reveal that group-affiliated firms are more likely to diversify their 
operations than independent firms (Chang and Choi, 1988; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a, 
b; Ramaswamy, Li, and Petitt, 2004). Given institutional voids in emerging economies, 
much extant literature suggests that business groups would operate well through 
unrelated diversification (e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Li and Wong, 2003). 
Additionally, the form of an unrelated diversified group can leverage the differences 
across industries and largely spread costs and risks (Ramaswamy, Purkayastha, and 
Petitt, 2017), which would be more appropriate for firms from emerging economies. In 
contrast, corporate refocusing strategy, which emphasizes the reduction of business 
segments and making changes to diversification strategy, is more challenging to 
implement in emerging economies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000). Other 
scholars, who also favor refocusing strategy, contend that business groups’ performance 
has been negatively impacted and that they have tended to be involved in refocusing 
activities, when emerging economies’ institutions have been improved (Hoskisson, 
Johnson, Tihanyi, and White, 2005).  
 
According to Wan, Hoskisson et al.’s study (2011:1341-1347), 10 of 64 articles mention 
the significant role of business group affiliation on firms’ diversification. This role is 
more significant for firms from emerging economies including Korea (Chang and Hong, 
2000; Chang, Chung, and Mahmood, 2006; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004), China (Yiu, 
Lu, Bruton, and Hoskisson, 2007), and other emerging countries. The resource-based 
view (RBV) suggests that the main determinants of diversification are attributed to the 
resources that business groups possess, which drive their continued expansion of new 
markets (Guillen, 2000). Due to relative imperfections in emerging-country institutions, 
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business groups possess advantageous resources compared to independent firms, such 
as human resources allocation (e.g. Castellacci, 2015; Leff, 1978), and their own 
internal capital markets (e.g. Carney, Essen, Estrin, and Shapiro, 2017; Chang, Chung, 
and Mahmood, 2006). Therefore, I propose that business group affiliation significantly 
influences CMNEs’ international diversification strategies. The second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Business group affiliated firms are more inclined towards unrelated  
international product diversification. 
 
 
4.3.3 State ownership types and unrelated internationa l 
diversification 
Contexts and institutions are of critical importance for EMNEs as the benefits they 
achieve and exploit in international markets are closely related to their domestic 
contexts and institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; Gaur, Kumar, and Singh, 
2014). In China, the institutional forces have more significant effects on CMNEs’ 
internationalization decisions (Buckley et al. 2007). For instance, government 
endorsement is essential for CMNEs if they want to acquire foreign firms (Deng, 2009).  
 
Drawing on institutional theory, much literature discusses the benefits of unrelated 
diversification strategies in emerging economies (Chakrabarti, Singh, and Mahmood, 
2007; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Lu and Yao (2006:489) have noted, “Firms with the 
dominant state ownership could enjoy government support and incentives, such as 
favorite conditions, monopolistic positions, or strategic resources, such as capital, 
business licenses, and information, which are critical to implement diversification 
strategies.” Except for the benefits from firms following diversification strategy in 
emerging economies, do local governments pose pressures on firms’ internationa l 
diversification strategy? Since state ownership has been relatively prevalent in 
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emerging economies in which SOEs have leaded the economic reforms (Peng, 2003; 
Fan, Huang, Oberholzer-Gee, Smith, and Zhao, 2008), it is problematic to ignore the 
effects of state ownership on firms’ diversification strategy (Xia, Ma, Lu and Yiu, 2014). 
 
As for domestic diversification strategy, many scholars have provided significant 
supportive evidence that Chinese firms with higher state ownership are more likely to 
diversify into unrelated business operations (Fan, et al. 2008; Zhou and Delios, 2012). 
One possible explanation is that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may have 
supportive capital available to them from the government-controlled banks and relevant 
financial institutions (Buckley et al. 2007). On the other hand, there are also 
disadvantageous aspects associated with international diversification, including a lack 
of foreign market knowledge, increased coordination costs (Buckley and Strange, 2011; 
Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, and Connelly, 2006; Zaheer, 1995), higher internal transaction 
costs, the liabilities of foreignness (Hennart, 2007), and additional business risks due to 
exposure to uncertain environments (Majocchi and Strange, 2012). Given the costs of 
international diversification, SOEs may follow more inward-looking diversifica t ion 
strategies that support home country investment, as they seem to be more vulnerable to 
domestic political ties than privately-owned enterprises (POEs) (Vernon, 1979).  
 
A substantial body of empirical literature has noted the role of governments on CMNEs’ 
rapid foreign acquisitions (e.g., Du and Boateng, 2015; Luo, Xue, and Han, 2010; Peng, 
2010; Rui and Yip, 2008; Xiao and Sun, 2005). For example, Du and Boateng (2015) 
found that the government and institutions play a significant role in CMNEs’ value 
creation through CBM&As. Despite the growing body of diversification research, 
studies examining the state’s effects on EMNEs’ international product diversifica t ion 
strategy are fairly scant. As a consequence, the third hypothesis is formulated as follows :  
 
Hypothesis 3: State ownership types are positively related to the level of CMNEs’ 
international product diversification. 
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4.4 Methodology 
In this study I explore a slightly different research topic regarding CMNEs’ 
international diversification strategy although employing the same data set on CMNEs’ 
CBM&As in the period between 2006 and 2015.  
 
4.3.1 Data sources and sample 
This study mainly relies on two data sources: first of all, the Thomson One Banker 
(TOB) database enables us to achieve Chinese firms’ international M&As. The TOB 
database includes M&A year, target firms’ and acquirers’ Standard Industria l 
Classification (SIC) codes, and ownership level after M&As. Secondly, Orbis database 
provides us more firm-level information, including both target firms’ and Chinese 
acquirers’ age, financial performance, number of patents, trademarks, ultimate owner 
and so forth. I matched both target firms’ and acquirers’ company name in both TOB 
and Orbis databases. Matching as such allows for the collection of firm-level data. I 
found 486 Chinese acquirers that had completed M&As.  
 
4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Dependent variable 
There are many approaches to measuring the extent of firms’ diversification. Jing (2008) 
used four different approaches to measure international diversification, including (1) 
the number of industries a firm is engaged in, (2) the ratio of revenue from an industry 
to the total revenue of a firm, (3) it is the opposite of (2), and (4) the dummy variable 
for diversification whereby a value of ‘1’ means that the firm is involved in 
diversification, and a value of ‘0’ indicates the opposite.  
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Traditionally, SIC codes are used to measure the extent of firms’ diversifica t ion 
operations in different industries (Andersen and Kheam, 1998; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). 
In this study I followed Caves, Porter, Spence, and Scott’s (1980) and Li and Wong’s 
(2003) approaches to measuring the international diversification degree (Internati_de) 
as a dependent variable. I matched target firms’ and Chinese acquirers’ four digits of 
SIC codes. I labelled ‘3’ if target’s and acquirer’s 4 digits of SIC codes are totally 
different, which can be also referred to as a totally unrelated acquisition; I labelled ‘2’ 
if both the target and acquirer simply have the same first digit in a four-digit code; I 
labelled ‘1’ if both of them have the same first two digits in four-digit code; and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. Table 4.3.2.1 presents target firms’ and Chinese acquirers’ number of M&As 
by level of relatedness. The total number of unrelated acquisitions (302) is quite close 
to the number of related acquisitions (303).  
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Table 2. Number of M&As by level of relatedness between target firms and Chinese acquirers  
Chinese 
acquirers' 
industry sector 
Number of deals(L-3) Number of deals(L-2) Number of deals(L-1) Number of deals(L-0) 
 
Target firms Acquirers Target firms Acquirers Target firms Acquirers Target firms Acquirers 
Agriculture 4 9 1 1 1 0 2 2 
Construction 6 7 0 0 0 0 1 1 
*Finance 52 58 3 3 0 0 20 20 
Manufacturing 82 125 60 60 46 43 146 146 
Mining 63 24 4 4 43 43 73 73 
Public 
Administration 
1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Retail Trade 4 16 1 0 0 0 4 4 
Services 44 15 6 6 0 1 30 30 
Transportation 19 24 3 3 0 2 25 25 
Wholesale Trade 27 21 1 2 0 1 2 2 
Total 302 302 79 79 90 90 303 303 
Notes: *A large proportion of Chinese acquirers involved in Finance sector are affiliated to large business group. They often will set up an investing company 
when they want to acquire a foreign business. Therefore, I made double check on every acquirer engaged in finance sector and replaced a new SIC code 
accordingly.  
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4.3.2.2 Independent variables 
There are three groups of main independent variables for testing three hypotheses, 
including the degree of home diversification (Homediv_de) (Hypothesis 1), business 
group affiliation (BGA) (Hypothesis 2), and state ownership types (CENG, PROG, 
CITYG, and PRIVATE) (Hypothesis 3). Three dummy variables were employed to 
represent Chinese SOEs’ different levels of government affiliation: variable CENG, ‘1’ 
refers to central-level government-owned enterprises, and ‘0’ otherwise; variable 
PROG, ‘1’ refers to CMNEs owned by a provincial government, and ‘0’ otherwise; 
variable CITYG, ‘1’ refers to CMNEs owned by municipal- level government or county-
level government, and ‘0’ otherwise. Homediv_de is a categorical variable measured 
by Chinese acquirers’ level of unrelatedness in domestic M&As. This study expected 
there to be a significant and positive relationship between Chinese firms’ domestic 
diversified acquisitions and their international diversified acquisitions.  
 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
A series of control variables were used. First of all, log-transformed firm age (LAGE) 
was added as one antecedent of firms’ international diversification, following prior 
research (Gaur and Delios, 2015; Sahaym and Nam, 2013; Sun, Peng, and Tan, 2017; 
Wu, Pangarkar, and Wu, 2016). A firm may need time to accumulate resource and 
knowledge so as to alleviate costs related to ‘liabilities of foreignness’(LOF) costs 
(Hymer, 1976). Secondly, financial situation was also seen as the antecedent of 
international diversification, and then a firm’s profit margin (PROFIT) was added 
(Sahaym and Nam, 2013). Existing literature suggests that one benefit ‘economies of 
scale’ may significantly drive firms to pursue international diversification (e.g., Gaur 
and Delios, 2015; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). A firm’s larger total assets may be 
correlated with its economies of scale. Then I followed the Sun et al.’ (2017) approach 
and added log-transformed firm’s total assets (LTASSET) as another control variable. 
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Fourthly, Du, Lu and Tao (2015) argue that a firm’s physical resources (i.e. patents) and 
intangible resources (i.e. brand) may encourage firms’ diversification decision of 
stepping into new industries in which their accumulated resources can be exploited. 
Thus, in this study I added acquirers’ log-transformed number of patents (LANPAT) 
and trademarks (LANTRADM) as control variables. FEXPE refers to firm’s 
international experience, which is a dummy variable whereby ‘1’ means Chinese firms 
have already owned a foreign subsidiary prior to their M&As, and ‘0’ to indicate 
otherwise. As discussed above, firms operating abroad may address LOF costs due to 
unfamiliarity of the environment (Zaheer, 1995). Consequently, a firm’s prior 
international experience may mitigate its diversification risks. Then FEXPE was used 
as a control variable. Further, unrelated diversification may likely need suffic ient 
financial investment for a longer time (Kochhart and Hitt, 1998). Thus, I added firms’ 
public status (PUBLIC) as a control variable, whereby ‘1’ means it was a publicly listed 
company before acquiring the target firms, and ‘0’ indicates otherwise (Wu, Pangarkar, 
and Wu, 2016). I also followed Sun et al.’s (2017) approach and added the industry 
types that acquirers were involved in as industrial control effects. Lastly, the ownership 
percentage after M&As (OWNTRANS) is considered as another control variable, 
predicting its relationship with Chinese firms’ international product diversifica t ion 
activities.  
 
4.3.3 Research models 
Hisey and Caves (1985) used the probit model to investigate what factors account for 
U.S. firms’ overseas related and unrelated acquisitions. The dependent variable in this 
study is a categorical variable explaining the degree of unrelatedness between target 
firms’ and Chinese acquirers’ industrial sector (i.e. from ‘0’ the most related acquisit ion 
to ‘3’ the most unrelated acquisitions). Thus, ordered probit modelling was employed.  
 
Drawing from Greene (2012:827), the ordered probit model is established on a latent 
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regression, which can be characterized as follows: 
𝑦∗ = 𝑋′𝛽 + 𝜀,  
whereby y* is unobserved and X’ is the vector of independent variables and control 
variables as mentioned above. β is the vector of regression coefficients which we want 
to achieve and estimate. What we can observe is 
y= 0 if y* ≤ 0 
=1 if 0<y*≤μ1 
=2 ifμ1<y*≤μ2 
=3 ifμ2<y*≤μ3 
 
I consistently used the probit model to explore the determinants of Chinese firms’ 
international diversification via totally unrelated acquisitions and related acquisitions.  
 
The probability of engaging in technology-, brand- and natural resources-seeking FDI 
== 
1
{1+𝑒𝑥𝑝−𝛾 }
                  
 
Whereby  
𝑦(/𝑇_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡/𝑇_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡/𝑇_𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡)  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽2 ×
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 × 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1  +𝛽4 × 𝐵𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +𝛽5 × 𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽7 × 𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 ,𝑡−1  + 𝛽8 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽9 × 𝐿𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽10 ×
𝐹𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1  + 𝛽11 × 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽12 × 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  (if variable 
Internatio_de >2 [unrelated acquisitions]/ Internatio_de <1[related acquisitions]) + 𝜀  
 
𝑇_𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 , as the proxy of technology, represents the target firm i in year t has at least 
one patent. 𝑇_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡, as the proxy of brand, refers to the target firm i in year t has 
at least one trademark. 𝑇_𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡, as the proxy of natural resources, means that in 
year t the target firm i was involved in the natural resources sector. 
 
4.3.4 Estimation 
In estimation, heteroscedasticity has to be tested as it may bias variance estimation 
(Goldberger, 1964). The Breusch-Pagan test is a proper approach to identify the 
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existence of heteroscedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). If there was 
heteroscedasticity problem, a robust standard error analysis would be added. 
Furthermore, the variance inflation factor (VIF) test was also added to address 
underlying multicollinearity problem.  
 
Notably, all independent variables were lagged one year prior to the M&A year in use. 
For example, one main independent variable Homediv_de refers to Chinese firms’ 
relatedness of diversification in domestic M&As. These sample deals selected had to 
satisfy one condition that their domestic M&As should occurred prior to internationa l 
M&As. Additionally, I also used business group affiliation as a moderator variable 
studying the relationship between private ownership and CMNEs’ internationa l 
diversification. Then, an interactive dummy variable PRIVATE_BG was built and 
factored into estimations.  
 
4.3.5 Robust analysis 
To the best of my knowledge, no empirical research so far suggests whether developed 
markets or developing markings are a better fit for EMNEs’ (including CMNEs’) rapid 
international diversification strategy via M&As. As such, this study split two 
subsamples including one subsample concerning target firms located in developed 
countries and another subsample referring to target firms located in developing 
countries. Given the heterogeneity in firms, subsample estimations may further provide 
robust research findings. 
 
Apart from dealing with endogeneity problems via lagging variables, endogenous 
variables have to be treated appropriately. Business groups are largely considered to be 
more diversified than stand-alone firms (Chang and Choi, 1988; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000a, b). Moreover, business groups likely diversify operations domestically before 
they invest abroad. On that account, the variable business group affiliation BGA is 
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potentially an endogenous variable. Then I employed a two-stage model of 
simultaneous equations to deal with the potential bias. In the first stage, a probit  
regression was used to estimate the probability that a firm is affiliated to a business 
group as a function of its age, size, ownership, and firm-level capacities or resources. 
The predicted value derived from the first stage was transformed into a mills ratio 
‘called’ lambda. It was included as a regressor or the correction variable in the second 
stage model (Heckman, 1979).  
 
 
4.4 Results  
This section mainly contains three parts including a descriptive analysis on variables’ 
pairwise correlations, number of observations, mean, and standard deviation.  
 
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Pairwise correlations were made and displayed below (Table 4.4.1.1). The least number 
of variables’ observation reached 721 occupying 91.96% of full observations. The mean 
industry relatedness in domestic and international M&As is relatively close, at 1.15 and 
1.47 respectively (Table 4.4.1.1). Also, independent variables’ correlations were lower 
and significant at 5 percent confidence level.    
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Table 4.4.1.1 Pairwise correlations 18 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Internatio_de 784 1.4719 1.3492 0 3 1
2 Homediv_de 784 1.1518 1.3808 0 3 0.0883* 1
3 PRIVATE 784 0.5191 0.5000 0 1 0.0093 -0.2105* 1
4 BGA 784 0.7398 0.4390 0 1 -0.0662 0.2127* -0.4777* 1
5 CENG 784 0.2513 0.4340 0 1 0.0262 0.2900* -0.6019* 0.3302* 1
6 PROG 784 0.0753 0.2640 0 1 -0.0604 -0.0454 -0.2964* 0.1251* -0.1653* 1
7 CITYG 784 0.1543 0.3615 0 1 -0.0003 -0.024 -0.4439* 0.1729* -0.2475* -0.1219* 1
8 LAGE 784 2.7779 0.5728 0 5.1059 -0.1266* 0.1525* -0.2256* 0.1889* 0.1704* 0.0599 0.0637 1
9 PROFIT 721 6.9191 26.2023 -253 150 0.0362 -0.02 0.0526 0.0085 0.001 -0.0668 -0.0254 -0.0171 1
10 LTASSET 739 21.6736 2.3708 10.166 27.425 -0.0869* 0.2895* -0.4239* 0.4709* 0.3872* 0.1460* 0.0106 0.2456* 0.1313* 1
11 LANPAT 784 2.0650 2.9016 0 10.591 -0.1211* 0.1693* -0.1579* 0.2054* 0.0566 0.1810* 0.0182 0.1602* 0.0537 0.4155* 1
12 LANTRADM 784 0.5068 0.9540 0 4.9698 -0.0377 0.2028* 0.0318 0.1378* 0.0231 -0.0685 -0.0216 0.1182* 0.0623 0.2973* 0.5543* 1
13 FEXPE 784 0.7207 0.4490 0 1 0.0387 0.1241* -0.1383* 0.1815* 0.1313* 0.0806* -0.0252 0.0888* 0.034 0.2720* 0.1589* 0.1423* 1
14 PUBLIC 784 0.5293 0.4995 0 1 -0.0263 0.0371 0.0898* -0.07 -0.1018* -0.0119 0.0067 -0.1006* -0.0123 0.0238 0.0816* 0.0183 0.1647* 1
15 OWNTRANS 784 73.7790 32.9500 10 100 -0.0641 -0.0918* 0.1530* -0.0221 -0.0946* -0.1137* -0.015 -0.0051 0.0722 -0.1316* -0.047 0.0231 -0.0578 0.0412 1
Notes: significant at 5 percent confidence level
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4.4.2 Modelling results 
Table 4.4.2.1 presented ordered probit modelling results from models 1-10 for testing 
hypotheses 1-3. Models 1-10 are all significant as per the wald chi square test. Models 
1-4 were developed for all samples, while models 5-7 and models 8-10 were separately 
designed for target firms located in developed markets and developing markets 
respectively.  
 
Model 1 was a base model without adding industry control variables. Model 2 and 
model 4 were used to test hypotheses 1-3. Business group affiliation (BGA) was used 
as a moderator variable on PRIVATE and added in model 3. Instead of using PRIVATE, 
in model 4, three government affiliation level variables including CENG, PROG, and 
CITYG were added. From model 1 to model 4, Homediv-de were both significant and 
positive. The first hypothesis is accepted that CMNEs’ domestic diversification is 
positively associated with international diversification level.  
 
BGA in models 1-2 and 4 are insignificant and it cannot be decided whether or not the 
second hypothesis can be accepted. However, PRIVATE_BG is a significant 
moderating variable (0.9485, p<0.10), meaning that business group affilia t ion 
significantly moderates the relationship between Chinese POEs and their internationa l 
diversification level. In model 4, three government affiliation level variables are all 
significant and positive. Consequently, the third hypothesis can be accepted. Namely, 
the findings showed that Chinese SOEs tend to pursue unrelated internationa l 
acquisitions.  
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Table 4.4.2.1 Ordered probit regression models 19 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Variable World World World World Developed  
markets 
Developed 
markets 
Developed 
markets 
Developing 
markets 
Developing 
markets 
Developing 
markets 
Homediv_de 0.1185** 0.0984** 0.1022** 0.0972** 0.1130** 0.1191** 0.1103** 0.0758 0.0664 0.0496 
  0.0348 0.0357 0.0357 0.0357 0.0420 0.0422 0.0422 0.0756 0.0763 0.0757 
PRIVATE -0.1768 -0.3052* -1.1985* 
 
-0.4493** -1.2323* 
 
-0.1131 -5.0817*** 
 
  0.1102 0.1200 0.4853 
 
0.1453 0.5247 
 
0.2686 0.5823 
 
BGA -0.0282 -0.0981 -0.9761* -0.0926 -0.0889 -0.8444 -0.0795 -0.1258 -5.0871*** -0.1026 
  0.1357 0.1421 0.4835 0.1427 0.1747 0.5214 0.1755 0.2722 0.5953 0.2752 
PRIVATE_BG 
  
0.9485+ 
  
0.8432 
  
5.0085*** 
 
  
  
0.4994 
  
0.5446 
  
0.6472 
 
CENG 
   
0.3514* 
  
0.5123** 
  
0.3861 
  
   
0.1498 
  
0.1831 
  
0.3226 
PROG 
   
0.4361* 
  
0.4830* 
  
0.3994 
  
   
0.2038 
  
0.2411 
  
0.4608 
CITYG 
   
0.2328+ 
  
0.3972* 
  
-0.4164 
  
   
0.1320 
  
0.1547 
  
0.3813 
LAGE -0.1823+ -0.2001* -0.1981* -0.1937* -0.1699 -0.1697 -0.1687 -0.3553+ -0.3596+ -0.2834 
  0.0936 0.0924 0.0924 0.0930 0.1109 0.1105 0.1112 0.1926 0.1927 0.2062 
PROFIT 0.0027 0.0019 0.0020 0.0019 0.0031 0.0034 0.0031 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
  0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 
LTASSET -0.0730** -0.0721* -0.0708* -0.0776** -0.0570+ -0.0548 -0.0636+ -
0.09700618 
-0.0972+ -0.1215* 
  0.0271 0.0280 0.0280 0.0293 0.0339 0.0340 0.0359 0.0573 0.0569 0.0587 
LANPAT -0.0391* -0.0038 -0.0060 -0.0052 -0.0208 -0.0218 -0.0195 0.0606 0.0511 0.0743 
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  0.0197 0.0207 0.0208 0.0219 0.0240 0.0241 0.0258 0.0496 0.0509 0.0491 
LANTRADM 0.0488 -0.0077 -0.0065 0.0004 0.0679 0.0649 0.0712 -0.2046 -0.1782 -0.2146 
  0.0543 0.0561 0.0559 0.0570 0.0656 0.0654 0.0665 0.1521 0.1546 0.1580 
FEXPE 0.2490* 0.2990** 0.3065** 0.2945** 0.2412+ 0.2446+ 0.2348+ 0.6792** 0.7023** 0.6463** 
  0.1056 0.1096 0.1096 0.1097 0.1333 0.1334 0.1337 0.2346 0.2363 0.2387 
PUBLIC -0.0285 -0.0232 -0.0178 -0.0138 0.0844 0.0855 0.0996 -0.5984* -0.5741* -0.5928* 
  0.0943 0.0968 0.0967 0.0995 0.1158 0.1157 0.1197 0.2430 0.2441 0.2466 
OWNTRANS -0.0036* -0.0035* -0.0034* -0.0034* -0.0041* -0.0040* -0.0040* -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0035 
  0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 
Agriculture 
 
1.0924* 1.1164* 1.0899* 1.2637+ 1.3264* 1.2516+ 2.0708* 2.0144* 1.9709* 
  
 
0.5278 0.5310 0.5256 0.6561 0.6545 0.6548 0.9466 0.9520 0.9194 
Construction 
 
0.3466 0.3546 0.3559 -0.7261 -0.7226 -0.7676 6.3407*** 6.3125*** 6.3114*** 
  
 
0.5046 0.5042 0.5064 0.7063 0.7061 0.7182 0.5617 0.5238 0.5190 
Finance 
 
0.3331 0.3083 0.3488 0.0867 0.0578 0.0873 0.7416 0.7211 0.8615+ 
  
 
0.2761 0.2777 0.2757 0.3527 0.3545 0.3531 0.4760 0.4765 0.4716 
Manufacturing 
 
-0.1341 -0.1420 -0.1174 -0.4813+ -0.4816+ -0.4884+ 0.5823 0.5576 0.6675+ 
  
 
0.2185 0.2186 0.2176 0.2732 0.2725 0.2753 0.4040 0.4051 0.4018 
Mining 
 
-0.6256** -0.6169* -0.6358** -0.8406** -0.8259** -0.8637** -0.6245 -0.6129 -0.6350 
  
 
0.2396 0.2404 0.2381 0.3015 0.3019 0.3019 0.4667 0.4699 0.4626 
PublicAdm 
 
0.6814 0.6754 0.7210 0.1394 0.1444 0.1176 5.1677*** 5.1598*** 5.8996*** 
  
 
0.6909 0.6940 0.6949 0.9577 0.9648 0.9573 0.5077 0.5066 0.6420 
WholesaleTrade 
 
1.1169** 1.1381** 1.1234** 0.8577* 0.8938* 0.8379+ 1.6420* 1.6009* 1.8246** 
  
 
0.3504 0.3492 0.3483 0.4377 0.4381 0.4394 0.6925 0.6872 0.6542 
Service 
 
-0.6798* -0.6704* -0.6682* -1.2088** -1.1827** -1.2199*** 0.1303 0.0908 0.3329 
  
 
0.2873 0.2870 0.2868 0.3477 0.3477 0.3489 0.5392 0.5399 0.5526 
RetailT 
 
0.8814* 0.8726* 0.8815* 0.2004 0.1963 0.1730 2.0665** 2.0098** 2.1816** 
 208 
 
  
 
0.4373 0.4337 0.4365 0.5850 0.5794 0.5849 0.7233 0.7268 0.7235 
cut1_cons -2.4372*** -2.8502*** -3.6793*** -2.6004*** -2.3239** -3.0200** -1.9742* -4.1029** -9.0737*** -4.1282** 
  0.6309 0.7024 0.8252 0.6826 0.8375 0.9403 0.8149 1.4621 1.5136 1.3990 
cut2_cons -2.1326*** -2.5252*** -3.3538*** -2.2754*** -1.9036* -2.5992** -1.5540 -3.9989** -8.9693*** -4.0230** 
  0.6312 0.7009 0.8238 0.6813 0.8341 0.9370 0.8121 1.4604 1.5116 1.3964 
cut3_cons -1.8656** -2.2329** -3.0601*** -1.9829** -1.5824 -2.2762* -1.2326 -3.7215* -8.6904*** -3.7415** 
  0.6311 0.7011 0.8232 0.6813 0.8351 0.9368 0.8131 1.4532 1.5048 1.3897 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 721 721 721 721 528 528 528 193 193 193 
Wald chi2 52.48 124.52 130.45 124.83 102.43 106.05 102.17 1394.97 1630.92 1440.85 
Prob>chi2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0291 0.0729 0.0751 0.0736 0.0817 0.0837 0.082 0.177 0.1802 0.1858 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-848.1066 -809.779 -807.9244 -809.2227 -604.9545 -603.6294 -604.7261 -163.8041 -163.1797 -162.0556 
Mean vif 2.34 2.32 4.03 2.3 2.32 4.03 2.3 2.32 4.03 2.3 
Notes: As for Finance industry, I found many acquirers established an investing company as an acquirer. And I had excluded all Banks, Insurance companies and 
Trust companies.; The degree of international product diversification is the dependent variable; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Comparing model groups 5-7 and 8-10, Homediv_de is significant and positive in all 
of the models of the former group, but insignificant in every model of the latter group. 
It means CMNEs’ domestic diversification activities significantly encourage their 
international diversification activities through acquiring unrelated businesses in 
developed countries as opposed to developing countries. Likewise, CENG, PROG and 
CITYG were all found to be significant and positive in model 7 but not model 10. It 
reflects that Chinese SOEs have a higher likelihood of acquiring unrelated businesses 
in developed countries.  
 
With respects to industry factors, a subsample analyses provide us with more significant 
results. First of all, acquirers involved in the agriculture and wholesale Trade sector are 
more likely to acquire unrelated businesses in both developed and developing countries. 
Secondly, industry variables such as manufacturing, mining, and services are 
significantly but negatively related to international diversification level in developed 
countries. In other words, Chinese acquirers in such industries have a higher likelihood 
of acquiring related firms from developed countries. On the other hand, Chinese 
acquirers in construction, public administration, and retail trade are more likely to 
acquire firms from developing countries for unrelated diversification purpose.  
 
As for other control variables, I find that LAGE is significant but negative in model 
groups 1-4 and 8-10, meaning that younger Chinese firms are less likely to acquire 
unrelated foreign businesses from other developing countries. In comparison, the 
control variable FEXPE is significant and positive related to CMNEs’ internationa l 
product diversification strategy via M&As, showing that CMNEs are more likely to 
acquire unrelated foreign businesses if they have already had international investment 
experience. As for ownership control influence, I find that there is a significant 
relationship on OWNTRANS in models 5-7. This result reflects the fact that CMNEs 
tend to acquire DMNEs by occupying a smaller ownership percentage for pursuing 
international product diversification strategy.  
 
 210 
 
For further explanations, average marginal effects on modes 1-10 were estimated and 
four main variables were mainly reported including Homediv_de, PRIVATE, BGA, 
PRIVATE_BG, CENG, PROG, and CITYG (Table 4.4.2.2). Marginal effects enabled 
us to directly explain the coefficients and identify the exact relationship between each 
independent variable and predicted dependent variable’ results in four levels. 
Specifically, the first level (i.e. predicted outcome is 0) means Chinese acquirers’ and 
target firms’ four-digit SIC codes are totally the same or have the same first 3-digit SIC 
codes at least; the four level (i.e. predicted outcome is 3) means their four-digit SIC 
codes are totally different. By and large, findings show that these main independent 
variables are significantly associated with dependent variable’s results on both the first 
level and the fourth level. For example, PRIVATE in model 2 is significantly related to 
predicted outcome (0) (0.1056, p<0.05) and predicted outcome (3) (-0.1005, p<0.05). 
In short, 10.56% of Chinese SOEs tend to acquire target firms in the most related 
industry.  
 
Moreover, 16.41% of Chinese central-government owned enterprises are more likely to 
seek unrelated international diversification in developed countries, and 15.83% of 
Provincial-government owned enterprises and 12.83% of municipal government owned 
enterprises tend to seek unrelated international diversification in developed countries. 
There were no significant relationship between CMNEs’ higher government affilia t ion 
levels and unrelated international diversification in developing countries.  
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Table 4.4.2.2 Average marginal effects 20  
Model 1-
mar 
Model 2-
mar 
Model 3-
mar 
Model 4-
mar 
Model 5-
mar 
Model 6-
mar 
Model 7-
mar 
Model 8-
mar 
Model 9-
mar 
Model 10-
mar  
World World World World Developed 
markets 
Developed 
markets 
Developed 
markets 
Developing 
markets 
Developing 
markets 
Developing 
markets 
Homediv_degree 
pr outcome(0) -0.0442*** -0.0342** -0.0355** -0.03378** -0.0388** -0.0408** -0.0379** -0.0221 -0.0193 -0.0142  
0.0127 0.0123 0.0123 0.0123 0.0143 0.0143 0.0144 0.0219 0.0220 0.0216 
pr outcome(1) -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002  
0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
pr outcome(2) 0.00239** 0.0021* 0.0022* 0.0020* 0.0035* 0.0037* 0.0034* -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002  
0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 
pr outcome(3) 0.0425** 0.0325** 0.0337** 0.0321** 0.0350** 0.0367** 0.0342** 0.0227 0.0198 0.0146  
0.0122 0.0118 0.0117 0.0117 0.0130 0.0130 0.0131 0.0225 0.0226 0.0222 
1.PRIVATE 
pr outcome(0) 0.0658 0.1056* 0.3576*** 
 
0.1541** 0.3737** 
 
0.0327 0.4385*** 
 
 
0.0409 0.0409 0.1015 
 
0.0485 0.1140 
 
0.0769 0.0286 
 
pr outcome(1) 0.0011 0.0012 0.0040 
 
-0.0020 -0.0058 
 
0.0006 0.0062+ 
 
 
0.0010 0.0014 0.0036 
 
0.0030 0.0055 
 
0.0014 0.0032 
 
pr outcome(2) -0.0035 -0.0063* -0.0147*** 
 
-0.0145** -0.0287*** 
 
0.0004 0.0178*** 
 
 
0.0024 0.0028 0.0037 
 
0.0053 0.0058 
 
0.0014 0.0040 
 
pr outcome(3) -0.0634 -0.1005* -0.3469** 
 
-0.1377** -0.3392** 
 
-0.0337 -0.4624*** 
 
 
0.0393 0.0388 0.1036 
 
0.0427 0.1106 
 
0.0795 0.0290 
 
1.BGA 
pr outcome(0) 0.0105 0.0340 0.2887** 0.0320 0.0304 0.2526* 0.0272 0.0366 0.4726*** 0.0293  
0.0505 0.0488 0.1059 0.0490 0.0593 0.1229 0.0596 0.0789 0.0276 0.0784 
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pr outcome(1) 0.0002 0.0006 0.0236 0.0006 0.0001 0.0219 0.0001 0.0006 0.0121+ 0.0005  
0.0011 0.0013 0.0183 0.0013 0.0009 0.0257 0.0008 0.0015 0.0063 0.0015 
pr outcome(2) -0.0006 -0.0019 0.0032 -0.0018 -0.0026 -0.0047 -0.0023 0.0005 0.0323*** 0.0004  
0.0026 0.0024 0.0133 0.0024 0.0047 0.0119 0.0048 0.0015 0.0063 0.0014 
pr outcome(3) -0.0102 -0.0327 -0.3155* -0.0308 -0.0279 -0.2699+ -0.0249 -0.0377 -0.5170*** -0.0302  
0.0490 0.0478 0.1366 0.0479 0.0553 0.1594 0.0555 0.0816 0.0284 0.0812 
1.PRIVATE_BG 
pr outcome(0) 
  
-0.2806* 
  
-0.2532+ 
  
-0.4588*** 
 
   
0.1111 
  
0.1303 
  
0.0281 
 
pr outcome(1) 
  
-0.0173 
  
-0.0129 
  
-0.0141+ 
 
   
0.0138 
  
0.0162 
  
0.0073 
 
pr outcome(2) 
  
0.0009 
  
0.0098 
  
-0.0378*** 
 
   
0.0096 
  
0.0063 
  
0.0073 
 
pr outcome(3) 
  
0.2970* 
  
0.2564+ 
  
0.5107*** 
 
   
0.1335 
  
0.1512 
  
0.0288 
 
1.CENG 
pr outcome(0) 
   
-0.1196* 
  
-0.1698** 
  
-0.1081     
0.0490 
  
0.0565 
  
0.0865 
pr outcome(1) 
   
-0.0040 
  
-0.0054 
  
-0.0024     
0.0031 
  
0.0049 
  
0.0027 
pr outcome(2) 
   
0.0050** 
  
0.0110** 
  
-0.0030     
0.0018 
  
0.0033 
  
0.0046 
pr outcome(3) 
   
0.1186* 
  
0.1641** 
  
0.1135     
0.0507 
  
0.0585 
  
0.0929 
1.PROG 
pr outcome(0) 
   
-0.1431* 
  
-0.1562* 
  
-0.1083 
 213 
 
    
0.0615 
  
0.0715 
  
0.1167 
pr outcome(1) 
   
-0.0086 
  
-0.0093 
  
-0.0030     
0.0070 
  
0.0095 
  
0.0046 
pr outcome(2) 
   
0.0027 
  
0.0072** 
  
-0.0048     
0.0024 
  
0.0024 
  
0.0093 
pr outcome(3) 
   
0.1490* 
  
0.1583* 
  
0.1160     
0.0699 
  
0.0808 
  
0.1300 
1.CITYG 
pr outcome(0) 
   
-0.0793+ 
  
-0.1324** 
  
0.1230     
0.0439 
  
0.0492 
  
0.1153 
pr outcome(1) 
   
-0.0026 
  
-0.0045 
  
0.0006     
0.0024 
  
0.0041 
  
0.0012 
pr outcome(2) 
   
0.0034* 
  
0.0086** 
  
-0.0023     
0.0015 
  
0.0029 
  
0.0061 
pr outcome(3) 
   
0.0785+ 
  
0.1283* 
  
-0.1213     
0.0449 
  
0.0505 
  
0.1090 
Notes: ‘i’ refers to the variable is a dummy variable; 
1._predict: Pr (InternationalDiv==0), predict (pr outcome(0));  
2. _predict: Pr (InternationalDiv==1), predict (pr outcome(1));  
3. _predict: Pr(InternationalDiv==2), predict(pr outcome(2));  
4. _predict: Pr(InternationalDiv==3), predict(pr outcome(3)); 
0-3 refers to Chinese firms acquired the foreign firms from the most related level to the most unrelated level; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline);  
+P<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Figure 4.2.2.1-4.2.2.3 clearly display these relationships between independent variables 
(i.e. Homediv_de, PRIVATE, BGA, CENG, PROG, and CITYG) and the dependent 
variable’s four different predicted outcomes.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.2.1 Average marginal effects – home diversification, private ownership, and 
business group affiliation 5 
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Figure 4.2.2.2 Average marginal effects-business group characteristics 6 
 
 
Figure 4.2.2.3 Average marginal effects-government affiliation level 7 
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4.4.3 Antecedents of International diversification 
The above findings reveal that CMNEs tend to pursue different internationa l 
diversification strategies by their domestic diversification activities, differing industria l 
sectors, business group affiliation, and state ownership types (i.e. POEs and SOEs with 
three different government affiliation levels). To some extent, these factors are ‘push’ 
factors that facilitate CMNEs’ international diversification. How about ‘pull’ factors 
from the lens of target firms or even target markets?  
 
Following from the previous chapters, I selected three firm-level motivat ions 
(technology, brand, and natural resources) that may attract Chinese firms’ rapid foreign 
acquisitions. Herein, I mainly attempted to identify what real antecedents drive CMNEs 
to undertake more unrelated acquisitions or related acquisitions.  
 
Models 11-16 were designed to identify the antecedents of Chinese firms’ unrelated 
acquisitions, while models 17-22 were to test the antecedents of their related 
acquisitions. First of all, the Wald chi square test reveals that findings from models 11-
12 and model 20 are not observable. Models 11-12 were designed to test the probability 
of Chinese firms’ seeking technology via unrelated acquisitions and model 12 
(particularly government affiliation level variables selected) was designed to test the 
probability of Chinese firms’ seeking brands via related acquisitions. Results from 
models 11-12 and model 20 suggest that CMNEs’ international unrelated acquisit ions 
are not related to seeking technology, but to seeking brands and natural resources.  
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Table 4.4.3.1 Antecedents of Chinese firms’ international diversification 1 
  Unrelated International diversification Related International diversification 
Antecedents Technology seeking Brand seeking Natural resources 
seeking 
Technology seeking Brand seeking Natural resources 
seeking 
Models Model 11 Model 12 Model 
13 
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 
17 
Model 18 Model 
19 
Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
Observable NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Observations 253 253 232 219 265 265 301 280 301 280 301 301 
Wald chi2 test 
result 
20.94 23.37 28.85* 28.03+ 66.89*** 88.49*** 40.70** 43.62** 30.38* 27.71 71.33*** 94.03*** 
Prob>chi2 0.2834 0.2711 0.0359 0.0615 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0017 0.0472 0.1163 0.0000 0.0000 
Null  
hypothesis (H0) 
Accepted Accepted Rejected ^Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Accepted Rejected Rejected 
Pseudo R2 0.0935 0.0999 0.1107 0.1093 0.3377 0.3931 0.1284 0.1412 0.0939 0.0933 0.2951 0.3462 
Log 
pseudolikelihoo
d 
-111.4158 -110.6327 -
114.019
5 
-110.9018 -89.6349 -82.1328 -145.336 -137.9799 -
154.118
3 
-
148.4316 
-112.4868 -104.3406 
Mean VIF 2.39 2.34 2.39 2.34 2.39 2.34 2.39 2.34 2.39 2.34 2.39 2.34 
Regression results - variables 
PRIVATE 0.2194 
 
0.3723 
 
-0.9148** 
 
0.6374** 
 
0.6415*
* 
 
-
1.3075**
* 
 
  0.2406 
 
0.2478 
 
0.2843 
 
0.2150 
 
0.2066 
 
0.2395 
 
CENG 
 
-0.2168 
 
-0.4047 
 
0.6963* 
 
-0.7952** 
 
-
0.6597** 
 
0.9997**
* 
  
 
0.2622 
 
0.2688 
 
0.3317 
 
0.2792 
 
0.2457 
 
0.2767 
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PROG 
 
-0.8233 
 
- 
 
2.5205**
* 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2.5765**
* 
  
 
0.5611 
 
- 
 
0.5120 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.3956 
CITYG 
 
-0.1071 
 
-0.1415 
 
0.9503** 
 
-0.1870 
 
-0.3134 
 
1.0941**
* 
  
 
0.3330 
 
0.3527 
 
0.3652 
 
0.2698 
 
0.2680 
 
0.2926 
BGA 0.8291** 0.8510** 0.3353 0.3841 -0.7683* -0.8570* 0.2124 0.2058 0.0160 0.0056 0.0051 -0.0335 
  0.3083 0.3060 0.2691 0.2672 0.3412 0.3536 0.2299 0.2329 0.2248 0.2260 0.3802 0.3855 
LAGE 0.1449 0.1547 -0.0659 -0.0294 0.0589 -0.0343 0.0802 -0.0173 -0.1268 -0.2234 -0.3617 -0.2230 
  0.1892 0.1861 0.1971 0.1907 0.2229 0.2325 0.2073 0.2199 0.1869 0.2020 0.2213 0.2285 
PROFIT 0.0039 0.0038 0.0035 0.0034 -0.0019 -0.0032 0.0119* 0.0122* 0.0084* 0.0078+ -0.0095* -0.0082* 
  0.0034 0.0034 0.0029 0.0029 0.0032 0.0030 0.0046 0.0050 0.0039 0.0041 0.0041 0.0039 
LTASSET -0.0235 -0.0216 0.0236 0.0314 0.0141 0.0146 -0.0569 -0.0362 0.0142 0.0256 0.1205+ 0.1511* 
  0.0548 0.0554 0.0553 0.0567 0.0670 0.0666 0.0522 0.0544 0.0487 0.0483 0.0641 0.0719 
LANPAT -0.0014 0.0074 -0.0056 0.0083 0.0120 -0.0439 0.1233** 0.1523**
* 
0.0474 0.0649+ 0.0267 -0.0008 
  0.0390 0.0399 0.0408 0.0421 0.0408 0.0414 0.0367 0.0391 0.0350 0.0363 0.0396 0.0397 
LANTRADM 0.1707 0.1494 0.2352* 0.1962+ -0.3715+ -0.1189 -0.1624 -0.2533* -0.0107 -0.0515 -0.2710* -0.2420+ 
  0.1064 0.1102 0.1131 0.1174 0.1974 0.1702 0.1173 0.1217 0.1070 0.1054 0.1309 0.1314 
FEXPE -0.1862 -0.1945 -0.1210 -0.1415 1.0362** 1.2094**
* 
-0.0763 -0.0072 0.0341 0.0892 0.1458 0.0649 
  0.2529 0.2532 0.2546 0.2608 0.3144 0.3386 0.1994 0.2032 0.1895 0.1945 0.2180 0.2295 
PUBLIC 0.2578 0.2701 0.0133 0.0312 -
0.9350**
* 
-
0.9871**
* 
0.0478 -0.0202 -0.1175 -0.1891 -0.1612 -0.0640 
  0.2009 0.2071 0.2028 0.2159 0.2403 0.2390 0.1784 0.1892 0.1745 0.1833 0.2088 0.2286 
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OWNTRANS -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0012 -
0.0117**
* 
-
0.0118**
* 
-0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0042 -0.0051+ 0.0013 0.0026 
  0.0029 0.0030 0.0029 0.0031 0.0032 0.0032 0.0029 0.0030 0.0027 0.0028 0.0030 0.0031 
Constant -1.4849 -1.3891 -2.1157 -2.1070+ 0.3990 -0.1854 -0.5137 0.1430 -1.0616 -0.2608 -1.0588 -3.3719+ 
  1.3247 1.2666 1.2981 1.2423 1.4985 1.4460 1.3326 1.2965 1.3203 1.2922 1.8495 1.9572 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Correct 
predictions 
81.42% 80.63% 77.16% 74.43% 85.28% 86.79% 79.40% 76.07% 77.41% 75.36% 85.38% 86.05% 
Notes: H0: all of the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero; 
Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 0<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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4.5 Discussion 
Consistent with the overarching theme, the findings above clearly showed a positive 
and significant relationship between state ownership types and CMNEs’ internationa l 
diversification strategies. This study contributes to the literature about the impact of 
business group affiliation and state ownership types on Chinese firms’ strategies and, 
in particular, on international diversification via CBM&As. My findings have shown 
that CMNEs’ international diversification via acquisitions would be determined not 
only its own firm-level attributes (i.e. firm age, total assets, and prior internationa l 
experiences) but also by its government affiliation level and heterogeneity in industry 
sectors.  
 
4.5.1 Home diversification and international diversification 
Firms need to accumulate and learn different types of knowledge when expanding into 
foreign markets. Firms can achieve such knowledge through experiential learning in 
foreign markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Accordingly, firms’ experient ia l 
knowledge of domestic diversification via M&As could increase related experient ia l 
knowledge of undertaking unrelated domestic acquisitions, which further facilitate their 
unrelated international diversification strategies. Lu, Liu, Filatotchev, and Wright 
(2014:457) suggest that “when internationalizing operations, firms which have engaged 
in domestic diversification will likely have developed organizational knowledge about 
how to manage scope economies and achieve effective management and integration of 
business units located in different countries.” In this study my findings have attested to 
the fact that acquirers’ domestic diversification positively and significantly determine s 
their international diversification via CBM&As. The findings contribute to existing IB 
research in a number of ways.  
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First of all, this finding revealed that Chinese firms had accumulated capacities or 
resources for acquiring unrelated businesses prior to international diversified 
acquisitions. Such skills and knowledge may decrease firms’ negotiation costs and 
mitigate potential risks due to exposure to uncertain foreign environments. Thus firms’ 
prior skills and knowledge may underpin firms’ international diversification. In this 
regard, my finding is particularly consistent with the prior results of related research 
(e.g. Lu, Liu et al. 2014; Wu, Pangarkar and Wu, 2016), though I focused on firm’s 
international diversification strategy via CBM&As.  
 
Specifically, Lu, Liu et al. (2014) find that international diversification of Chinese firms’ 
is positively and significantly influenced by their domestic regional diversificat ion. 
Moreover, Wu, Pangarkar and Wu (2016) find that regional diversification of Chinese 
manufacturing MNEs can significantly predict global diversification. Therefore, this 
research may largely further contribute to existing literature on Chinese firms’ 
diversification. I have found that Chinese firms’ domestic product diversifica t ion 
activities significantly determine their international product diversification strategy via 
CBM&As. As such, firms’ available resources or capabilities are critically important 
determinants to whether firms will undertake international product diversifica t ion 
strategies. Moreover, this view is also supported by my findings that Chinese firms’ 
prior international experience is positively related to unrelated internationa l 
diversification.  
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4.5.2 Business group affiliation and Internationa l 
diversification 
Li and Wong (2003) suggest that Chinese firms may seek both unrelated diversifica t ion 
and related diversification to address market condition deficiency and institutiona l 
uncertainty. In this study I found that business group affiliation is not directly and 
significantly associated with Chinese firms’ international diversification level. 
However, Chinese POEs affiliated to a business group are significantly related to firms’ 
international diversification in developed countries. Business group affiliated firms 
have access to more resources than independent firms that facilitate Chinese firms’ 
international diversification. Transaction cost theory suggests that a firm’s sole 
motivation for diversification may be attributable to the exploitation of excess resources 
to improve efficiency (Teece, 1982). Earlier research suggests business group affilia t ion 
is more positively and significantly related to the diversification levels of firms in 
emerging economies than those in developed economies (Chang and Choi, 1988; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000b). However, my findings support the argument that business 
group affiliation significantly facilitate Chinese POEs’ international diversifica t ion 
activities only in developing countries.  
 
Wan, Hoskisson, Short, and Yiu (2011) suggest that based on the assumption of an 
imperfect market, the resource-based view (RBV) could assist us in understanding the 
diversification, and especially related diversification, which may create significant 
value to the firm. My findings suggested that Chinese POEs are more likely to 
undertake related international diversification strategy. Namely, my findings partially 
support the argument by Wan et al. (2011) that the RBV could extend the understand ing 
of firms’ related diversification activities.  
 
Furthermore, I identified that Chinese SOEs owned by high government affilia t ion 
levels are more likely to undertake unrelated international diversification via foreign 
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M&As. In comparison, findings from Chapter two suggest that neither foreign 
technologies nor brands attract Chinese SOEs’ FDI via M&As. Therefore, previous 
mixed results on state ownership influence may be also attributed to CMNEs’ differ ing 
specific FDI strategies (i.e. specific SAS strategies or international diversifica t ion 
strategy). This finding here, therefore, may firstly contribute to the past literature on the 
role of state ownership on Chinese firms’ outward FDI. For example, prior studies 
found a significant and positive relationship between state ownership and Chinese firms’ 
outward FDI (e.g. Hong, Wang, and Kafouros, 2015; Lu, Liu, Wright, and Filatotchev, 
2014; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, and Wright, 2012). Other studies conversely found a 
significant but negative relationship between state ownership and Chinese firms’ 
outward FDI (e.g. Huang, Xie, Li, and Reddy, 2017; Xia, Ma, Lu and Yiu, 2014). As a 
consequence, mixed results on state ownership influences may hinder the 
understanding EMNEs’ real determinants of outward FDI. To an extent, my findings 
assist in addressing that issue.  
 
In addition, a firm’s diversification strategy could be explained as value-added purpose 
by drawing on the RBV (Andersen and Kheam, 1998). The nature of firms’ availab le 
resources and host countries’ market opportunities may direct a firm’s diversifica t ion 
strategy (Peteraf, 1993). Firms may tend to pursue an international diversifica t ion 
strategy by developing new products and expanding new markets when their resource 
capabilities reach the target countries’ resource requirements. My findings showed that 
business group affiliation significantly moderates the relationship between private 
ownership and unrelated international diversification. Compared to independent private 
firms, privately-owned Chinese group-affiliated firms possess more resources and are 
more likely to pursue an international product diversification strategy.  
 
 224 
 
4.5.3 Government affiliation level and International product 
diversification 
One significant contribution of this study is that my findings showed that Chinese SOEs 
owned by high government affiliation levels are more likely to undertake unrelated 
international diversification via CBM&As.  
 
My findings support the IB literature founded on institutional theory by showing that 
government involvement significantly determines Chinese firms’ internationa l 
diversification in developed countries only. International diversification relatively leads 
to additional business risks due to exposure to uncertain environments (Majocchi and 
Strange, 2012). As such, governments may apply institutional pressure on Chinese 
SOEs requiring them to choose developed countries rather than developing countries 
for undertaking international diversification strategies. The the IBV should be added 
here to explain the role of state ownership type on CMNEs’ international diversifica t ion 
strategy.  
 
Xia, Ma, Lu, and Yiu (2013) suggest that resource dependence theory (RDT) 
contributes to a logic of diversification, as Pfeffer (1976:39) highlights, that a firm is 
likely ‘to diversify operations and thereby lessen dependence on the present  
organizations with which it exchanges.’ Drawing on the RDT, my findings contribute 
to the understanding that Chinese SOEs were not significantly attracted to target firms’ 
technology and brand-based assets, but to their natural resource endowments regardless 
of whether target firms were located in developed countries or developing countries. 
 
4.5.4 Industrial transfer, location choices via internationa l 
product diversification strategy 
My findings presented above show that Chinese firms engaging in the sectors includ ing 
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Agriculture, Construction, Public Administration, Retailer Trade and Wholesale Trade 
have a higher likelihood of pursuing unrelated acquisitions, thought there are 
underlying diversification risks and LOF costs (table 4.4.3.1). Drawing from the RDT, 
Chinese firms likely want to catch up with DMNEs in these sectors. Despite CMNEs 
lack of tradition ownership advantages (i.e. technologies, brands) that DMNEs possess 
and face the costs of LOF when operating abroad, they may still diversify businesses 
internationally in some sectors such as agriculture and wholesale trade to the world 
market as well as in construction, retailer and public administration to developing 
markets. 
 
My findings showed that Chinese firms engaging in the sectors including agriculture, 
construction, public administration, retailer trade and Wholesale Trade have a higher 
likelihood of pursuing unrelated acquisitions in developing countries, thought there are 
underlying diversification risks and LOF costs. It may capture the market-seeking 
motives of these firms in developing countries. These findings suggested that a 
synthesis of international diversity strategies and the role of industry types based on the 
RBV offer new insights into the distinctive strategic behavior of EMNEs. These 
perspectives may assist to develop theories towards an integrated view of EMNEs’ FDI 
strategies.  
 
4.5.5 Other influential factors 
In this research there are also some interesting findings regarding the control variables. 
First of all, I have found that younger Chinese firms are less likely to pursue 
international product diversification strategies in any other emerging countries via 
CBM&As. This could be due to younger Chinese firms lacking internationa l 
experiences or capacities for managing unrelated foreign businesses. Notably, my 
findings have rightly attested that Chinese acquirers’ prior international experience 
significantly and positively encouraged their international product diversifica t ion 
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activities via CBM&As. Due to this, I recorded findings also consistent with extant 
studies (e.g. Jing, 2008) as regards to Chinese firms’ foreign diversification activit ies.  
In detail, Jing (2008) empirically found that Chinese listed companies’ internationa l 
diversification activities are largely dependant on to what extent they need to address 
company risks.  
 
Majocchi and Strange (2012) argued that firms’ ownership structure determines their 
level of international diversification. In my research I have found that Chinese firms 
maintain a relatively smaller ownership percentage after acquiring unrelated foreign 
businesses, especially those located in developed countries. On balance, no empirica l 
research has been developed to explore the relationship between the ownership 
advantage after the M&As and Chinese firms’ strategic purpose of seeking internationa l 
product diversification.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Firstly, my findings reveal that Chinese MNEs' domestic diversification activit ies 
significantly determine their international diversification in developed countries rather 
than developing countries. Second, Chinese privately-owned business groups are more 
likely to pursue international product diversification strategies in developing countries 
than in developed countries. Third, higher government affiliation level significantly 
influences Chinese MNEs' degree of international diversification in developed 
countries rather than in developing countries. Fourth, Chinese MNEs are more likely to 
choose other developing countries undertaking international diversification strategies 
in the industries of agriculture, construction, public administration, and retail trade.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Discussion of main findings 
EMNEs have been emerging as important competitors in the world (UNCTAD, 2017). 
The study of EMNEs has generated significant academic interest and generated the 
‘Goldilocks debate’ regarding the need to analyze their distinctiveness in relation to 
theory (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). The debate has three perspectives: (i) EMNEs behave 
differently and there is a need to have new theories and models to analyse their 
behaviour; (ii) EMNEs are not a new species and existing theories can adequately 
explain their behavior; and (iii) the analysis of EMNEs does not require new theories 
but some modification or extension to existing theories and models (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2012). Research on EMNEs’ FDI strategies provides much research implication on 
existing theories and studies. Luo and Zhang (2016:333) contend that: “The 
internationalization of EM MNEs [EMNEs] promises to change the landscape of world 
business, and provide a new laboratory for developing international business (IB) 
theories.” This study is expected to make a significant contribution to extant theorizing 
and further understanding of EMNEs, with a particular reference to CMNEs.  
 
Chapter five firstly discusses and summarises the key findings and contributions, 
highlighting the importance of understanding the business group affiliation and state 
ownership types that determine CMNEs’ specific outward FDI strategies. Identifying 
these unique home country effects in the world’s largest emerging economy may 
contribute to further evaluation research on EMNEs’ outward FDI performance.  
 
As Meyer (2015:57) stresses, “The identification and classification of investment 
motives is important for foreign direct investment (FDI) research because the 
objectives of an action determine how the performance should be assessed.”  
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Secondly, chapter five focuses on the discussion about theoretical contributions of this 
research.  
 
Thirdly, it discusses the shortcomings of this thesis and identifies some future research 
areas. Table 5.1 below summarises the key findings and contributions to past literature 
from Study 1 to Study 3. 
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Table 5.1 Research findings on Chinese MNEs’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions between 2006 and 2015 1 
Study Purpose Key findings Contribution to the past literature 
1 Influence of 
business group 
affiliation on 
CMNE SAS 
orientation 
a) Chinese business group affiliated firms have a 
greater likelihood of seeking patents and also 
seeking greater volumes of patents which have NLB 
properties than non-affiliated firms 
b) Chinese business group affiliated firms with R&D 
center are more likely to seek NLB assets and also 
greater volumes of NLB assets than non-affiliated  
firms 
c) Internal capital markets within a business group has 
no significant influence on CMNEs’ SAS FDI 
d) Business group affiliation significantly and 
positively facilitates Chinese POEs’ NLB assets 
seeking FDI 
e) There are no significant relationship between 
business group affiliation and CMNEs’ brand 
seeking FDI which have LB properties  
Novelty-1: I identified a stronger evidence testifying that business group 
affiliation significantly facilitates CMNEs’ patent-based asset seeking FDI, 
which contributes to the following past literature:  
 Chari’s (2013) findings reveal that business group affiliation significantly  
facilitates Indian firms’ outward FDI.  
 Both ‘springboard perspective’ (Luo and Tung, 2007) and ‘strategic 
intent perspective’ (Rui and Yip, 2008) suggest that EMNEs seek 
strategic assets via rapid cross-border CBM&As.  
 Sutherland’s (2009) findings show that Chinese large business groups 
contribute to outward FDI, though there is no significant result of 
strategic asset seeking FDI. 
 Yiu (2011) argues that Chinese business groups facilitate Chinese firms ’ 
asset-seeking internationalization activities. 
Novelty-2: Compared with independent firms, I further found the evidence that 
business group affiliated firms have more access to technological resources 
(i.e. R&D centre) facilitating their foreign technology-related acquisitions, 
which may contributes to the past literature:  
 Gaur, Kumar, and Singh (2014) identify that Indian group affiliated firms  
can benefit more from technological capabilities than independent firms  
that positively affect firm decisions from export to FDI. 
Novelty-3: I found that Chinese POEs use ‘business group affiliation’ as a 
‘springboard’ to seek foreign technologies via rapid foreign acquisitions (Luo  
and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008), and also ‘catch up’ with DMNEs (Child  
and Rodrigues, 2005).  
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Novelty-4: Notwithstanding, I also identified that business group affiliation  
does not significantly affect Chinese firms’ trademark-based assets which have 
location-bounded properties. Such findings partially support the view that 
Rugman and Verbeke’s (1992) ‘New Internalization Theory’ suggests.  
2 Impact of State 
ownership type on 
technology and 
brand seeking FDI 
vis-a-vis natural 
resource seeking 
FDI 
a) Chinese POEs are less likely to seek natural resource 
endowments via international acquisitions  
b) CMNEs owned by a higher government affiliation  
level are more likely to seek natural resource 
endowments held by foreign firms in both developed 
and developing countries  
c) Chinese POEs are more likely to seek foreign  
technologies in both developed countries and 
developing countries 
d) CMNEs owned by a higher government affiliation  
level are less likely to seek foreign technologies in 
developed countries and developing countries via 
CBM&As 
e) Chinese POEs are more likely to seek foreign brands 
in developed countries only 
f) Chinese MNEs with higher government affiliation  
level are less likely to seek foreign brands in 
developed countries and developing countries  
Novelty-1: I firstly identified that Chinese POEs are more likely to seek both 
technologies and brands via rapid foreign acquisitions, which contribute to the 
past literature on EMNEs’ SAS FDI (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Luo and 
Tang, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008).  
 
Such findings about Chinese POEs are also in accordance with previous 
studies (including Anderson and Sutherland, 2015; Cui, Meyer, and Hu, 2014;  
Huang and Chi, 2014; Zheng, Wei, Zhang, and Yang, 2016).  
Novelty-2: My findings showed that Chinese POEs tend to acquire 
technologies from both DMNEs and other EMNEs, however, they tend to 
acquire brands from DMNEs and not EMNEs. These firm-level evidences 
reveal that results on SAS FDI from previous location choice studies may be 
biased, which then contribute to the past literature (containing Deng and Yang, 
2015; De Beule and Duanmu, 2012; Kang and Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, 
and Laforet, 2012; Yang and Deng, 2017) 
Novelty-3: my findings testified that the cross-border M&As by Chinese SOEs  
owned by higher government affiliation levels are not driven by the 
motivations of strategic asset seeking, but target firms’ natural resource 
endowments. Anderson and Sutherland (2015) use three-way linear additive 
composite to measure strategic assets instead of using traditional number of 
patents registered and find that Chinese SOEs are less likely to seek strategic 
assets via M&As.  
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3 Influence of 
business group 
affiliation and 
state ownership 
types on 
International 
product 
diversification 
a) CMNEs’ level of domestic product diversification is 
positively and significantly related to their level of 
international product diversification via M&As 
b) Chinese POEs affiliated to a business group are more 
likely to seek unrelated international acquisitions in 
developing countries only 
c) CMNEs owned by a higher government affiliation  
level have more likelihood of seeking unrelated 
international diversification in developed countries 
only 
d) CMNEs tend to seek brand-assets and natural 
resource endowments via unrelated international 
acquisition, but not for technology-based assets 
e) CMNEs have more likelihoods of seeking 
technology-based assets, brand-based assets and 
natural resource endowments via related international 
acquisitions 
f) Chinese POEs tend to seek foreign technologies and 
brands via related international acquisitions rather 
than unrelated international acquisitions  
g) Prior international experiences significantly affect 
CMNEs’ international product diversification  
activities in both developed and developing countries 
h) CMNEs in Agriculture and Wholesale Trade sector 
are more likely to seek unrelated international 
diversification in both developed and developing 
Novelty-1: To the best of my knowledge, this is likely the first study to 
investigate the extent to which business group affiliation and state ownership  
types determine Chinese MNEs’ international product diversification.  
Novelty-2: I identified that Chinese SOEs owned by high government 
affiliation levels are more likely to undertake international product 
diversification via foreign M&As. This finding may largely contributes to the 
past literature on the role of state ownership on Chinese firms’ outward FDI:  
 These studies found significant and positive relationship between state 
ownership and Chinese firms’ outward FDI (e.g. Hong, Wang, and 
Kafouros, 2015; Lu, Liu, Wright, and Filatotchev, 2014; Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros, and Wright, 2012).  
 These studies conversely found significant but negative relationship 
between state ownership and Chinese firms’ outward FDI (e.g. Huang, 
Xie, Li, and Reddy, 2017; Xia, Ma, Lu and Yiu, 2014).  
Novelty-3: As for Chinese firms’ unrelated international acquisitions, I still 
found that Chinese firms have more likelihood of seeking foreign brands and 
natural resource endowments. It may imply that Chinese firms acquiring 
foreign businesses are not only to maintain competitive advantages via 
acquiring related strategic assets, but also to build competitive advantages via 
acquired unrelated strategic assets.  
Novelty-4: To the best of my knowledge, this is likely the first study of 
identifying stronger evidences that Chinese firms engaged in different industry 
sectors tend to pursue differing international product diversification strategy.  
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countries 
i) CMNEs in Construction and Public Administration  
sector are more likely to seek unrelated international 
diversification in developing countries only 
j) CMNEs in Manufacturing, Mining and Service sector 
significantly tend to seek related international 
acquisitions in developed countries only 
Notes: SAS represents strategic asset seeking; NLB refers to non-location-bounded; LB means location-bounded; Industry classification is based on Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Codes  
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5.1.1 Chapter 2-Contributions to past literature: Business 
group affiliation and SAS orientation 
Previous research uses mostly location choice modelling using country level proxies 
(i.e. number of patents granted nationally) (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; Deng and Yang, 
2015; Kang and Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and Laforet, 2012; Yang and Deng, 
2017), I used firm-level data instead (i.e. target firms’ number of patents). Strategic 
assets by types were further disaggregated (i.e. patents and trademarks), which provides 
further insights into EMNE theory. I achieved five key findings regarding the 
relationship between business group affiliation and Chinese MNEs’ SAS FDI by types 
in chapter two (Table 5.1).  
 
Amsden and Hikino (1994) argue that business groups from late-industrializ ing 
countries possess ‘project execution capability’. This argument implies that business 
groups in emerging markets become experts at internalising technology acquisit ions 
and have strong motives to do so. Further, this argument that business group affilia t ion 
in emerging economies may facilitate SAS related FDI, a view generally in accord with 
the EMNE literature (though not tested) (Chari, 2013; Sutherland, 2009; Yiu, Bruton 
and Lu, 2007), can be supported by my findings.  
 
The first key finding is that stronger evidence proving that business group affilia t ion 
significantly facilitates CMNEs’ patent-based asset seeking FDI, contributes to past 
literature. Chari (2013) found a significant relationship between business group 
affiliation and Indian firms’ outward FDI. Likewise, Sutherland (2009) testified that 
Chinese large business groups contribute to outward FDI, though there is no significant 
result of strategic asset seeking FDI. Thus, my findings further extend Chari’s (2013) 
and Sutherland’s (2009) empirical work. Moreover, Yiu (2011) argued that Chinese 
business groups facilitate asset-seeking internationalization activities. My findings 
support Yiu’s (2011) proposition.  
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The second key finding is that I further found the evidence that business group affilia ted 
firms possessing more technological resources (i.e. R&D center) facilitating their 
foreign technology-related acquisitions, when comparing with independent firms. Gaur, 
Kumar, and Singh (2014) identified that Indian group affiliated firms can benefit more 
from technological capabilities than independent firms that positively affect firm 
decisions from export to FDI. 
 
The third novelty of my findings showed that business group affiliation significantly 
and positively facilitated Chinese POEs’ patent-based asset seeking FDI. It may imply 
that Chinese POEs use ‘business group affiliation’ as a ‘springboard’ to seek foreign 
technologies via rapid foreign acquisitions (Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008), 
and also ‘catch up’ with DMNEs (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). As for Chinese SOEs, 
Huang and Chi (2014) have asserted that they have favorable institutional environment 
as opposed to POEs because Chinese governments consider SOEs as the pillars of the 
national economy. On that account, Chinese SOEs can enjoy privileged treatment from 
government owned banks and institutions, such as receiving larger financial support 
and R&D support or cooperation from Universities or Departments, developing their 
own indigenous technologies.    
 
I also identified that business group affiliation does not significantly affect Chinese 
firms’ trademark-based assets which have location-bounded properties. In contrast, 
Chinese business group affiliated firms have a greater likelihood of seeking patents, 
which have non-location-bounded (NLB) properties (i.e. can be exploited back in their 
domestic market, China), rather than trademarks, which have location bounded (LB) 
properties (and are therefore less easy to exploit domestically). My findings are partially 
supported by the rationality of ‘New Internalization Theory’ (developed by Rugman 
and Verbeke (1992)), which stresses the properties of location-boundedness in strategic 
assets. Drawing from Hennart’s (2012) bundling model, EMNEs are likely to exploit 
assets acquired in the home market. Insignificant evidence of CMNEs’ LB assets 
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seeking FDI relatively supports Hennart’s bundling model. As mentioned previous ly, 
China Bright Food Group acquired Weetabix, the world famous breakfast cereal brand 
especially in UK market, but failed to promote the brand in China’s market in the end, 
and sold to US POST Holdings Company. 
 
Since I found that business group affiliation in emerging economies is a facilitator for 
CMNEs’ NLB assets seeking, it could be seen as one unique ‘ownership’ advantage. 
Ramamurti (2012) argued that EMNEs may have differing ownership advantages. 
There are FSAs and country-specific advantages (CSAs) that EMNEs can exploit when 
undertaking OFDI (Ramamurti, 2009; Rugman, 2009). Compared with independent 
firms, business groups’ unique attributes, such as internal markets, inward linkages, and 
institutional support, as Yiu (2011) argues, potentially provide additional support to 
SAS FDI activities. 
 
To argue Dunning’s OLI model, Hennart (2012:168) highlighted that “But some CSAs 
[country specific advantages] have owners, usually local firms, who can sometimes 
derive significant gains from the monopoly control of these resources. They can use 
this monopoly power to finance intangible-seeking investments in developed countries 
to obtain the firms specific advantages (FSAs) they lack and, hence compete with FSA-
rich MNEs in their own market, and then internationally.” As noted above, Chinese 
group affiliated firms control more complementary local resources (i.e. R&D centers) 
than independent firms. My findings have suggested that business group affiliated firms 
with R&D centers have a higher likelihood of seeking NLB assets via M&As. Therefore, 
these research findings are also partially supported by the rationality that Hennart’s 
(2012) bundling model stresses.  
 
This research concentrating on CMNEs’ CBM&As in past ten years may also 
contribute to the understanding of the resource-dependence theory (RDT). Based on 
RDT, EMNEs’ increasing CBM&As are thought to minimize environmenta l 
dependence on host countries via achieving strategic resources (Peng, 2012; Rabbiosi, 
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Stefano, and Bertoni, 2012). In comparison, given market imperfections in emerging 
economies, Chinese POEs relatively speaking have a large dependence on advanced 
technologies and known brands. Drawing from the RDT, Deng and Yang (2015) 
suggested that host country-based factors are likely to have a ‘pull’ effect on M&As, 
whereas home country-based factors will have a ‘push’ effect. Put simply, target firms’ 
technologies and brands pull Chinese POEs to go abroad for acquisitions, while their 
business group affiliation pushes Chinese POEs to undertake foreign acquisitions. As 
such, my findings are also supported by the logic of the RDT (Pfeffer and Salncik, 1978, 
2003).  
 
5.1.2 Chapter 3-Contributions to past literature: Government 
affiliation level and specific FDI strategies 
In Chapter 3 I discuss the role of state ownership types on Chinese firms’ specific FDI 
strategies. I firstly identified that Chinese POEs are more likely to seek both 
technologies and brands via rapid foreign acquisitions, which contribute to the past 
literature on EMNEs’ SAS FDI. Such findings about Chinese POEs are also in 
accordance with previous studies (including Anderson and Sutherland, 2015; Cui, 
Meyer, and Hu, 2014; Huang and Chi, 2014; Zheng, Wei, Zhang, and Yang, 2016). 
Notably, my findings also provided the significant evidence of seeking foreign brands 
by Chinese POEs. In comparison, my findings showed that the cross-border M&As by 
Chinese SOEs owned by higher government affiliation levels are not driven by the 
motivations of strategic asset seeking, but target firms’ natural resource endowments. 
Namely, the ‘springboard perspective’ and ‘strategic intent perspective’ failed to 
explain Chinese SOEs’ SAS FDI.  
 
Secondly, my findings indicated that Chinese POEs tend to acquire both DMNEs and 
other EMNEs for seeking technologies, and prefer DMNEs only for seeking brands. 
This firm-level evidence implies that results on SAS FDI from previous location choice 
 237 
 
studies may be biased, which then contribute to the past literature (e.g. Deng and Yang, 
2015; De Beule and Duanmu, 2012; Kang and Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, and 
Laforet, 2012; Yang and Deng, 2017).  
 
In addition, Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2014) argued that existing theory does not present a 
consistent prediction of the state ownership influence on MNEs’ outward FDI. To 
illustrate, previous empirical studies provide the positive effect of state ownership on 
EMNEs’ outward FDI (e.g. Hong, Wang, and Kafouros, 2015; Lu, Liu, Wright, and 
Filatotcheve, 2014), while other studies show the negative influence of state ownership 
on CMNEs’ outward FDI (Huang, Xie, Li and Reddy, 2017; Xia, Ma, Lu and Yiu, 
2014). These mixed findings reveal that the linkages between state ownership influence 
and CMNEs’ outward FDI may be more complex than presumed. 
 
Fourthly, my findings indicated that Chinese firms owned by higher government 
affiliation levels are more likely to seek natural resource endowments as opposed to 
both technologies and brands. This finding may contribute to previous related literature. 
Previous studies have suggested that another important antecedent of Chinese outward 
FDI is to achieve greater security of access to natural resources (e.g. Buckley et al. 2007; 
Deng, 2004, 2007; Hong and Sun, 2006; Kang and Jiang, 2012; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; 
Li, Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro, and Chen, 2013; Morck et al., 2008). For instance, 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) argued that it likely reveals Chinese governments’ politica l 
objectives if China’s general FDI is directed to seek overseas natural resources. From 
the lens of micro level, my research findings rightly further revealed that Chinese SOEs 
may be under institutional pressure so that they have to seek and reserve natural 
resources reaching governments’ strategic objectives. 
 
Another explanation may be that Chinese SOEs acquiring foreign firms involved 
natural resource sectors are to mitigate own resource dependencies and build 
competitive advantages as opposed to counterparts. The core argument of RDT stresses 
that firms can implement various viable strategies to mitigate external constraints and 
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achieve critical resources through depending on certain environment (Pfeffer and 
Salncik, 1978, 2003). The RDT has been seen as one of the mainstream theoretica l 
logics for exploring the determinants of acquisitions (Hillman et al. 2009). 
 
5.1.3 Chapter 4-Contributions to previous literature: Home 
country effects and international product diversification 
strategy 
Firms’ product diversification activities have been found to be pervasive in emerging 
economies including China, India, Mexico, and Russia (Du, Lu and Tao, 2015). 
Nonetheless, research on whether home country effects determine CMNEs’ 
international product diversification via M&As is scant. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is likely the first study to investigate the extent to which business group affilia t ion 
and state ownership types determine CMNEs’ international product diversification.  
 
Specifically, I identified that Chinese SOEs owned by high government affilia t ion 
levels are more likely to undertake international product diversification via foreign 
M&As. For example, one provincial government-owned enterprise in our sample, 
China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN) (SIC code: 4911) acquired 
Kalahari Minerals PLC (SIC code: 1094) in year of 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014. Kalahari 
Minerals PLC is based in London, which mainly engages in exploring minerals in 
Namibia. Thus, CGN can achieve minerals for future strategic reserve of natural 
resource endowments by pursuing an international product diversification strategy. 
Such a finding, therefore, primarily contributes to existing IB literature on the role of 
government involvement on Chinese firms’ outward FDI strategy.  
 
In addition, prior findings from Chapter two suggest that neither foreign technologies 
nor brands attract Chinese SOEs’ FDI via M&As. Herein, previous inconsistent results 
on state ownership influence may be also attributed to CMNEs’ differing specific FDI 
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strategies (i.e. SAS strategies or international product diversification strategy). This 
finding, therefore, further reveals the importance of identifying specific FDI strategies 
by using firm-level data.  
 
Furthermore, my findings have also shown that Chinese POEs are less likely to 
undertake unrelated international acquisitions in both developed and developing 
countries. Those affiliated to a business group, however, have a greater probability of 
pursuing unrelated international acquisitions in developing countries. Moreover, as for 
Chinese firms’ unrelated international acquisitions, I found that Chinese firms have a 
higher likelihood of seeking foreign brands and natural resource endowments. In other 
words, Chinese privately-owned business groups are less likely to exploit their 
economies of scale in developing countries, but are attracted by other purposes. Further, 
it may imply that Chinese firms acquiring foreign businesses are not only to mainta in 
competitive advantages via acquiring related strategic assets, but also to build 
competitive advantages via acquired unrelated strategic assets and expand in other 
developing countries.  
 
Ramaswamy et al. (2017) argue that if business groups were very involved with 
unrelated diversification, their benefits such as economies of scale would be weakened. 
Therefore, industry types may be another influential factor determining CMNEs’ 
international product diversification strategy. For instance, I found that CMNEs in 
construction and public administration sectors are more likely to seek unrelated 
international diversification in developing countries only. Also, CMNEs in agriculture 
and wholesale trade sectors are more likely to seek unrelated internationa l 
diversification in both developed and developing countries. Therefore, Chinese 
privately-owned business groups that undertook unrelated international product 
diversification strategies in developing countries are probably engaged in the 
construction, public administration, agriculture, or wholesale trade sector. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is likely the first study identifying stronger evidence that Chinese 
firms engaged in different industry sectors tend to pursue differing international product 
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diversification strategy. 
 
In light of the home market, I also found that CMNEs’ degree of domestic 
diversification activities also positively and significantly determine their degree of 
international diversification. If firms had completed several deals of acquiring unrelated 
businesses in the domestic market, this domestic diversification would allow them to 
accumulate certain coordination skills and knowledge in managing increased diversity 
of domestic activities. Such skills and knowledge may underpin firms’ internationa l 
diversification. To illustrate, Alibaba Group (SIC code: 5961), one of my research 
samples, acquired Mainland China based China Civilink (SIC code: 7375) in 2009 and 
then acquired Auctiva Corporation affiliates (SIC code: 7372) located in Singapore 
with 10.193 percentage of ownership (i.e. in year 2014), and in America with 100 
percent ownership (i.e. in 2010, 2011, and 2013). In 2005, Alibaba Group acquired the 
package assets of Yahoo China including search technology, the website, 
communication and advertising business (Xinhua, 2005), diversifying and enhancing 
its online searching service and business activities.  
 
In this research I have found that Chinese firms’ age is significantly but negative ly 
related to their international product diversification activities in any other emerging 
countries via CBM&As. It is possible that the reason is that younger Chinese firms lack 
international knowledge or experience of managing more diversified foreign businesses. 
More importantly, I found that Chinese firms’ prior international experience (e.g. 
greenfield subsidiaries) significantly and positively affect their international product 
diversification activities. To a large extent, this research finding contributes to the 
Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009), revealing that EMNEs also need to 
accumulate some amount of knowledge or experiences before they engage in 
international markets.  
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5.2 Conceptual contributions  
To identify specific home country effects that facilitate CMNEs’ FDI strategies, I 
integrate two traditional firm theories including resource-based view (RBV) and 
institution-based view (IBV). Based on a specific literature view on CMNEs’ outward 
FDI strategies, there are big gaps. These gaps mainly refer to the lack of studies on the 
role of business group affiliation and state ownership types on CMNEs seeking strategic 
assets in what types and properties and undertaking international product diversifica t ion 
via rapid overseas M&As. To this end, my findings may further extend the logic of the 
RBV and the IBV in understanding CMNEs’ FDI strategies. 
 
5.2.1 Resource-based view 
The resource-based view (RBV) suggests “what a firm wants is to create a situation 
where its own resource position directly or indirectly makes it more difficult for others 
to catch up” (Wernerfelt, 1984:173). Barney (1991) further argues that resource 
heterogeneity and immobility are critical assumption that enable us to understand 
sources of sustained competitive advantage.  
 
Business groups are seen as a pool of resources that can facilitate member firms’ 
internationalization (Carney, 2008; Yiu, Bruton and Lu, 2005). Du and Boateng 
(2015:431) state that “the resource-based view literature suggests that one important 
reason for CBM&A [cross-border mergers and acquisitions] is to gain access to 
strategic assets, such as natural resources, product differentiation, patent-protected 
technologies, and superior managerial and marketing skills.” In chapter two, I found 
that Chinese business group affiliated firms with R&D center have a higher likelihood 
of seeking patent-based assets and a greater amount of patent-based assets. Drawing 
from the RBV, it may extend the view that business group affiliation can be seen as a 
unique ‘ownership’ advantage.  
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Moreover, business groups, as an organizational form, have been widely prevalent in 
emerging economies as an alternative to address institutional voids (Carney et al. 2011; 
Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Leff, 1978). This question of ‘how 
do business groups add value?’ has been central to research on business groups. A 
firm’s diversification strategy could be explained as value-added purpose by drawing 
on the RBV (Andersen and Kheam, 1998). The nature of firms’ available resources and 
host countries’ market opportunities may direct a firm’s diversification strategy (Peteraf, 
1993). In short, firms tend to pursue an international product diversification strategy by 
developing new products and expanding new markets when their resource capabilit ies 
reach the target countries’ resource requirements. In Chapter four, my findings showed 
that business group affiliation significantly moderates the relationship between private 
ownership and unrelated international product diversification. 
 
The RBV suggests variations in assets or resources affect outward FDI. However, the 
government involvement interfering with firm resource utilization and then influenc ing 
firms outward FDI is neglected. My findings in chapter four showed that Chinese SOEs 
owned by higher government affiliation levels tend to target developed countries for 
unrelated international product diversification strategy other than developing countries. 
International diversification relatively leads to additional business risks due to exposure 
to uncertain environments (Majocchi and Strange, 2012). As such, governments may 
pose institutional pressure on Chinese SOEs in undertaking international product 
diversification strategies, except for some specific purposes such as strategic natural 
resource reservation. As such, use of IBV may further assist us in understanding and 
explaining the role of state ownership types on CMNEs’ international product 
diversification strategies.  
 
5.2.2 Institution-based view 
The institution-based view (IBV) suggests that national institutions can be regarded as 
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the rules of the game that influence firms’ strategies (North, 1990). Moreover, North 
formally defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction” (1990:3), which contains formal institutions (i.e. laws, regulations) and 
informal institutions (i.e. social customs, norms, cultures). The organizational form of 
business groups is to address the voids that emerging economies lack the effective 
formal and informal institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000). In comparison, 
SOEs’ behaviors or strategies may be more influenced by formal institutions, while 
POEs’ may have to address both formal and informal institutions.  
 
Peng, Wang, and Jiang (2008:923) argued that “it is research on emerging economies 
that has pushed the institution-based view to the cutting edge of strategy research, 
which is becoming the third leg in the strategy ‘tripod’ (the other two legs being 
industry- and resource-based views)”. My findings in chapter three suggested that 
Chinese SOEs owned by a higher government affiliation level were neither attracted by 
target firms’ technology- nor brand-based assets, but by natural resource endowments. 
In contrast, my findings revealed Chinese POEs have a higher likelihood of seeking 
both technology-based and brand-based assets. Related research suggests that Chinese 
SOEs have to follow home country governments’ strategic needs and invest more in 
natural resource sectors, while POEs have more interests on the target market size and 
strategic assets of host countries (Amighini, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo, 2013; Huang 
and Chi, 2014). As they are ‘a part of the home-country institutions, SOEs may carry 
non-commercial objectives driven by the political interests of the state’ (Cui and Jiang, 
2012:268). The IBV suggests that national institutions can be regarded as the rules of 
the game that influence firms’ strategies (North, 1990). Therefore, my findings 
contribute to extending the IBV by investigating the role of state ownership types on 
CMNEs’ FDI strategies.  
 
Furthermore, my findings may enable to extend the IBV by examining the role of 
business group affiliation on CMNEs’ specific SAS FDI strategies. My findings in 
chapter two have shown that business group affiliation significantly facilitates Chinese 
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POEs’ patent-based asset seeking FDI. Group affiliated firms with an R&D centre have 
a higher likelihood of seeking patent-based assets, especially when comparing with 
independent firms. As discussed above, the RBV may better explain the significant role 
played by the business group affiliation on CMNEs’ SAS FDI. A substantial literature 
suggests that business group’s ability lies in addressing institutional voids via interna l 
capital, labour and product markets is often remarked upon (Carney, Essen, Estrin, and 
Shapiro, 2017; Granovetter, 1995; Kedia, Mukherjee, and Lahiri, 2006; Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997; Lee, Peng, and Lee, 2008).  
 
Above all, both the RBV and the IBV should be combined to explain the role of 
business group affiliation and state ownership types on CMNEs’ specific FDI strategies. 
This also suggests that successful EMNEs (including CMNEs) are mostly ambidextrous, 
and exploit institutional complementarities.  
 
5.3 Managerial implications 
The findings provide some important managerial implications for both managers and 
policymakers.  
 
In Study 1, I found that Chinese business group affiliates are positively and significantly 
associated with patent seeking FDI strategies. Many large firms in China are business 
group affiliated. Therefore, this study has important implications for EMNEs’ managers. 
Managers should take full advantage of domestic rapid growth before venturing abroad. 
This research may help managers of DMNEs understand the true antecedents of 
EMNEs’ FDI strategies.  
 
Secondly, study 2 may assist in reminding the government or any other relevant 
institutions to offer Chinese independent firms or POEs more supportive policies if they 
are going to expand into foreign markets and more entrepreneurial guidance if they only 
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want to maintain positions in the domestic markets. This research also has implicat ions 
on further understanding the role of government in emerging economies. Luo (2007) 
stresses that China follows a dual-track approach to operating Chinese market economy 
that keeps certain government controls while liberalizes the former central planning 
mechanism. 
 
In study 3, I found that CMNEs in the construction and public administration sectors 
are more likely to seek unrelated international diversification in developing countries 
only. Also, CMNEs in agriculture and wholesale trade sectors are more likely to seek 
unrelated international diversification in both developed and developing countries. 
These findings may provide CMNEs’ managers more guidance on undertaking foreign 
product diversification strategies in terms of industry factors.  
 
5.4 Limitations and future research  
This research has several limitations that may suggest avenues for future research.  
 
First of all, although business groups are particularly prevalent in emerging economies, 
there are significant differences between them and they are also known by various kinds 
of designations (e.g. ethnic Chinese business groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines,  Thailand, the Chaebol in Korea, Business houses in India, the Hongs in 
Hong Kong, China) (Carney, 2008). In China, the central government initially started 
to form large business groups known as qiye jituan or national team (Nolan, 2001; 
Sutherland, 2009). Afterwards, Chinese business groups have experienced a series of 
reforms including ownership structures and organizational strategies. Thus, this study’s 
findings may be subject to the research generalizations of other emerging economies 
due to differing characteristics of business groups.  
 
Secondly, I focused on all Chinese CBM&As completed between 2006 and 2015. One 
negative factor regarding our methodology is that I used a pooled data set. Since I 
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selected a time period between 2006 and 2015, the impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
in 2008 on CMNEs’ SAS FDI via CBM&As may need for further consideration. As 
such, this might be one research limitation. Moreover, neglecting greenfield FDI might 
lead to a biased finding regarding CMNEs’ SAS FDI by business groups.  
 
Thirdly, scholars suggest that two different dimensions should be considered for 
explaining EMNEs’ state ownership influence, including the percentage of state-owned 
shares and the type of government affiliation (e.g. Li, Cui, and Lu, 2014; Wang et al. 
2012). However, it was difficult to achieve sufficient data about the percentage of state 
ownership, especially for those unlisted POEs.  
 
Fourthly, I have to admit that any cross-level study of firm-level factors which 
collectively determine firms’ international diversification is by no means exhaustive. 
As for the home country effects on international diversification strategy, existing 
studies have also found other factors may determine firms’ diversification strategy, such 
as the CEOs, board composition, and the top management team (Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller 
and Connelly, 2006; Majocchi and Strange, 2012; Ramaswamy, Li, and Petitt, 2004; 
Wan, Hoskisson, Short, and Yiu, 2011), top managers’ prior experiences (Sahaym and 
Nam, 2013), entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics including age, education, and 
managerial experiences (Du, Lu, and Tao, 2015). In future, some more country-leve l 
variables that may affect firms’ international diversification can be added, includ ing 
cultural distance or country-level distances to serve as proxies of the costs of integrat ing 
foreign firms, like Hisey and Caves (1985) did. They employed the U.S.’s FDI stock in 
the target country by its GDP to represent the density of FDI in the host economy. 
 
Fifthly, this study simply selected a single country, China, as research sample. 
Therefore, findings from CMNEs’ FDI strategies via CBM&As may be limited to 
research generalization on other EMNEs. In the future, I would attempt to build a 
comparative study between CMNEs and another EMNEs in exploring their distinct 
OFDI SAS strategies via CBM&As. 
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Appendix 
Chapter 1-Tables and figures 
Figure A1.2.2 FDI stocks (millions of dollars) 1 
 
 
Figure A1.2.3: FDI stocks-BRICS (millions of dollars) 2 
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Chapter 2-Tables and figures 
Table A2.4.2.1: Probit model-NLB assets seeking FDI 1 
Variable Model 1-c Model 2-c Model 3-c Model 4-c Model 5-c  
Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 1.0323*** 1.1053*** 1.1224*** 1.2096*** 1.1653***  
0.1550 0.1618 0.1624 0.2582 0.2450 
BGA 0.4653** 0.6050** 0.1194 0.7652 0.6086**  
0.1728 0.1771 0.2343 0.5384 0.2048 
BG_FIN 
  
-0.0131 
  
   
0.1564 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.6541*** 
  
   
0.1830 
  
STATE -0.3851** -0.3279* -0.4029** 
  
 
0.1333 0.1356 0.1438 
  
LAGE -0.0658 -0.1174 -0.1630 -0.1218 -0.1413  
0.1140 0.1187 0.1235 0.1699 0.1951 
PROFIT 0.0033 0.0037 0.0028 -0.0043 0.0090**  
0.0024 0.0025 0.0026 0.0039 0.0034 
LTASSET -0.0467 -0.0066 0.0055 0.0092 0.0289  
0.0390 0.0430 0.0458 0.0568 0.0957 
LANPAT 0.0655** 0.0576* 0.0554* 0.0091 0.1430**  
0.0220 0.0259 0.0260 0.0350 0.0434 
LANTRADM 0.0617 0.0658 0.0430 0.1221 -0.0216  
0.0631 0.0716 0.0737 0.1156 0.0969 
FEXPE -0.1830 -0.2429+ -0.2417+ -0.4101* -0.0811  
0.1402 0.1410 0.1430 0.2055 0.1980 
PUBLIC 0.0327 -0.0027 0.0312 0.0644 0.0293  
0.1249 0.1295 0.1333 0.1740 0.2330 
OWNTRANS -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0019 0.0008 -0.0061*  
0.0017 0.0018 0.0018 0.0025 0.0027 
lambda_bga -0.0379 -0.1525 -0.1935 -0.0628 -0.9056  
0.4617 0.4825 0.5029 0.7103 0.9593 
HITECH 
 
1.0896*** 1.1214*** 0.9548* 1.0870*   
0.2459 0.2521 0.4124 0.4779 
MEDTEC 
 
0.6574** 0.7386*** 0.5469* 0.6938   
0.1928 0.1997 0.2337 0.4556 
LOWTEC 
 
0.7997** 0.9346** 0.2481 1.0851*   
0.2868 0.2949 0.4761 0.5055 
KNINTEN 
 
0.2626 0.3824 0.2776 0.3514   
0.2330 0.2372 0.2983 0.4812 
LEKNIN 
 
0.2439 0.3572 0.1605 0.2003 
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0.2617 0.2709 0.3385 0.5129 
Constant -0.2629 -1.4581+ -1.6513+ -2.3061 -1.7007  
0.7415 0.8695 0.9096 1.4768 1.5310 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 103.17 139.87 154.86 70.15 87.3 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1382 0.1764 0.193 0.179 0.2326 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-351.3398 -335.77 -328.973 -158.7887 -160.9198 
Mean vif 2.53 2.54 2.57 2.55 2.55 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
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Table A2.4.2.2: Negative binomial regression-NLB assets seeking FDI 2 
Variable Model-6c Model-7c Model-8c Model-9c Model-10c  
Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 2.4407*** 2.6090*** 2.7177*** 4.5216*** 3.6547***  
0.6377 0.6111 0.6351 0.8986 0.5399 
BGA 0.9844 1.9111** -0.0981 7.3402*** 1.8174**  
0.6475 0.6886 0.8698 1.7778 0.5656 
BG_FIN 
  
-1.5591* 
  
   
0.6368 
  
BG_RD 
  
4.3855*** 
  
   
0.7090 
  
STATE -0.3338 -0.6289 -1.2728* 
  
 
0.5982 0.5463 0.5401 
  
LAGE -0.1659 -0.3458 -0.9257+ -2.3749* 0.4032  
0.5434 0.4172 0.5248 0.9714 0.4665 
PROFIT -0.0071 -0.0055 -0.0077 -0.0768** 0.0203*  
0.0103 0.0074 0.0075 0.0230 0.0080 
LTASSET -0.0838 0.0198 0.0350 0.3719* 0.4940*  
0.1422 0.1090 0.1176 0.1704 0.2396 
LANPAT 0.5081*** 0.4034*** 0.4132*** 0.0706 0.6128***  
0.0809 0.0845 0.0845 0.1277 0.0905 
LANTRADM 0.3161 0.5275* 0.2874 0.4712 -0.4584*  
0.2653 0.2355 0.2633 0.5232 0.2337 
FEXPE -0.7657+ -0.7767+ -0.8701+ -4.2918*** 0.1076  
0.4318 0.4132 0.4745 0.8823 0.5501 
PUBLIC -0.4326 -0.4415 -0.3403 -2.6775*** -0.1587  
0.5190 0.4460 0.4906 0.6444 0.5460 
OWNTRANS 0.0047 0.0012 0.0032 -0.0142 -0.0194**  
0.0060 0.0057 0.0060 0.0096 0.0071 
lambda_bga 0.8856 -0.4333 -0.2789 -3.8264 -5.0967*  
2.0320 1.7251 1.8418 2.3720 2.2036 
HITECH 
 
1.5605+ 1.8534* 1.6571 3.4282**   
0.8363 0.8972 1.5200 1.2577 
MEDTEC 
 
1.8130** 1.8221** 2.5230* 3.3148**   
0.6861 0.6971 1.2438 1.1017 
LOWTEC 
 
0.0570 1.5379 1.2552 3.4183*   
0.9684 1.2228 1.6912 1.5344 
KNINTEN 
 
-1.4464* -0.7981 1.5694 0.8000   
0.7351 0.7966 1.5017 1.2213 
LEKNIN 
 
-0.7052 0.2558 -3.4549* 2.8247*   
0.8211 0.9525 1.3604 1.2368 
Constant 0.9072 -1.6003 -0.4362 -3.1552 -10.8350***  
2.5446 2.0642 2.1556 3.6289 3.0387 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
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Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 287.48 459.59 480.53 351.63 516.82 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0499 0.057 0.0626 0.0706 0.1152 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-1251.4955 -1242.1969 -1234.8320 -564.3170 -624.6368 
LR test of alpha=0 
    
Prob>=chibar2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean vif 2.53 2.54 2.57 2.11 3.98 
Voung test of zinb vs standard negative binomial (inflate _cons) 
  
z 2.21 0.7 -0.01 1.14 0.29 
Pr>z 0.0136 0.2423 0.5054 0.1266 0.3863 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
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Table A2.4.2.3: Ivprobit regression model -NLB asset seeking FDI 3 
Models Model 11-
co 
Model 12-
co 
Model 13-
co 
Model 14-co Model 15-co 
Variables Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
SOE POE 
DEVOPED 1.6808*** 1.8339*** 1.8405*** 1.9831*** 1.9060*** 
  0.2231 0.2279 0.2312 0.3512 0.3193 
BGA 0.4203* 0.5450** 0.1110 0.7916 0.5155** 
  0.1678 0.1722 0.2225 0.4877 0.1977 
BG_FIN 
  
0.0793 
  
  
  
0.1516 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.5444** 
  
  
  
0.1785 
  
STATE -0.3612** -0.2917* -0.3680** 
  
  0.1292 0.1318 0.1407 
  
LAGE 0.0088 -0.0345 -0.0756 -0.0345 -0.0989 
  0.1068 0.1115 0.1149 0.1615 0.1781 
PROFIT 0.0043+ 0.0047* 0.0039 -0.0001 0.0082* 
  0.0023 0.0024 0.0025 0.0043 0.0033 
LTASSET -0.0433 0.0033 0.0105 0.0237 0.0567 
  0.0383 0.0422 0.0445 0.0543 0.0963 
LANPAT 0.0471* 0.0407 0.0419+ -0.0023 0.1250** 
  0.0218 0.0249 0.0250 0.0336 0.0409 
LANTRADM 0.0500 0.0453 0.0234 0.0590 -0.0381 
  0.0609 0.0678 0.0696 0.1113 0.0929 
FEXPE -0.2606+ -0.3153* -0.3158* -0.4866* -0.1037 
  0.1366 0.1373 0.1394 0.1973 0.1922 
PUBLIC 0.1234 0.0951 0.1166 0.1816 0.0703 
  0.1212 0.1257 0.1291 0.1714 0.2223 
OWNTRANS -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0025 0.0005 -0.0072** 
  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0024 0.0026 
lambda_bga -0.0604 -0.2215 -0.3079 -0.0190 -1.1011 
  0.4454 0.4655 0.4835 0.6773 0.9359 
HITECH 
 
1.1141*** 1.1558*** 1.2379** 1.0115* 
  
 
0.2404 0.2464 0.3832 0.4600 
MEDTEC 
 
0.6406** 0.7236*** 0.5828* 0.6940 
  
 
0.1872 0.1935 0.2279 0.4372 
LOWTEC 
 
0.8012** 0.9260** 0.3264 1.0688* 
  
 
0.2784 0.2854 0.4573 0.4906 
KNINTEN 
 
0.2714 0.3765+ 0.2949 0.3469 
  
 
0.2228 0.2281 0.2851 0.4628 
LEKNIN 
 
0.4034 0.4964+ 0.3273 0.3882 
  
 
0.2518 0.2596 0.3177 0.4978 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
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Constant -0.7939 -2.1599 -2.2505* -3.3355* -2.4977 
  0.7357 0.8518 0.8833 1.3666 1.5455 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 135.11 192.34 206.63 97.88 123.99 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-602.3468 -575.0917 -567.3948 -293.5716 -247.8606 
Wald test of exogeneity 
chi2 13.41 15.52 14.78 6.95 9.52 
Prob>chi2 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0084 0.002 
Mean vif 2.59 2.59 2.61 2.6 2.6 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 254 
 
Table A2.4.2.4: Instrumental variables (GMM) regression-NLB asset seeking FDI 
4 
Models Model 16-co Model 17-
co 
Model 18-
co 
Model 19-
co 
Model 20-co 
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE POE 
DEVOPED 1.3375*** 1.3255*** 1.2746*** 1.5323*** 1.3108*** 
  0.1954 0.2031 0.2054 0.3886 0.2454 
BGA 0.2937+ 0.3396* 0.0142 0.4442 0.2501 
  0.1587 0.1624 0.1863 0.4451 0.1994 
BG_FIN 
  
0.1743 
  
  
  
0.1889 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.3895** 
  
  
  
0.1187 
  
STATE -0.3831* -0.3374* -0.4115* 
  
  0.1779 0.1791 0.1905 
  
LAGE 0.1574 0.1036 0.0628 -0.0498 0.0915 
  0.1155 0.1150 0.1144 0.1637 0.1672 
PROFIT 0.0022 0.0023 0.0017 -0.0008 0.0027 
  0.0017 0.0018 0.0017 0.0032 0.0024 
LTASSET -0.0420 0.0000 0.0066 0.0134 0.0618 
  0.0366 0.0396 0.0396 0.0570 0.0769 
LANPAT 0.0958** 0.0812** 0.0825** -0.0278 0.2330*** 
  0.0278 0.0311 0.0317 0.0320 0.0627 
LANTRADM 0.0566 0.0648 0.0354 0.2159+ -0.1555 
  0.0781 0.0817 0.0822 0.1310 0.1099 
FEXPE -0.2317 -0.2415 -0.2379 -0.4138+ -0.0460 
  0.1620 0.1625 0.1613 0.2439 0.2204 
PUBLIC -0.0377 -0.0700 -0.0661 0.1148 -0.1764 
  0.1306 0.1290 0.1285 0.1662 0.2207 
OWNTRANS -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0039 
  0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0028 0.0028 
lambda_bga 0.2127 0.0335 -0.0955 0.8233 -0.8323 
  0.4234 0.4271 0.4180 0.7330 0.7219 
HITECH 
 
0.6902** 0.7247** 0.8624+ 0.5471 
  
 
0.2696 0.2678 0.5166 0.3356 
MEDTEC 
 
0.4497** 0.5144** 0.2272 0.5752+ 
  
 
0.1920 0.1938 0.2348 0.3045 
LOWTEC 
 
0.5346** 0.6023** 0.2706 0.9213** 
  
 
0.2202 0.2217 0.2997 0.3299 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0266 0.0997 -0.1237 0.1887 
  
 
0.2010 0.2039 0.2821 0.2966 
LEKNIN 
 
0.2473 0.3169 -0.1593 0.6095+ 
  
 
0.2202 0.2225 0.2705 0.3426 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
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Constant 0.0835 -0.8262 -0.8471 -1.7659 -1.2906 
  0.6902 0.8008 0.7913 1.4426 1.1227 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 76.79 92.85 96.91 38.89 79.44 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0378 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0643 0.0802 0.0921 0.0365 0.1998 
DWH test 
Robust score 
chi2 
25.1705 
(p=0.0000) 
24.7318 
(p=0.0000) 
23.3164 
(p=0.0000) 
11.3396 
(p=0.0008) 
15.1709 
(p=0.0001) 
Robust 
regression F 
25.9097 
(p=0.0000) 
25.3811 
(p=0.0000) 
23.8342 
(p=0.0000) 
11.539 
(p=0.0008) 
14.0118 
(p=0.0002) 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansens J chi2 1.48344 
(p=0.2232) 
1.12461 
(p=0.2889) 
1.21128 
(p=0.2711) 
1.72191 
(p=0.1894) 
0.196803 
(p=0.6573) 
Mean vif 2.59 2.59 2.61 2.6 2.6 
Notes: GMM weight matrix: robust; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline);  
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A2.4.2.5 Marginal effects-NLB assets seeking FDI 5 
  Model 1-co-m Model 2-co-m Model 3-co-
m 
Model 4-co-
m 
Model 5-co-
m 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.1069** 0.1281*** 0.0275 0.1183* 0.1500** 
  0.0354 0.0323 0.0529 0.0557 0.0491 
1.BG_FIN 
  
-0.0031 
  
  
  
0.0369 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.1457*** 
  
  
  
0.0375 
  
  Model 11-co-
m 
Model 12-co-
m 
Model 13-co-
m 
Model 14-co-
m 
Model 15-co-
m 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.4203* 0.5450** 0.1110 0.7916 0.5155** 
  0.1678 0.1721 0.2225 0.4877 0.1977 
1.BG_FIN 
  
0.0793 
  
  
  
0.1516 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.5444** 
  
  
  
0.1785 
  
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
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Table A2.4.3.1: Probit model-LB assets seeking FDI 6 
Variable Model 21-c Model 22-c Model 23-c Model 24-c Model 25-c  
Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 0.7862*** 0.8017*** 0.7864*** 0.5400** 1.1566***  
0.1399 0.1461 0.1482 0.2051 0.2146 
BGA 0.1096 0.1142 -0.1316 -0.4562 0.1944  
0.1618 0.1653 0.2163 0.4763 0.1969 
BG_FIN 
  
0.0266 
  
   
0.1536 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.3343* 
  
   
0.1659 
  
STATE -0.3830** -0.3642** -0.4115** 
  
 
0.1319 0.1320 0.1379 
  
LAGE -0.0637 -0.1205 -0.1499 -0.1901 -0.0833  
0.1055 0.1047 0.1067 0.1559 0.1608 
PROFIT 0.0022 0.0023 0.0019 -0.0042 0.0077*  
0.0020 0.0021 0.0022 0.0036 0.0030 
LTASSET -0.0194 0.0151 0.0223 0.0585 -0.0362  
0.0366 0.0381 0.0391 0.0481 0.0821 
LANPAT 0.0214 0.0146 0.0131 -0.0282 0.0633  
0.0214 0.0253 0.0255 0.0361 0.0421 
LANTRADM 0.1467* 0.1608* 0.1436* 0.1688 0.1727+  
0.0608 0.0658 0.0664 0.1115 0.0897 
FEXPE 0.0358 0.0063 0.0053 -0.1256 0.0610  
0.1346 0.1359 0.1367 0.2030 0.2011 
PUBLIC -0.1546 -0.2259+ -0.2174+ -0.1497 -0.1296  
0.1231 0.1242 0.1263 0.1676 0.2025 
OWNTRANS -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0027+ 0.0015 -0.0091***  
0.0016 0.0017 0.0017 0.0024 0.0026 
lambda_bga -0.0215 -0.0737 -0.1193 0.1142 -0.1986  
0.4485 0.4499 0.4672 0.6865 0.8783 
HITECH 
 
0.4638* 0.4831* -0.1040 1.3869**   
0.2296 0.2333 0.3883 0.4776 
MEDTEC 
 
0.3388+ 0.3762+ 0.1657 1.2063**   
0.1887 0.1941 0.2319 0.4513 
LOWTEC 
 
0.7358** 0.7938** 0.8441* 1.3513**   
0.2730 0.2767 0.3729 0.5131 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0154 0.0730 -0.1211 0.8593+   
0.2222 0.2250 0.2788 0.4788 
LEKNIN 
 
0.0558 0.1203 -0.0568 0.8491+   
0.2427 0.2470 0.3192 0.4853 
Constant -0.5942 -1.3151+ -1.3824+ -1.7783 -0.9469  
0.6599 0.7469 0.7633 1.1841 1.4865 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
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Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 77.65 88.79 89.5 39.92 80.66 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0297 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1085 0.127 0.132 0.1071 0.2024 
Log 
pseudolikelihoo
d 
-381.9862 -374.0608 -371.8929 -176.7923 -177.6011 
Mean vif 2.53 2.54 2.57 2.55 2.55 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
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Table A2.4.3.2: Negative binomial regression-LB assets seeking FDI 7 
Variable Model 26-c Model 27-c Model 28-c Model 29-c Model 30-c  
Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE sample POE sample 
DEVOPED 1.9108*** 1.9007*** 1.9342*** 1.5619** 3.2864***  
0.3422 0.3602 0.3552 0.5449 0.4276 
BGA 0.8102+ 0.2652 -0.1262 -1.1490 0.3920  
0.4200 0.4270 0.5245 1.0194 0.4184 
BG_FIN 
  
0.8269* 
  
   
0.3895 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.2311 
  
   
0.3891 
  
STATE -0.5524 -0.7093* -0.7617* 
  
 
0.3368 0.3195 0.3236 
  
LAGE 0.1294 -0.2352 -0.2829 -0.4410 0.0195  
0.2826 0.2818 0.2864 0.4090 0.3220 
PROFIT 0.0090 0.0095+ 0.0075 -0.0038 0.0117  
0.0059 0.0056 0.0057 0.0129 0.0092 
LTASSET 0.0268 0.0474 0.0416 0.1678 0.2051  
0.1077 0.1073 0.1091 0.1339 0.1722 
LANPAT 0.1405* 0.1230* 0.1367* -0.0736 0.3661***  
0.0590 0.0616 0.0621 0.0845 0.0794 
LANTRADM 0.0562 0.2512 0.1702 0.8409*** -0.3357+  
0.1618 0.1686 0.1713 0.2106 0.1937 
FEXPE -0.3558 -0.1718 -0.3249 -1.1423* -0.2210  
0.3312 0.3273 0.3204 0.4641 0.4059 
PUBLIC -0.0531 -0.5780+ -0.6732* -0.2649 -0.8686+  
0.3004 0.2958 0.3025 0.4542 0.4769 
OWNTRANS -0.0015 -0.0044 -0.0044 0.0046 -0.0155**  
0.0041 0.0039 0.0040 0.0057 0.0050 
lambda_bga 1.5029 1.8265 1.1038 1.9213 -1.5394  
1.2345 1.2078 1.2310 1.7586 1.7995 
HITECH 
 
-0.4590 -0.3318 -2.3488* 3.4783**   
0.5845 0.5851 0.9676 1.0156 
MEDTEC 
 
0.0966 0.2739 -0.4065 2.8943**   
0.5780 0.5901 0.8338 0.9518 
LOWTEC 
 
1.6683* 1.9586** 1.2321 5.1832***   
0.6997 0.7194 1.0414 1.1184 
KNINTEN 
 
-0.5155 -0.3916 -1.2653+ 2.4149*   
0.5749 0.5772 0.7452 0.9981 
LEKNIN 
 
-1.3063* -1.1927+ -2.9151*** 3.7256**   
0.6039 0.6128 0.8169 1.0862 
Constant -3.6650+ -2.6111 -2.1607 -4.6125 -4.7061  
2.0044 2.0131 2.0362 3.3170 2.4937 
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Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 780 780 780 417 363 
Wald chi2 152.14 180.53 189.87 149.2 178.67 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0365 0.0435 0.0447 0.0482 0.0861 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-1077.9096 -1070.0524 -1068.7398 -472.6961 -561.4342 
LR test of alpha=0 
Prob>=chibar2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean vif 2.53 2.54 2.57 2.11 3.98 
Voung test of zinb vs standard negative binomial (inflate _cons) 
z -1.05 -1.38 -2.5 0.98 -0.9 
Pr>z 0.8527 0.9167 0.9938 0.163 0.8161 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
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Table A2.4.3.3: Ivprobit regression model-LB assets seeking FDI 8 
Models Model 31-co Model 32-co Model 33-
co 
Model 34-
co 
Model 35-co 
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
DEVOPED 1.3758*** 1.4426*** 1.4302*** 1.2023** 1.8607*** 
  0.2233 0.2242 0.2271 0.3734 0.2575 
BGA 0.0829 0.0779 -0.1511 -0.3741 0.1221 
  0.1550 0.1609 0.2118 0.4359 0.1926 
BG_FIN 
  
0.1018 
  
  
  
0.1479 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.2741 
  
  
  
0.1669 
  
STATE -0.3670** -0.3375** -0.3886** 
  
  0.1280 0.1283 0.1335 
  
LAGE -0.0019 -0.0561 -0.0823 -0.1187 -0.0800 
  0.1053 0.1043 0.1059 0.1547 0.1591 
PROFIT 0.0030 0.0031 0.0027 -0.0010 0.0068* 
  0.0021 0.0021 0.0022 0.0041 0.0029 
LTASSET -0.0191 0.0202 0.0241 0.0613 0.0010 
  0.0373 0.0388 0.0397 0.0480 0.0805 
LANPAT 0.0082 0.0046 0.0052 -0.0358 0.0571 
  0.0215 0.0248 0.0250 0.0351 0.0406 
LANTRADM 0.1315* 0.1356* 0.1191+ 0.1229 0.1334 
  0.0601 0.0642 0.0645 0.1104 0.0860 
FEXPE -0.0347 -0.0668 -0.0712 -0.1826 0.0123 
  0.1331 0.1334 0.1344 0.1995 0.1923 
PUBLIC -0.0716 -0.1361 -0.1333 -0.0485 -0.0937 
  0.1231 0.1246 0.1261 0.1723 0.1945 
OWNTRANS -0.0028+ -0.0027+ -0.0028+ 0.0015 -0.0093*** 
  0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0024 0.0025 
lambda_bga -0.0165 -0.0947 -0.1780 0.2531 -0.4920 
  0.4443 0.4488 0.4627 0.6735 0.8518 
HITECH 
 
0.5090* 0.5351* 0.1552 1.3166** 
  
 
0.2259 0.2290 0.3817 0.4680 
MEDTEC 
 
0.3467+ 0.3875* 0.2109 1.1914** 
  
 
0.1868 0.1916 0.2249 0.4409 
LOWTEC 
 
0.7780** 0.8333** 0.9258* 1.3485** 
  
 
0.2735 0.2765 0.3733 0.5057 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0426 0.0920 -0.0898 0.8545+ 
  
 
0.2196 0.2225 0.2789 0.4671 
LEKNIN 
 
0.2059 0.2566 0.0695 1.0141* 
  
 
0.2425 0.2457 0.3114 0.4821 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -1.0416 -1.8969* -1.8975* -2.6251* -1.8727 
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  0.6717 0.7509 0.7623 1.1764 1.4438 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 93.64 112.6 112.57 52.89 112.89 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-633.6701 -614.39024 -610.85994 -
311.74059 
-265.07421 
Wald test of exogeneity 
chi2 10.14 11.63 11.39 4.48 11 
Prob>chi2 0.0015 0.0006 0.0007 0.0342 0.0009 
Mean vif 2.59 2.59 2.61 2.6 2.6 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
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Table A2.4.3.4: Instrumental variables (GMM) regression-LB asset seeking FDI 9 
Models Model 36-co Model 37-co Model 38-co Model 39-co Model 40-
co 
Variables Full sample Full sample Full sample SOE POE 
DEVOPED 0.8395*** 0.8751*** 0.8594*** 0.8022** 1.0356*** 
  0.1546 0.1550 0.1585 0.2725 0.1875 
BGA 0.1299 0.1143 -0.0445 0.0530 0.1229 
  0.1165 0.1197 0.1467 0.2868 0.1488 
BG_FIN 
  
0.1569 
  
  
  
0.1135 
  
BG_RD 
  
0.1551 
  
  
  
0.1133 
  
STATE -0.2922* -0.2756* -0.3190** 
  
  0.1176 0.1154 0.1176 
  
LAGE 0.0626 0.0201 0.0008 -0.0635 0.0225 
  0.0782 0.0747 0.0750 0.1001 0.1218 
PROFIT 0.0011 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0017 0.0011 
  0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0025 0.0016 
LTASSET -0.0123 0.0097 0.0110 0.0125 0.0058 
  0.0250 0.0248 0.0245 0.0297 0.0548 
LANPAT 0.0148 0.0203 0.0224 -0.0350 0.0997** 
  0.0187 0.0206 0.0209 0.0239 0.0367 
LANTRADM 0.0980* 0.0829 0.0669 0.2057* -0.0553 
  0.0499 0.0509 0.0509 0.0811 0.0649 
FEXPE -0.0783 -0.1055 -0.1066 -0.1417 -0.0597 
  0.1000 0.1000 0.1004 0.1371 0.1515 
PUBLIC -0.0385 -0.0766 -0.0796 0.0303 -0.0897 
  0.0962 0.0939 0.0937 0.1218 0.1603 
OWNTRANS -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0052* 
  0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0022 
lambda_bga 0.2437 0.2637 0.1568 0.6265 0.0755 
  0.3104 0.3050 0.3016 0.4608 0.5557 
HITECH 
 
0.3231* 0.3463* 0.0790 0.4684+ 
  
 
0.1648 0.1664 0.2617 0.2707 
MEDTEC 
 
0.1435 0.1811 -0.0209 0.4131+ 
  
 
0.1215 0.1249 0.1357 0.2377 
LOWTEC 
 
0.6926** 0.7261** 0.7336** 0.8026* 
  
 
0.2201 0.2202 0.2780 0.3208 
KNINTEN 
 
0.0798 0.1129 -0.0210 0.3204 
  
 
0.1324 0.1373 0.1709 0.2391 
LEKNIN 
 
0.1379 0.1646 -0.1395 0.5062* 
  
 
0.1428 0.1458 0.1591 0.2587 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.0300 -0.5394 -0.5021 -0.8872 -0.2295 
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  0.4446 0.4974 0.4912 0.8045 0.9224 
Observations 776 776 776 413 363 
Wald chi2 71.14 87.45 88.79 45.5 82.64 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 
R-squared 0.0606 0.0751 0.0809 0.0506 0.1576 
DWH test 
Robust score 
chi2 
15.7825 
(p=0.0001) 
16.6154 
(p=0.0000) 
15.6076 
(p=0.0001) 
8.1054 
(p=0.0044) 
9.57814 
(p=0.0020) 
Robust 
regression F 
16.9935 
(p=0.0000) 
18.1478 
(p=0.0000) 
16.8906 
(p=0.0000) 
8.7598 
(p=0.0033) 
9.15662 
(p=0.0027) 
Test of overidentifying restriction: 
Hansens J chi2 2.51337 
(p=0.1129) 
2.07165 
(p=0.1501) 
2.22093 
(p=0.1362) 
1.03344 
(p=0.3094) 
0.227289 
(p=0.6335) 
Mean vif 2.59 2.59 2.61 2.6 2.6 
Notes: GMM weight matrix: robust; Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); 
+p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table A2.4.3.5 Marginal effects-LB assets seeking FDI 10 
  Model 21-co-
m 
Model 22-co-
m 
Model 23-co-
m 
Model 24-co-
m 
Model 25-co-
m 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.0297 0.0302 -0.0362 -0.1256 0.0536 
  0.0428 0.0427 0.0607 0.1481 0.0538 
1.BG_FIN 
  
0.0071 
  
  
  
0.0412 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.0876* 
  
  
  
0.0417 
  
  Model 31-co-
m 
Model 32-co-
m 
Model 33-co-
m 
Model 34-co-
m 
Model 35-co-
m 
  Full sample Full sample Full sample SOEs POEs 
1.BGA 0.0829 0.0779 -0.1511 -0.3741 0.1221 
  0.1550 0.1609 0.2118 0.4359 0.1926 
1.BG_FIN 
  
0.1018 
  
  
  
0.1479 
  
1.BG_RD 
  
0.2741 
  
  
  
0.1669 
  
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.0001 
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Chapter 4-Tables and figures 
Table A4.4.2.1 Ordered probit regression models 1 
Variable Model 1-co Model 2-co Model 3-co Model 4-co Model 5-
co 
Model 6-
co 
Model 7-co Model 8-co Model 9-co Model 10-
co  
World World World World Devoped 
markets 
Devoped 
markets 
Devoped 
markets 
Devoping 
markets 
Devoping 
markets 
Devoping 
markets 
Homediv_de~e 0.1040** 0.0895* 0.0868* 0.0817* 0.1233** 0.1323** 0.1145** 0.0037 -0.0202 -0.0159  
0.0347 0.0364 0.0366 0.0368 0.0429 0.0432 0.0437 0.0757 0.0771 0.0766 
PRIVATE -0.2551* -0.3933** -1.4561* 
 
-0.5311** -1.4485* 
 
-0.2495 -5.1838*** 
 
 
0.1152 0.1283 0.6168 
 
0.1569 0.6498 
 
0.2712 0.6109 
 
BGA -0.1093 -0.1731 -1.6122* -0.1500 -0.1965 -1.3727* -0.1552 -0.3031 -5.9784*** -0.2925  
0.1494 0.1542 0.6331 0.1550 0.1865 0.6728 0.1873 0.3144 0.6184 0.3175 
BG_FIN 
  
0.0512 
  
-0.1343 
  
0.1192 
 
   
0.1269 
  
0.1542 
  
0.3231 
 
BG_RD 
  
0.4509** 
  
0.4106* 
  
0.7322** 
 
   
0.1403 
  
0.1726 
  
0.2804 
 
PRIVATE_BG 
  
1.1922+ 
  
1.0032 
  
5.1557*** 
 
   
0.6296 
  
0.6705 
  
0.6448 
 
CENG 
   
0.5532** 
  
0.7709*** 
  
0.4183     
0.1602 
  
0.1995 
  
0.3249 
PROG 
   
0.5074* 
  
0.5919* 
  
0.3214     
0.2167 
  
0.2611 
  
0.5280 
CITYG 
   
0.2218 
  
0.3470* 
  
-0.0467 
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0.1349 
  
0.1588 
  
0.3421 
LAGE -0.1718+ -0.1677+ -0.1702+ -0.1564 -0.1351 -0.1410 -0.1335 -0.3246+ -0.3264+ -0.2906  
0.0946 0.0943 0.0953 0.0958 0.1138 0.1150 0.1155 0.1894 0.1959 0.1953 
PROFIT 0.0034+ 0.0028 0.0026 0.0028 0.0043 0.0044 0.0041 0.0008 0.0012 0.0010  
0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0037 0.0039 0.0038 
LTASSET 0.0326 -0.0109 -0.0053 -0.0239 0.0064 0.0163 -0.0142 -0.0646 -0.0479 -0.0692  
0.0352 0.0382 0.0382 0.0391 0.0483 0.0478 0.0512 0.0685 0.0697 0.0677 
LANPAT -0.0746*** -0.0289 -0.0388+ -0.0282 -0.0442+ -0.0550* -0.0410 0.0108 -0.0076 0.0165  
0.0197 0.0211 0.0212 0.0219 0.0248 0.0250 0.0261 0.0459 0.0486 0.0460 
LANTRADM 0.0135 -0.0068 -0.0100 0.0057 0.0557 0.0625 0.0723 -0.1700 -0.1836 -0.1782  
0.0581 0.0590 0.0602 0.0610 0.0710 0.0729 0.0740 0.1411 0.1474 0.1482 
FEXPE 0.1791 0.2412* 0.2406* 0.2246* 0.2424+ 0.2470+ 0.2206 0.3763 0.3753 0.3473  
0.1099 0.1117 0.1118 0.1123 0.1344 0.1335 0.1358 0.2446 0.2457 0.2523 
PUBLIC -0.0132 -0.0304 0.0196 0.0004 0.0432 0.0886 0.1013 -0.3720 -0.2862 -0.3774  
0.1044 0.1077 0.1094 0.1097 0.1308 0.1328 0.1341 0.2437 0.2475 0.2500 
OWNTRANS -0.0041** -0.0035* -0.0038* -0.0034* -0.0031+ -0.0035+ -0.0030 -0.0067* -0.0064+ -0.0066+  
0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034 
lambda_bga -0.2767 -0.2781 -0.3556 -0.2954 -0.2731 -0.2836 -0.3087 0.2044 0.2898 0.1574  
0.3342 0.3428 0.3584 0.3434 0.4320 0.4538 0.4337 0.6661 0.6806 0.6726 
Agriculture 
 
0.9893+ 1.0404+ 0.9333+ 1.0796 1.0370 1.0264 1.7167* 1.8833* 1.6419+   
0.5425 0.5466 0.5384 0.7037 0.7165 0.7072 0.8722 0.8544 0.8522 
Construction 
 
0.8520 1.0754 0.8194 0.4368 0.4921 0.2638 4.3941*** 4.9131*** 4.8325***   
0.8007 0.7373 0.8125 0.9463 0.8839 0.9919 0.6210 0.6477 0.7263 
Finance 
 
0.9785*** 0.9719*** 0.9868*** 0.8015* 0.7917* 0.7674* 1.3462** 1.3113** 1.4056**   
0.2458 0.2446 0.2483 0.3133 0.3140 0.3193 0.4264 0.4413 0.4194 
Manufactur~g 
 
-0.0406 -0.1441 -0.0319 -0.3643 -0.4895+ -0.3953 0.6223 0.4875 0.6542 
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0.2196 0.2257 0.2193 0.2702 0.2854 0.2734 0.4111 0.4276 0.4027 
Mining 
 
-0.5747* -0.5621* -0.5971* -0.7394* -0.7193* -0.8070** -0.6625 -0.7354 -0.6459   
0.2432 0.2461 0.2428 0.3007 0.3092 0.3029 0.4986 0.4990 0.5105 
PublicAdm 
 
0.6520 0.6701 0.7148 0.0972 -0.0410 0.0045 4.8910*** 5.3522*** 5.2754***   
0.6545 0.6864 0.6635 0.9025 0.9300 0.9020 0.5136 0.5890 0.6373 
WholesaleT~e 
 
0.9938** 0.9637** 0.9786** 0.9109* 0.8715+ 0.8394+ 0.9725 0.7962 1.0464   
0.3552 0.3607 0.3549 0.4449 0.4555 0.4549 0.6952 0.6922 0.6543 
Service 
 
-0.6291* -0.6925* -0.6221* -1.1665** -1.2478** -1.2179*** 0.2098 -0.0708 0.3233   
0.2897 0.2953 0.2909 0.3454 0.3597 0.3492 0.5549 0.5838 0.5678 
RetailT 
 
0.9309* 0.9302* 0.8980* 0.3199 0.2604 0.2035 1.9827** 1.9524* 2.0358**   
0.4383 0.4511 0.4411 0.5877 0.6004 0.5973 0.7208 0.7683 0.7157 
cut1_cons -0.7816 -1.8025 -2.7968 -1.5615 -1.2420 -2.0354 -1.0313 -3.5427 -8.0713 -3.2313  
0.6641 0.7694 0.9649 0.7487 0.9437 1.1169 0.9341 1.5917 1.6579 1.5447 
cut2_cons -0.4864 -1.4726 -2.4629 -1.2315 -0.8052 -1.5942 -0.5932 -3.4703 -7.9967 -3.1587  
0.6662 0.7686 0.9637 0.7481 0.9420 1.1146 0.9329 1.5898 1.6555 1.5423 
cut3_cons -0.2322 -1.1765 -2.1611 -0.9335 -0.4917 -1.2746 -0.2771 -3.1605 -7.6737 -2.8471  
0.6676 0.7704 0.9639 0.7495 0.9451 1.1158 0.9354 1.5849 1.6504 1.5386 
Year control Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 723 723 723 723 529 529 529 194 194 194 
Wald chi2 62.05 185.92 211.39 187.21 154.75 188.95 152.6 1348.98 1350.24 1210.55 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0391 0.1123 0.1206 0.1152 0.1342 0.141 0.1385 0.1576 0.178 0.1609 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-829.6262 -766.4263 -759.3338 -764.0039 -565.9468 -561.4908 -563.1183 -162.2105 -158.2706 -161.5718 
Mean vif 2.51 2.46 4.1 2.44 2.78 4.1 2.44 2.46 4.1 2.44 
Notes: Robust standard error (italic); coefficient (underline); +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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